Great Western Coffee Shop

It is not just a fallen signal cable - it is the whole signal.   The 10:41 Truro to Paddington ran over it and was 93 minutes late into Reading where it was terminated and sent back as the 17:03 from Paddington to Plymouth starting at Reading.  The following 12:56 from Plymouth was diverted via Melksham/Swindon meaning a Trans Wilts service heading south was sent via Bathampton and missed out the Melksham call.

It is not just a fallen signal cable - it is the whole signal.   The 10:41 Truro to Paddington ran over it and was 93 minutes late into Reading where it was terminated and sent back as the 17:03 from Paddington to Plymouth starting at Reading.  The following 12:56 from Plymouth was diverted via Melksham/Swindon meaning a Trans Wilts service heading south was sent via Bathampton and missed out the Melksham call.

What was that about otevdntative maintenance, Network Rail?

W. Heath Robinson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Heath_Robinson) would be proud of that scaffolding.  ::)

The Signalling Infrastructure Condition Assessment (SICA) system is a well established indicator for inputs into the signalling renewals programme. The Western Route SICA targets going forward into CP5 are clearly defined and monitored each period.

Considering the age of the equipment most of it is performing well, with many equipment types (particularly the mechanical signalling infrastructure) still in service long beyond their envisaged service life. The Base Plan has an ongoing replacement and life extension plan for CP4 which is driven by asset condition.

It had to happen.  I'm totally unsurprised by this as the NR policy since the beginning in 2002 has been not to paint signals nor renew them unless absolutely necessary (obviously missed this one)  >:( :o :P

15:09: The driver of 1A83 reported to Newbury signaller that T2865 has rotted out at the base of the signal causing the signal to fall over and foul both the Up / Down Westbury lines with a large amount of signalling cables across the line.

Most metal posts in the ground that fail do so just at or slightly below ground level

Perhaps Network Rail could train some moles to apply a bit of Hammerite. And backfill afterward, obviously.  :P ;) ;D

So it's "life extension", obviously.

We have been discussing this on another board. http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=14689.msg165562#msg165562 (http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=14689.msg165562#msg165562) Would it be possible to merge the two threads? Either on this thread or the other?

I thought the train hit the signal?.....where's the damage?

Don't tell me that it was known it had fallen (and photo taken), and the train *still* hit the signal...

Or was the original report an exaggeration? :-)

presumably the signal wasn't at danger when it fell over?  If it was then surely the train shouldn't have hit it. 

We have been discussing this on another board. Would it be possible to merge the two threads?

Ought to be here?...

It applied to a different track to that which the train was running on, as per post #7 #30 above.  Another 'post' that moved suddenly...  :o
Paul

https://twitter.com/philatrail/status/535022741200859136/photo/1 (https://twitter.com/philatrail/status/535022741200859136/photo/1)

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B2zIWO6IcAAA1Op.jpg)

W. Heath Robinson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Heath_Robinson) would be proud of that scaffolding.  ::)

As for the location. Mexico?

Or Network Rail could maintain their assets such that they don't get into such a parlous state.  ::)

S&T....if that signal is where I think it is (judging by the background view), I'm guessing that salt water corrosion could be a factor.

Long Rock?

Anyway, in all seriousness, I look forward to reading the report on the RAIB website and the recommendations that it makes.  Like others have said, in a different set of circumstances this had the potential to result in a very serious incident.

Anyway, in all seriousness, I look forward to reading the report on the RAIB website and the recommendations that it makes.  Like others have said, in a different set of circumstances this had the potential to result in a very serious incident.

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It had to happen.  I'm totally unsurprised by this as the NR policy since the beginning in 2002 has been not to paint signals nor renew them unless absolutely necessary (obviously missed this one)  >:( :o :P

Here is one I used to have to look after before it finally got renewed out of necessity :o
(http://i102.photobucket.com/albums/m92/cbrailways/P2060067_zpsd440157a.jpg)
Image (c)2014 SandTEngineer

The IET Innovation Awards 2014

Asset Management Award Winner 2014
(http://conferences.theiet.org/innovation/categories/asset/-images/2014-winners.jpg)
Offering rail better information services - linear asset decision support solution
Network Rail Asset Information ORBIS Programme, Cap Gemini and EY
ORBIS LADS capability transforms Network Rail's track infrastructure maintenance availability. By joining multiple fragmented, complex datasets into actionable asset intelligence we have enabled track engineers to make the ^right interventions, right time, determined by facts^. ORBIS will save ^750m over the next 10 years, enhance safety and increase asset availability.

