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Title: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: bobm on February 28, 2013, 08:24:59 Significant problems for FGW this morning following a power failure at Swindon Panel. No signalling between Didcot Parkway and Bristol Parkway/Bath Spa. Also affecting the line to Gloucester from Swindon and the line through Melksham.
It all went dark at 07:20. Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: ChrisB on February 28, 2013, 09:04:33 You'd think they'd have a back-up generator?....
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: bobm on February 28, 2013, 09:06:05 They do - it failed to cut in.
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: ChrisB on February 28, 2013, 09:25:03 <splutter>
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: bobm on February 28, 2013, 09:31:01 Trains on the move again - just seen one making its way out of Swindon towards Chippenham. Another just arriving from the west.
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: IndustryInsider on February 28, 2013, 11:49:32 They do - it failed to cut in. The number of times these back-up generators fail to work must be quite high! Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: Brucey on February 28, 2013, 11:52:00 I saw the advice given on Twitter this morning was along the lines of "Virgin will accept tickets between Euston and Birmingham NS and CrossCountry will accept tickets between Birmingham NS and Bristol". That would've been a rather long way round.
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: ellendune on February 28, 2013, 18:40:13 I was just clearing the ice off my windscreen when the tweet came through. I was planning to catch the 08:11.
Well done FGW for the tweet as this allowed me to re-plan as I was supposed to be in a meeting in London at 10:00. I drove to Didcot arriving at about 8:50 missed one train coming from the west, but got onto the platform in time to catch the 07:29 (07:11 ex Swindon) which arrived at Didcot at 08:53 after being stuck for some time between Swindon and Didcot. Arrived at my meeting at 10:15 so not too bad. Question: If it was Swindon Panel that failed it must have been pretty near the boundary with TVSC (nr Challow) at 07:20 and the earlier train I saw was presumably the 07:01 - which must have been even nearer Challow at 07:20. So were these the first trains through after the failure? Or did the failure cause problems at TVSC also? Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: JayMac on February 28, 2013, 19:04:00 Were there any arrangements made to hand signal services at greatly reduced speed or was it a case of 'all stop' until someone had put 50p in the meter at Swindon Panel?
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: Louis94 on February 28, 2013, 19:21:44 Were there any arrangements made to hand signal services at greatly reduced speed or was it a case of 'all stop' until someone had put 50p in the meter at Swindon Panel? Staff were sent out to clip points and switch in overrides to allow services to move - of course this was a slow process. 1L14 was trapped in section just west of Wootton Bassett Jun towards Bristol Parkway (0527 Swansea-Paddington) 1A05 was trapped in section just west of Wootton Bassett Jun towards Chippenham (0640 Bristol TM-Paddington) 1A04 was trapped in section at South Marston (0630 Bristol TM-Paddington) 1A04 was allowed to continue once override switches has been switched in between Swindon and Didcot, this then formed the delayed 0729 from Didcot as the previous poster said, and it was the first train through the area. The 0701 ex Swindon made it through the area without a hitch, and I am not sure what was in the platform before 1A04 arrived, maybe an HST that had terminated at Didcot and was returning east. EDIT: The service the previous poster saw in platform 2 before the delayed 0729 arrived was an additional service 1Z24 which started at Didcot booked to depart at 0847 for Reading and Paddington Only. 1A05 had points clipped at Rushey Platt and Swindon station to allow it to get into the platforms at Swindon. 1L14 was returned to Bristol Parkway upon the operation of the override switches between Bristol Parkway and Swindon. Furthermore, 1A06 between Bath and Chippenham changing ends and returning to Bath (0620 Weston-Paddington) 2M11 on Melksham single line changing ends and diverted via Bristol upon arriving and reversing at Bradford Junction (0704 Westbury-Gloucester) 1L16 between Stroud and Kemble moving in to Kemble Station (0631 Cheltenham-Paddington) Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: Electric train on February 28, 2013, 19:49:36 They do - it failed to cut in. The number of times these back-up generators fail to work must be quite high! That's a little unfair, they are at the end of the day a mechanical device that sits dormant for 99% of its life and is expected to spring into life instantly which in my experience they usually do. The Western standby set used to have a full "black" start test every 3 months (black start = mains fail) that is walk up to the mains switch and turn it off I used to earn a lot of overtime doing just that Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: bobm on February 28, 2013, 19:53:29 From talking to a member of staff I saw today I was told it wasn't the actual generator which failed but rather the switchgear which tells the unit to fire up which did not operate as designed.
