Great Western Coffee Shop

Echoes of Potters Bar 2002..?

Thought so too, Red Squirrel. I'd have thought there would have been earth leakage circuit breakers, as well as residual current protection. But if one bit can fail... who knows?

Electrocution was reported right from the start. The train mowed down several OLE supports, so the line may have dropped towards the ground before power was removed. In addition, this line is 1500V DC, not 25 kV AC, so the fault current to trip the breakers will be much higher.

... they are often screened by an insulting barrier.

I also think that the contrast to the safety of Aviation vs other transport modes is ridiculous.

How so? Are you saying that rail has nothing to learn from the excellent safety systems used in aviation?

I also think that the contrast to the safety of Aviation vs other transport modes is ridiculous. A Pilot told me you're more likely to die slipping over in the bath than on an Aircraft.

I note that some tabloid reports are suggesting that passengers were electrocuted. Is that likely? Wouldn't the power have tripped out pretty quickly as soon as a derailing train shorted the circuit?

The morning after successfully flying my first ever solo cross-country flight,

For someone on the platform the position is very different, a person standing on the ground could well be killed by contact with displaced overhead line equipment that remained live, even briefly.

Being that it was cross-country, were there plenty of toilets, but all smelling worse than a downtown Kolkata sewer? Did you turn up expecting a seat but had to fight for one because the reservation system had gone t*ts up? Did the on-board catering consist of nothing more than a melting Kit-Kat and a warm can of Carling, delivered to you by a trolley dolly who turned up 3 minutes before your destination?

That's my experience of travelling solo cross-country.

Looking at the electrocution question again, I recall hearing that DC is more dangerous than AC, because the latter causes muscle spasm, meaning that one is likely to be thrown away from the danger. No-one on the train would be in danger in any case, but people on the platform may, sadly, have been. It remains a moot point only. Being crushed or electrocuted is unimportant compared to being killed or seriously injured.

Ah, les Fran^ais - quelle finesse!

But seriously, ET, I appreciate the explanation. As a barrack-room electrician only, I had missed the blindingly obvious. It seems then that the main protection from shock is normally the physical separation of equipment from civilian.

[I can not recall an incident where a passenger in a train has been electrocuted by the passage of OLE fault current through a train. 

Neither can I. The "Faraday Cage" effect would see any current running to earth around passengers, rather than through them. I have twice, in former times, seen Blackpool trams - both double-deckers - "brewed up" by a catastrophic short circuit. No passengers were harmed, although many were shaken by the sight and noise, and even more were inconvenienced.

No one has yet reported that it was a fishplate stuck in a diamond cross-over some yards north of the station...twitter photo (which I meant to grab) showed it stuck in the crossover. A loose nut on the wooden (rather old & splitting) sleeper that the diamond crossing was attached to.

Indeed you did. It was the mention of it having rotated while attached by one bolt that threw me - the photos in that article you linked to very clearly shiws one totally loose fishplate in the diamond of the crossing damaged where the train has obviously gone over it, and another loose lying on the sleeper aside the diamond. Neither attached by one bolt

A couple of things struck me in the pictures. It was always clear that the bits sitting on the rail in the second one had been collected and put there, presumably after the main legal record photos had been done. Looking closer, I see several rusty bolts, presumably discarded during earlier work. Isn't this now regarded as unacceptable in Britain, at least since Potters Bar and Grayrigg?

There are a number of new-looking loose nuts, but also what look like bolt heads (square) and shafts that have been sheared. What stands out by its absence a shaft with a nut still on it. It is not clear which way the bolts went through this particular joint - the gap on one side looks narrow enough to hinder inserting a bolt, but maybe not. You can see why the official response has been one of energetic head-scratching.

Another piece in Le Figaro. They have got hold of some track inspection records going back to February, and say that these did mention faults on this stretch of line. However, the detail is a bit lacking - while they say a missing bolt was recorded in February, it may have been a different one.

The report notes the similarity of this track failure and resulting accident to Southall (2002) and a Danish accident (Farris,  2012), but not Grayrigg (2007). In all cases they observe there were specific technical issues, as well as poor maintenance.

