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Germany train crash: Several killed near Bavarian town of Bad Aibling

Two passenger trains have collided in the German state of Bavaria, with police saying at least eight people have been killed and scores injured.

The head-on crash happened near Bad Aibling, a spa town about 60km (37 miles) south-east of Munich.

The trains' operator said both trains had partially derailed and were wedged into each other.

Emergency teams worked for hours to free some casualties from the wreckage.

Regional police said in a tweet (in German) that eight people were dead and about 100 injured, of whom 50 were seriously hurt.

The drivers of both trains and two train guards were among those killed, regional broadcaster Bayerischer Rundfunk said, quoting police.

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This sad accident is perhaps an example of the merits of electrifying even secondary routes, had DMUs been involved then fire would have been a real risk and could have added to the death toll.

By removing a fire hazard in this way (diesel fuel isn't particularly flammable anyway), you then surely introduce a different and equally real risk of electrocution?

Diesel fuel is indeed not that flammable, being much safer than petrol for example. Diesel fuel sprayed over a hot engine or exhaust system is however liable to ignite and has done so with fatal results.
OHLE has a good record of safety in the aftermath of accidents, in the event of collision or derailment that does NOT bring down the overhead, then it will normally remain live, but safely out of reach. The only significant risk is then to survivors or rescuers who are on top of the train and within reach of the overhead.
If the accident DOES bring down the overhead, then this is virtually certain to trip out within a fraction of a second as it contacts the train, the running rails, or supporting structures.

Persons within a train are safe from electric shock even if the live OHLE touches the train. Persons outside of the train are at some risk, but this is minimal for reasons already given.

Despite that explanation being around, the French press have seized their chance to have a go at Transdev. Apparently Transdev/Meridian have had a lot of problems with their new Swiss trains (Stadler FLIRT 3), some of which have been sent back for rectification. Some of these issues may affect other FLIRT 3 models, though the reports struggle to link this with safety. Even less relevant are the pantograph/catenary problems they have had. 

The FLIRT3 problems clearly have no link with this crash.  However, looking at some of the appalling photos of the crash on the BBC website , I was struck by how badly the trains performed structurally in the crash.  One of the trains essentially had the side wall prised off the rest of the train so that the other train was able to drive into the passenger space and cause so many injuries.  I am not a structural engineer, and maybe that kind of damage was inevitable at a 120 mph closing speed.  But I would have hoped that a modern train would perform better in a crash.  The UK's last fatal crash demonstrated that the Pendolino (nasty, cramped, smelly train though they are) perform very well in a crash at very similar speed and I do wonder if trains in Germany are as crash-worthy as some of the UK's trains (although we obviously have some less safe stock too - I was on the S Wales mainline in a pacer on Tuesday morning and the wind made me realise just how flimsy that design is)

Realistically, I don't think any trains (or any other means of transport for that matter) can be built to withstand that sort of impact, especially as it has been said it was unlikely any braking had been applied prior to the collision. I would imagine they performed as well as could be expected. Don't forget the Pendolino crash at Grayrigg was just a single train off the line, and only relatively light structures involved, so not as much of a sudden impact, just a rollover and rapid (but not instantaneous) dissipation of energy. Had the Pendolino hit a bridge or something similarly solid, I think things would've been much much worse, c.f. the ICE derailment & bridge collision in Germany.

In a collision like this where the only way that the energy can be lost is through the structure of the train - no braking, little interaction with the track such as after a derailment, just 2 trains impacting at maximum line speed. The welds are always going to be a weak point I the structure, with the energy of a 120mph collision between 2 objects of several hundred tonnes each, they're just going to burst like a tin can.

If you want an idea of the violence of the impact, take a look at this (nuclear flask crash test) https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY446h4pZdc (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY446h4pZdc)

In a collision like this where the only way that the energy can be lost is through the structure of the train - no braking, little interaction with the track such as after a derailment, just 2 trains impacting at maximum line speed. The welds are always going to be a weak point I the structure, with the energy of a 120mph collision between 2 objects of several hundred tonnes each, they're just going to burst like a tin can.