The judging panel commented:
"Network Rail has successfully met the need for asset intensive industries to acquire data and use it collectively to meet strategic objectives. Combining 14 complex data sources and integrating information from different departments into one common digital view.

"There are now new opportunities for maintenance operations to make better intervention decisions."

The RAIB are indeed investigating.

Collision between a train and a collapsed signal post at Newbury, Berkshire, 17 November 2014

RAIB is investigating an accident in which a passenger train struck a signal that had collapsed and fallen across the track between Newbury and Newbury Racecourse stations.

The accident occurred at about 14:35 hrs on 17 November 2014 and involved train 1A83, the 10:41 hrs First Great Western service from Truro to London Paddington, travelling on the up line. The train struck the junction indicator attached to the head of signal T2865. The signal was attached to a metal post which was lying across the down line (the line usually used by trains travelling west) and foul of the up line. Before it collapsed, this signal post had been standing adjacent to the down line.

The train was travelling at approximately 110 mph (177 km/h) at the point of collision. Although the train did not derail, it did sustain exterior damage to the cab of the leading power car and a ruptured air pipe.

Immediately before the accident there had been no indication of a problem to the signaller because the signalling cables were still intact and the signal itself was still showing a light. A freight train had passed through the area on the down line around 15 minutes before the collision without incident.

The post of signal T2865 (formerly numbered R824) had last been examined in June 2014 and no defects were reported for it. However, the base of the post was hidden by ballast and corrosion at and below ground level was not detected by the examination regime. The signal head was replaced on 28 September 2014 and no issues were reported with the signal post at that time.

(https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/44017/s300_Newbury.jpg)
Collapsed signal T2865 lying across the down line closest to the camera (train 1A83 was running on the furthest of the two lines) (photograph courtesy of Network Rail)

RAIB's investigation will focus on the examination regime for this signal post and other similar structures, and will seek to understand how the post of signal T2865 came to be susceptible to corrosion and why this was not detected before it collapsed.

RAIB will assess the railway industry's current strategy for the examination and maintenance of such structures, and will review the actions taken in response to previous RAIB recommendations relating to structural failures.

RAIB's investigation is independent of any investigation by the Office of Rail Regulation.

RAIB will publish its findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of its investigation. This report will be available on the RAIB website.

....err, here is another one to add to the list (Cantley, Sunday 29 March 2015).  Think the RAIB might be extending their investigation a bit ::) :-\ :o

(http://i102.photobucket.com/albums/m92/cbrailways/Spooner%20Row%20Signal%20Post%20Failure%2029%20March%202015_zpsfw3zf3be.png)

I can see a whole load of ultrasonic testing and or cctv being done to quite a number of hollow tubular signal posts

In my time in S&T maintenance you hit the post with a hammer. 

....err, here is another one to add to the list (Cantley, Sunday 29 March 2015).  Think the RAIB might be extending their investigation a bit ::) :-\ :o

(http://i102.photobucket.com/albums/m92/cbrailways/Spooner%20Row%20Signal%20Post%20Failure%2029%20March%202015_zpsfw3zf3be.png)

Summary

At about 14:35 hrs on Monday 17 November 2014, a train travelling at 110 mph (177 km/h) struck the top of a signal which had collapsed and fallen across the railway line near Newbury. The signal post completely obstructed one track and partially obstructed a second (the one on which the train was travelling). There were no injuries and the train did not derail, but it did sustain some exterior damage. The outcome could have been much more serious if the first train to encounter the signal had been travelling at speed on the line that the signal had completely obstructed.

The signal collapsed because the base of the post, which was of hollow tubular steel construction, had corroded through, causing an almost complete loss of wall thickness at and just above ground level. Corrosion had occurred to both internal and external surfaces; internally because water had entered the post and there was no drainage for it to escape, while the external corrosion was affected by the base being buried in ballast, which held water around the base and damaged the protective coating on the signal post.

Signal posts are subject to annual visual examinations, but the examinations of this signal did not detect the problem because the main area of corrosion was hidden by ballast, and the examinations regime was vulnerable to missing such defects. A separate examination in 2012 for a resignalling project in the area also did not detect the defect for similar reasons. Because the defect was not detected, it was not subsequently reported and remedied through maintenance.

The investigation also identified possible underlying factors associated with the management of ballast levels around post bases, competence management of structures examiners and corporate knowledge about the original design specifications for signal structures.

The RAIB has identified one learning point and made five recommendations. The learning point relates to the process for conducting visual examinations on structures such as signal posts. Four of the recommendations are addressed to Network Rail and cover the management, examination and resilience of signal structures to such failures. The remaining recommendation is addressed to Amey regarding its competence management arrangements for structures examiners.