I find there drawing a parallel with Southall strange, my recollection was not a track failure, it was Railtrack signaller / route control crossing a freight train from Southall Down West yard across to the UP Relief, which meant crossing over the DN and UP Main and DN Relief in front of a class 1 passenger train which was compounded by the ATP not functioning correctly and the drive "packing his bag" 

I do think Network Rail are in a much better place than they were at the time of Grayrigg in 2007 I cannot speak for maintenance, in projects the process, procedures and checking that has to be done before, during and after any work is exceedingly onerous.

Wrong derailment.  That was the 19 September 1997 one.  The one similar to the French one is that at Southall that occured on 24 November 2002 http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2003/e03027.htm

A year after the disaster, the conclusions of reports commissioned by the judges in charge of the investigation are instructive for the SNCF and its maintenance procedures.

Findings:

Rail disaster 12 July 2013 last Bretigny-sur-Orge (Essonne), which killed seven people and wounded thirty, is definitely due to a maintenance problem. It is telling that the railway and metallurgical expertise has procured reports whivh  Le Figaro and the prosecutor Evry shall make public on Monday. In these extremely severe reports for the SNCF, sent to judges on June 25, expert engineers (Court of Appeal of Douai) and Pierre Michel Dubernard Henquenet note that "metallurgical examinations were made possible to establish that we are not in the presence of a malicious act, and the process that led to the complete disintegration of the assembly is quite the opposite over several months and involved the entire assembly failing, from which were recorded over 200 anomalies of varying degrees of criticality. Most of these abnormalities were known from the railway company or its agents, but were not adequately remedied. The conclusion of the experts is final and evokes "dilapidation never seen elsewhere." He added: "imfrastructure perished by fatigue, vibration, beat, defects tightening, wear, etc.. Damages relating to the quality of maintenance. "
Number 3657 Intercity train consisted of seven cars Reef. There were 385 passengers on board. The train had left the Gare d'Austerlitz to 16 h 53. At 17 h 11, as it prepared to cross Br^tigny station vi platform 1, passengers felt a shock when crossing a double junction crossing . The train derailed and separated into two parts between cars 4 and while traveling at 137 km / h. the authorized speed limit on this road being 150 km / h. Due to the state of the network, the experts appointed by the judges noted in their report that "it would be desirable to limit to 100 km / hour speed trains approaching the station Br^tigny."
Inadequate monitoring network

It further notes that "current maintenance requirements" for sleepers at double junctions are "inadequate because insufficient." Currently, SNCF dismantles the spliced ​​connections to check every three years because they are classified as "comfort items". Experts advise strongly to dismantle every year to inspect. According to them, the tour audits on channels should lead agents to "the immediate compliance", which is not the case today. The network status Br^tigny "would logically have led the SNCF to increased surveillance, and especially adapted," they write.
Experts are clearly involved in the railway maintenance organization: "There is also important to say that the SNCF staff responsible for implementation of track maintenance and equipment should be chosen according to the first criteria for solid training in engineering and in addition have received extensive specialized training. "an allusion to the youth of the agent who made the last inspection tour July 4, 2013, eight days before the accident. It was a railwayman 25, freshly graduated from an engineering school. In February 2013, he became leader of nearby lanes Br^tigny. He framed 19 agents responsible ways to do maintenance on the rail network in the industry. At the last inspection, no abnormality was reported.
Abnormalities inadequately considered

"The maintenance requirements of the SNCF, complex, difficult to interpret or apply by field workers were not fully met (...). This has led to a lack of consideration and processing of errors encountered; It should be noted in this regard that many observations made ​​during the monitoring tours found themselves carried from one operation to another, sometimes to eventually disappear without us was sure they were treated . "And experts conclude by holding the top three factors that led to the accident by improper maintenance" repositories large maintenance superabundant, sometimes inadequate or contradictory so against-productive. "
Finally judicial engineers who conducted the inspection lane January 28 rounds alert on the status of network station of Noisy-le-Sec (Seine-Saint-Denis). They consider disturbing.

les ing^nieurs judiciaires

Advance news (in French) on RTL (http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/info/article/accident-de-bretigny-l-enquete-pointe-une-serie-de-dysfonctionnements-7768611306) of the results of the enquiries. The first report is due out tomorrow - I think that's the interim technical report from the BEA-TT.