If you want an idea of the violence of the impact, take a look at this (nuclear flask crash test) https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY446h4pZdc (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY446h4pZdc)

Human error by a train controller was to blame for a crash in Bavaria, Germany, last week that killed 11 people, prosecutors said.

More than 80 people were injured after two commuter trains collided on a single-track stretch of railway.

An area controller opened the track to the two trains and tried to warn the drivers, according to the prosecutors.

The man, a 39-year-old, is likely to be charged with involuntary manslaughter and could face five years in jail.

"If he had complied with the rules... there would have been no collision," said Chief Prosecutor Wolfgang Giese.

The trains crashed head-on while both were travelling at about 100km/h (60mph) east of Bad Aibling, a spa town about 60km south-east of Munich.

Investigations focused on why the trains were on the tracks at the same time despite safety mechanisms. The crash site is on a bend, meaning the drivers no visual contact so collided largely without braking, officials said.

Prosecutors said the controller's actions had catastrophic consequences but they do not believe he acted deliberately.

All those killed in the crash were men aged between 24 and 59.

Germany train crash: Controller 'distracted by computer game'

A German train controller has been arrested over the February rail crash that killed 11 people in Bavaria, as prosecutors suspect he was distracted by a computer game at the time.

According to prosecutors he was playing the computer game on his mobile phone and made a signalling error, then dialled the wrong emergency number.

He has admitted that version of events, German media report.

Two commuter trains collided on a single-track stretch near Bad Aibling.

Eighty-five passengers suffered injuries, some of them life-threatening.

The man could be charged with involuntary manslaughter and could face five years in jail.

The trains crashed head-on while both were travelling at about 100km/h (60mph) east of Bad Aibling, a spa town about 60km (37 miles) south-east of Munich.

Investigators quoted by German media said the timings of the computer game and the crash pointed to "the accused having been distracted from his management of rail traffic at the junction".

The stretch of line had an automatic signalling system designed to halt any train that passed a stop signal.

But reports in German media suggested that the system had been switched off to let the eastbound train, which was running late, go past.

The investigation ruled out technical faults with the trains or signalling system as being behind the crash.

All those killed in the crash were men aged between 24 and 59.

Germany's rail safety mechanism

In case signals fail, German railways are fitted with a final safety guard to prevent crashes.

Cab signalling known as PZB (Punktfoermige Zugbeeinflussung - or "intermittent train control") will set off an alarm in the driver's compartment when the train approaches a red light.

If the driver does not respond by pressing a button, the train will brake automatically.

A signal controller at the centre of an investigation into a German train crash that killed 11 people admitted on Tuesday to playing a game on his mobile phone while in charge on the day, the public prosecutor's office said.

The man was detained on Tuesday after developments in the investigation into the head-on train collision in Bavaria in February, which was Germany's biggest train crash since 1998. He faces possible charges of causing death through negligence.

The public prosecutor's office in Traunstein, near the border with Austria, said investigations had found the man "turned on his mobile phone during his shift on the morning of the accident, started an online computer game and played actively ... until just before the collision of the trains."

The man denied being distracted by the computer game. But the prosecutor's office said the time period in which he was found to be playing the game meant it could be expected that he was not paying attention to a critical traffic intersection.

The controller gave the trains an incorrect signal and then hit the wrong buttons when issuing a distress signal, meaning it was not heard by the train conductors, the prosecutor's office said.

The trains, carrying about 150 people in all, crashed at high speed on a 6-km (4-mile) stretch of track between the spa town of Bad Aibling and Kolbermoor, near the Austrian border.

The investigation is continuing. No evidence of technical problems has been found to date.

(Writing by Paul Carrel; Editing by Mark Heinrich)

Rail dispatcher charged in deadly German train collision
Jul. 18, 2016 8:52 AM EDT

BERLIN (AP) — German prosecutors have charged a railway dispatcher with negligent homicide in the collision of two commuter trains in Bavaria earlier this year that killed a dozen people.

