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A Southern Rail train split in two as it departed London Bridge station sparking further chaos for commuters who have already been blighted by delays all day.

The train was leaving the major commuter hub on Friday afternoon when the middle carriages of the eight-car train separated, the rail operator said.

Passengers were told to avoid London Bridge station and find another route home after the train split in two as it pulled away from the platform.

Govia Thameslink Railway, which runs the Southern train, said the brakes immediately kicked in and that no-one was injured.

The train was leaving for Tattenham Corner at 3.50pm when the carriages broke away from one another and were left 10 feet apart.

From the Evening Standard (https://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/london-bridge-delays-southern-rail-train-splits-in-two-as-it-departs-station-sparking-more-chaos-a3714501.html):


Despite that news, there were not many subsequent cancellations and those were not for that route. Most of those I can see are for e.g. Brighton or Horsham, explained as: "This service was cancelled between London Bridge and New Cross Gate due to a mishap (TY)." That code in full is "Mishap‐Train Operating Company cause". That's one way of putting it.

The earlier delays were due to a signalling power failure at Gatwick.

Investigation into passenger detrainment onto electrically live line, Peckham Rye, 7 November 2017.

(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/69789/s300_Peckham_Rye.jpg)
Image from the on-train CCTV, showing Peckham Rye station platform ahead of where the train had stopped. The third rail is initially on the right and then on the left. (image courtesy of Arriva Rail London)

At 18:46 hrs on Tuesday 7 November, an Arriva Rail London (London Overground) service from Dalston Junction to Battersea Park came to a stand, shortly before reaching Peckham Rye station. A faulty component on the train had caused the brakes to apply, and the driver was unable to release them. There were about 450 passengers on the train.

The train driver spoke over the train radio system with the service controller, train technicians, and the signaller. Following these conversations he began, with the assistance of staff from Peckham Rye station, to evacuate the passengers from the train via the door at the right-hand side of the driver’s cab at the front of the train. This involved passengers climbing down vertical steps to ground level, very close to the live electric conductor rail (3rd rail) and walking along the side of the line about 30 metres to Peckham Rye station.

Soon afterwards, an operations manager from GTR (which manages Peckham Rye station) contacted station staff and realised they were at the side of the electrically energised track assisting in the evacuation, and that about 80 passengers had already left the train by this route. The operations manager immediately instructed staff to stop the evacuation, and requested that the train driver contact the signaller and his company’s controller for further instructions.

The driver, with further advice from train technicians, then isolated various safety systems which enabled him to release the brakes and move the train forward into Peckham Rye station, arriving at about 19:40 hrs. It was then possible for all the passengers to leave the train normally, and it proceeded, empty, to the depot at New Cross Gate. No-one was hurt in the incident.

Examples of non-compliance with documented processes and principles include:

• The signaller was not notified that the train was stranded before the decision had already been made by ARL strategic command to detrain the passengers (which the train driver interpreted as an instruction to evacuate the train in its current position);
  
• Even after the signaller became aware of the planned evacuation no effective command of the incident was established to oversee the arrangements needed to carry out the evacuation in safety;
  
• The driver was offered neither advice about the need to protect the site nor support to establish safe conditions to enable safe evacuation; and Network Rail neither communicated with ARL strategic command to confirm which organisation was leading in the management of the incident nor established an Incident Response Commander.

Does this and other incidents of this nature hignlight the unions attitude for keeping guards/second safety trained person on a train. At least in this case two heads would probably have been better than one in asking the / seeking the answer to the question of "IS THE POWER TO THE THIRD RAIL OFF ? ".

And then repeat back again so that both parties understand correctly.