RTL concentrate more on the (leaked) prosecutors' report, which seems to be heading for a criminal prosecution as well as a civil liability case. The news item talks about missing bolts in fishplates that no-one is bothered about, and maintenance that was both random and not thorough enough. The other theme, which is obviously going to have political implications, is the confused relationship between RFF and SNCF, and how this clouds the responsibility for maintenance standards.

All sounds rather familiar, doesn't it?

I read the French article about the article, and agree, stuving. This doesn't look like the English way of doing things - a judge bugging the phone calls between an accused person and his company's lawyers? I know that major criminal matters are investigated by a judge in France, but I cannot imagine a Detective Chief Superintendent even asking for an intercept warrant from the Home Secretary in such a case.

It is exactly at this initial instruction phase that the French system is so different. It is led by the examining magistrate, who is a judge but on loan to the prosecutor's office (parquet). Normally the leg-work is done by the Police Judiciare but in this case most of that's been done by BEA-TT. So they are nowhere near court yet, and the comparison is with an employer advising staff before a - rather formal - police interview.

Le Parisen reported this morning that one of the three SNCF (then RFF) employees implicated in the case, and previously "witnesses under caution", has been mis en examen - charged with a criminal offence, roughly. The prosecutors' office at Evry has confirmed only that step about an unnamed SNCF employee.

The newspaper report says more, that it was the local track maintenance manager (the other two being his direct reports). He did the last inspection before the accident, and the independent engineering reports said (based largely on the state of the fracture surfaces) that the relevant trackwork damage was present at that time.

It was announced today by the prosecutors that the case (for manslaighter, more or less) against both SCNF and the individual already charged will go to court next year.

Our UK system doesn't take that long to bring cases forward do they?
It seems the French system drags on far longer than ours, so are their systems more effective than ours; which could mean we convict when perhaps we should take longer to investigate?

Our UK system doesn't take that long to bring cases forward do they?
It seems the French system drags on far longer than ours, so are their systems more effective than ours; which could mean we convict when perhaps we should take longer to investigate?

Remember that this is a high-profile corporate liability case, and against a nationalised industry too. In France individuals are commonly cited in these, and they do drag on for reasons that are hard to see - commissioning lots of expert reports into expert reports is part of that, I think. I don't think France is particularly bad in this respect, but maybe it is in the length of time it takes for the appeals processes to (almost always) eventually overturn personal convictions.

It was announced today by the prosecutors that the case (for manslaughter, more or less) against both SCNF and the individual already charged will go to court next year.

French rail operator SNCF fined over fatal 2013 train crash near Paris Access to the comments Comments
By AFP  with Euronews  •  Updated: 26/10/2022 - 13:29

France’s national rail operator has been convicted of manslaughter over a deadly train crash near Paris nine years ago.

SNCF was found criminally responsible for the accident, which killed seven people and injured more than 400 others.

The 3657 Intercity Paris-Limoges train derailed at Brétigny-sur-Orge station, south of the French capital, on 12 July 2013.

Investigators later found that a broken metal bar had caused the train to leave the tracks and hit the station platform.

On Wednesday, the court in Evry found SNCF guilty of involuntary injury and manslaughter and fined the French state company €300,000.

But former SNCF employee Laurent Waton and SNCF Réseau, a subsidiary company responsible for managing the railway line, were cleared by the court. Waton had carried out the last surveillance of the track eight days before the accident.

Victims’ associations had accused SNCF of failing to maintain the track, which led to "the decay of the suburban network".

The French company had acknowledged its “moral responsibility” for the derailment but claimed that the accident was caused by an undetectable defect in the steel.

But the court found that the metal bar had been damaged since 2008 and had been poorly maintained for five years.

"This negligence in monitoring the core is definitely linked to the derailment," the judge said on Wednesday.

The verdict can be appealed.