The dispatcher, whose name has not been released in line with German privacy laws, also faces 89 counts of causing bodily harm in addition to the 12 counts of negligent homicide, the dpa news agency reported Monday.

Traunstein prosecutors say the dispatcher is suspected of playing an online game shortly before the two trains he was in charge of collided on a single-track line on Feb. 9.

The crash was near the Bavarian town of Bad Aibling, about 60 kilometers (40 miles) southeast of Munich.
 
The dispatcher has been in custody since April.

A German train controller has admitted two errors that prompted two trains to collide head-on in Bavaria with the loss of 12 lives.

Named under privacy laws as Michael P, 40, he admitted making a signalling error and then dialling the wrong emergency number.

His lawyer said he also admitted playing on his mobile at the time.

Michael P told survivors that he was aware he had "burdened himself with huge guilt".

"I would like you to know that my thoughts are with you," he added, in a statement read by lawyers.

Those who died in the crash at Bad Aibling on 9 February were all men aged between 24 and 59. Another 89 passengers were injured.

Game 'distracted' controller in Bavaria crash

Prosecutors said Michael P had been playing the fantasy game "Dungeon Hunter 5" on his phone when he allowed the two trains on to a single-track line.

The court heard from one police official that the controller had regularly played on his smart phone while on shift, even though it was banned. Analysis of his phone records showed that his mobile use often corresponded with his working hours.

"He played almost every time," the official said, according to Germany's DPA news agency.

Although the line has a safety mechanism, prosecutors say the controller mistakenly disabled it, sending two commuter trains towards each other. When he tried to warn the train drivers, he then pressed the wrong alarm button, they say.

Michael P is accused of involuntary manslaughter and faces five years in jail if found guilty.

Some of the injured as well as the relatives of those who died were present when the defendant entered the court, wearing a hood to cover his face.

A lawyer representing some of the families described the confession given to the court as a tactical move, because what he had admitted was already proven.

"The really burning question remains unanswered," said Peter Duerr; how intensively had he been playing with his mobile phone at the time, and to what extent had he been distracted?

Although investigators did look into the role of the controller at the time of the disaster, it was only when they sifted through his phone data that he was fully investigated.

"The really burning question remains unanswered," said Peter Duerr; how intensively had he been playing with his mobile phone at the time, and to what extent had he been distracted?

At 06:47 (local time) on 9 February 2016, two passenger services collided at around 150 km/h (90mph) on a curve on the single line between crossing points at Bad Aibling and Kolbermoor.

One train derailed and several of its carriages overturned.

Eleven people were killed (7 passengers and 4 members of staff, including both drivers).

Of the 89 injured, 26 were seriously hurt.
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The German NIB determined that that immediate cause of the event was signaller error. The signaller completed his training on 16 January 1997, qualifying to signal Bad Aibling specifically later that year. Per his roster, he had been working at Bad Aibling, Bruckmühl and Westerham. On the day of the accident, he started work at 04:45 at Bad Aibling, his last shift (at Bruckmühl) having finished at 14:40 the previous afternoon. It was considered that the ‘required minimum rest’ had been ‘respected’.

Although the signaller had been trained to use GSM-R, the German NIB noted that the specifications for ‘establishing an emergency call connection and delivering an emergency stop order’ are incomplete. Specifically, there is ‘no distinction between emergency call train radio and emergency call route’. It was found that the former had been carried out for the last time on 15 September 2015. The implication is that – at the signaller’s last ‘refresher’ – the emergency call route function ‘was probably discussed, but not practiced’. The NIB pointed out that training exercises ‘take place in the relaxed atmosphere of a training course and not under the stress of a pending irregularity or a dangerous event in the railway operation’. The signaller had never had to make such a call in the field, and – as the NIB also clarified – ‘the likelihood of confusion between the two emergency call types is too high, especially under stress’.