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: SandTEngineer on February 28, 2013, 20:10:24 As ET states above. My past experience of the standby generators and associated changeover switchgear in the signalboxes in the far South West is that they are extremely reliable (and as his says are tested from a 'black out' start every three months). So the failure must have been quite an catastrophic event...... :( :( :'(
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: ellendune on February 28, 2013, 21:38:53 They do - it failed to cut in. The number of times these back-up generators fail to work must be quite high! That's a little unfair, they are at the end of the day a mechanical device that sits dormant for 99% of its life and is expected to spring into life instantly which in my experience they usually do. The Western standby set used to have a full "black" start test every 3 months (black start = mains fail) that is walk up to the mains switch and turn it off I used to earn a lot of overtime doing just that This is a known problem with all back up generators. I have worked with them in many places and even doing a test run once a week does not solve this problem. Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: inspector_blakey on February 28, 2013, 22:37:26 1A04 was allowed to continue once override switches has been switched in between Swindon and Didcot I may know a little more about signalling than your average man in the street but I'm a bit mystified by these overrides of which you speak - can you elaborate? Are you talking about manually keying the automatic signals back to danger and allowing trains to pass using handsignallers, or of a method of operation that I've apparently never heard of? Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: thetrout on February 28, 2013, 23:35:36 2M11 on Melksham single line changing ends and diverted via Bristol upon arriving and reversing at Bradford Junction (0704 Westbury-Gloucester) Did that service actually reverse at Bradford Junction? I wouldn't have thought that would be possible as most moves such as this would be done at Westbury where the platforms are bidirectional. Of course am happy to be corrected... Just didn't think that was possible and even allowed...? For the second time today, another prime example of the Melksham - Bradford-on-Avon part of the Bradford Junction Triangle... >:( Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: rogerw on March 01, 2013, 13:29:06 Quite possible to reversse at Bradford Junction. It is a fully signalled move.
Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: Louis94 on March 01, 2013, 22:18:32 1A04 was allowed to continue once override switches has been switched in between Swindon and Didcot I may know a little more about signalling than your average man in the street but I'm a bit mystified by these overrides of which you speak - can you elaborate? Are you talking about manually keying the automatic signals back to danger and allowing trains to pass using handsignallers, or of a method of operation that I've apparently never heard of? If I am entirely honest I am not 100% sure myself! All I know is that these switches control a far bigger area than a just one signal. All I can imagine is that they allow on the ground staff to control a trains without the signal box - if anyone does know there function I would be very interested! Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: swrural on March 02, 2013, 12:42:09 Quite possible to reversse at Bradford Junction. It is a fully signalled move. Ah, that was what I was asking the other day (the mythical main line 'Lacock' bridge incident with the river flowing under it ;D remember) and I was given the impression one had to take the HST to Westbury. So the triangle completed woould be dead handy as a permanent feature (not just for electrification, although needing thunderbird engines at Chippenham and Bathampton, I suppose) but it could be managed already, interesting. Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: SandTEngineer on March 02, 2013, 12:58:53 1A04 was allowed to continue once override switches has been switched in between Swindon and Didcot I may know a little more about signalling than your average man in the street but I'm a bit mystified by these overrides of which you speak - can you elaborate? Are you talking about manually keying the automatic signals back to danger and allowing trains to pass using handsignallers, or of a method of operation that I've apparently never heard of? If I am entirely honest I am not 100% sure myself! All I know is that these switches control a far bigger area than a just one signal. All I can imagine is that they allow on the ground staff to control a trains without the signal box - if anyone does know there function I would be very interested! The local overides (quite a new facility on the Western) as opposed to remote overides worked from the relevant signalbox panel, put the signalling into what is called 'Through Routes' mode. All of the principal running lines controlled interlocking signals are set up for the main running movements and they then work automatically without signaller intervention. All remote interlockings at panel signalboxes have some form of 'Overide' that will set and put 'Through Routes' into operation. Some panels also have 'Selective' overide. This can be used to select key routes at critical junctions. Although all of these remote panel overides are usually sufficient and are battery backed up, these are no good if the signalbox panel gets blacked out (which is an extremely rare event). Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: ellendune on March 02, 2013, 13:38:23 The local overides (quite a new facility on the Western) as opposed to remote overides worked from the relevant signalbox panel, put the signalling into what is called 'Through Routes' mode. All of the principal running lines controlled interlocking signals are set up for the main running movements and they then work automatically without signaller intervention. All remote interlockings at panel signalboxes have some form of 'Overide' that will set and put 'Through Routes' into operation. Some panels also have 'Selective' overide. This can be used to select key routes at critical junctions. Although all of these remote panel overides are usually sufficient and are battery backed up, these are no good if the signalbox panel gets blacked out. So do these local overides basically allow some box by the side of the line somewhere to work automatically? And I suppose that means someone actually going there to press the button? If the panle had not blacked out could the panel have done this remotely? Title: Re: Morning Peak hour disruption - 28 Feb 13 Post by: SandTEngineer on March 02, 2013, 13:44:27 The local overides (quite a new facility on the Western) as opposed to remote overides worked from the relevant signalbox panel, put the signalling into what is called 'Through Routes' mode. All of the principal running lines controlled interlocking signals are set up for the main running movements and they then work automatically without signaller intervention. All remote interlockings at panel signalboxes have some form of 'Overide' that will set and put 'Through Routes' into operation. Some panels also have 'Selective' overide. This can be used to select key routes at critical junctions. Although all of these remote panel overides are usually sufficient and are battery backed up, these are no good if the signalbox panel gets blacked out. So do these local overides basically allow some box by the side of the line somewhere to work automatically? And I suppose that means someone actually going there to press the button? If the panel had not blacked out could the panel have done this remotely? The switches are located where only authorised railway staff can access them (I'm obviously not going to tell you where). Somebody has to go to the site (that is why they are called 'Local Overide Switches' ::) ) If the panel had not been blacked out but the remote control had been lost then the signaller could have introduced it. Title: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: Chris from Nailsea on April 28, 2013, 16:29:38 From the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-22306918):
Quote West Sussex fire alert leads to train passenger delays Rail passengers have been facing delays after a fire alarm led to the evacuation of a railway signal centre. Emergency services cleared Three Bridges station in Crawley, West Sussex, after fire alarms were sounded on Friday morning. Southern services between Brighton and Horsham via East Croydon and First Capital Connect trains between Brighton and East Croydon are disrupted. First Great Western trains between Gatwick and Redhill are also delayed. The train firms have warned passengers to expect delays and some cancellations until about 16:00 BST. In a statement, Southern said: "Train services across the Southern network are currently disrupted due to an earlier fire alarm activation in the Three Bridges signalling centre, resulting in the main signalling centre being evacuated. Delays of up to 45 minutes can be expected. Services will remain subject to short notice alteration, delay or cancellations this afternoon." RMT General Secretary Bob Crow praised staff for the "exemplary fashion" in which they carried out the emergency procedures but said he thought plans to centralise signalling operations could lead to worse disruption in future. He added: "RMT now awaits an inquiry into the full facts behind the incident and the evacuation and the union expects to play a full role in the investigation and the drawing up of any conclusions and recommendations. However, RMT believes that this morning's incident shines the spotlight on plans to centralise signalling operations into 14 regional centres, a move that clearly throws up real risks of putting all the eggs in one basket with the obvious problem of a whole region going down if a centre is taken out of action." A spokesman for Network Rail said: "The investment we're making to upgrade Britain's railway signalling systems will mean that incidents like this morning's fire alarm at our Three Bridges control room will have significantly less impact on the travelling public in future. Currently, a number of different signalling systems are used across Britain's railway, meaning that if a problem occurs at a control room our options are extremely limited. Our new rail operating centres will all use a single system, meaning control of a section of railway can quickly and easily be transferred to another centre if needed." Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: SandTEngineer on April 28, 2013, 17:11:59 From the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-22306918): Quote A spokesman for Network Rail said: "The investment we're making to upgrade Britain's railway signalling systems will mean that incidents like this morning's fire alarm at our Three Bridges control room will have significantly less impact on the travelling public in future. Currently, a number of different signalling systems are used across Britain's railway, meaning that if a problem occurs at a control room our options are extremely limited. Our new rail operating centres will all use a single system, meaning control of a section of railway can quickly and easily be transferred to another centre if needed." ...so NR are going to train all of its staff at the Railway Operation Centres to work a bit of the railway anywhere in the UK at the drop of a hat..... Pigs might learn to fly sooner ::) :D :D Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: paul7575 on April 28, 2013, 18:09:12 I suggest what they'll have to do is organise the ROC's building, both its structure and its mechanical and electrical systems, so that the first reaction to a smoke alarm is NOT to immediately evacuate the whole building until such time as it's found to be a false alarm. There may be fairly straightforward ways to subdivide or compartmentalise the ROCs into operating, ancillary and domestic areas.
The operating floor (or whatever idea they come up with) doesn't actually have to be one massive room for the whole NR route/region, does it? Paul Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: SandTEngineer on April 28, 2013, 18:14:28 The operating floor (or whatever idea they come up with) doesn't actually have to be one massive room for the whole NR route/region, does it? ...but they are going to be... ::)Paul Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: bobm on April 28, 2013, 19:24:02 Of course it doesn't have to be a fire. Think of the problems over a wide area when there was a power failure at Swindon Panel in February. http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0 (http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0)
Are there any plans to have local emergency control in case of problems? As I understand it there used to be (maybe still are) emergency mini-panels at places like Weston-super-Mare and Newbury which could operate in cases of a failure at the main centre. Hopefully such disruption is rare and is that the thing which sways the argument in favour of the cost savings of centralisation? The electricity grid is controlled from one central point in Berkshire but does have a back-up centre in the Midlands. The lights going out over a wide part of the country due to a failure is likely to be more serious than trains being on stop in the great scheme of things. Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: devon_metro on April 28, 2013, 19:33:07 I understand it will be possible for control to be temporarily transferred to another one of the large signalling centres on spare panels set aside in the event of failure.
Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: Chris from Nailsea on April 28, 2013, 19:37:56 Of course it doesn't have to be a fire. Think of the problems over a wide area when there was a power failure at Swindon Panel in February. http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0 (http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0) Thanks for that reminder, bobm - I've therefore taken this opportunity to merge both topics here, in the interests of continuity and completeness ... ;) Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: Electric train on April 28, 2013, 20:15:36 Of course it doesn't have to be a fire. Think of the problems over a wide area when there was a power failure at Swindon Panel in February. http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0 (http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0) Thanks for that reminder, bobm - I've therefore taken this opportunity to merge both topics here, in the interests of continuity and completeness ... ;) There is a lot of work being done to improve along track signalling power supply systems, auto reconfigurable systems are going to be the norm the demo's I've seen they can switch out a fault within milliseconds although a delay of several seconds has to be built in to allow signalling system to let the signals go black before restoring the power. Within ROCs and the outlying remote locations again a lot of design work has been done to make the power system as secure as possible Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: John R on April 28, 2013, 20:50:22 Hijacking this thread slightly, I notice that all along the western section of the Great Western (certainly all the way from Nailsea to Swindon) the cabling troughing is being dug up and replaced. Is this in connection with the forthcoming resignalling of the area? The new troughing looks slightly larger - if so that seems surprising that in an age when most things to do with communications seem to be minitiarised.
Title: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: Electric train on April 28, 2013, 21:59:26 Hijacking this thread slightly, I notice that all along the western section of the Great Western (certainly all the way from Nailsea to Swindon) the cabling troughing is being dug up and replaced. Is this in connection with the forthcoming resignalling of the area? The new troughing looks slightly larger - if so that seems surprising that in an age when most things to do with communications seem to be minitiarised. It is all to do with the resignalling of the GWML. The GWML will have modern ETRMS signalling however this is being superimposed over a renewed classic type system which has to be installed in parallel to the old system. Also electrification means screening conductors have to be laid in the troughs the type of screening conductors being used on the GW will be about 20mm in diaTitle: Re: Signalling - centralised operations may lead to wider problems in the future? Post by: The SprinterMeister on May 14, 2013, 22:55:00 Of course it doesn't have to be a fire. Think of the problems over a wide area when there was a power failure at Swindon Panel in February. http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0 (http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=12086.0) There isn't one at Weston Super Mare anymore. It has been removed fairly recently. The panel was located in the chargmans office in the station buildings on the up side. There was I believe some dispute between Network Rail and the Bristol Panel signallers about sending them down there on Sundays to operate it occasionally to retain familiarality with it so out it came.....Are there any plans to have local emergency control in case of problems? As I understand it there used to be (maybe still are) emergency mini-panels at places like Weston-super-Mare and Newbury which could operate in cases of a failure at the main centre. This page is printed from the "Coffee Shop" forum at http://gwr.passenger.chat which is provided by a customer of Great Western Railway. Views expressed are those of the individual posters concerned. Visit www.gwr.com for the official Great Western Railway website. Please contact the administrators of this site if you feel that content provided contravenes our posting rules ( see http://railcustomer.info/1761 ). The forum is hosted by Well House Consultants - http://www.wellho.net |