On 12 April 2016, it was reported that the signaller had been arrested, as prosecutors suspect he was distracted by playing a game on his mobile phone at the time of the incident. This led him to make a signalling error, and then – in a state of some distress – dial the wrong emergency number (in fact altering all station staff along the line instead of the driver of the oncoming train). His second – correct – emergency message came too late to prevent the accident.

The game in question was ‘Dungeon Hunter 5’, which the signaller allegedly played with some regularity, even though this is prohibited during working hours. Analysis of his phone records show that his mobile use often corresponded with his working hours. Indeed, the NIB notes that the signaller’s ‘last active usage was at 06:40:47’ (ie, just over six minutes before the collision and after some 22 minutes of play). At this point, one passenger train had entered the Bad Aibling section, while the other had come to a stand at Kolbermoor. The signaller’s phone was not used again during subsequent events.

The investigation report also explains how – in the criminal case against the signaller – the subject of online gaming was discussed by an expert witness, who noted the following:

    The total duration and frequency of the signaller’s gaming actions had increased significantly since 1 January 2016
    The ‘proportion of playing time in working hours [was] 72%’
    ‘It is highly probable that simultaneous use of the computer game resulted in decreased cognitive resource allocation for the operational tasks (impairment of cognitive attention, memory and executive function, with an intense computer game continuing to linger for some time).’

Thus, ‘it can be assumed that’ the online game ‘directly contributed’ to the signaller’s error. That is, instead of allowing the trains to cross in Kolbermoor, he allowed the train at that station to enter the single line en route to Bad Aibling. He ‘looked but failed to see’ the indications on the panel showing the actual positions and routes of the trains involve. It did not help that the occupation of the single line (the signalling panel in question replacing a string of yellow route-setting lights with a single red ‘occupied’ light) was too easy to overlook.

The signaller had used a Zs-1 ‘ersatzsignal’ signal, which is not interlocked and can give authority to pass a stop signal showing danger when the main aspect cannot be cleared. Unlike the PoSA (proceed on sight aspect) signals in GB, it does not confirm the existence of a wheeled path to the end of the section of line protected, and can be cleared irrespective of a route having been set in the opposite direction.

Writing in the November 2016 IRSE News, Peter van der Mark noted that the Zs-1 ersatzsignal may only be used when the main aspect cannot show a proceed aspect for one or more of the following reasons:

    A defective signal semaphore or bulb.
    Defective point detection, but only after the turnout has been secured in the proper position.
    A defect in the signalling block system (such as a cable fault), but only once it has been established that the line ahead is clear.
    A proved clear track circuit that persistently shows ‘occupied’.

Once a Zs-1 ersatzsignal has been used, the train must travel at no more than 40 km/h (25mph) and be prepared to stop at any obstruction until the next relevant signal has been reached. When a starting signal displays a Zs-1 aspect, the train must keep to the 40-km/h rule until the train has reached the final set of points at the yard or station, after which 100 km/h is permissible. At Bad Aibling, the driver passed the Zs-1 and accelerated to 100 km/h after passing the last set of points and entering the single line section in accordance with the rules. However, the NIB noted that the ‘complexity of the rules is high’ and the rule book ‘is (under time pressure) not suitable as a reference work. The provisions to be applied are based on several directives and in different modules, sections or paragraphs.’
Action taken

The signaller was held in ‘pre-trial detention’ form 12 April 2016. The prosecutors brought the charges to the court in Traunstein in mid July 2016 with accusations on 12 counts of ‘murder by negligence’ and 89 accounts of ‘injury by negligence’. On 10 November – the first day of trial – the defendant confessed to the charges brought by the prosecutors, but his lawyer wanted the degree of guilt to be evaluated during the subsequent proceedings. The signaller showed a degree of compassion for the victims, he refused to answer questions on the intensity of his preoccupation with the mobile game.

The court ruled on 5 December 2016 that the signaller was guilty of all charges, and he was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison. He was released on probation in July 2018.
Recommendations

    The ‘train radio emergency call’ and ‘emergency call route’ functions in the GSM-R selection menu should be combined such that they operate after a signaller has pressed the ‘emergency call button’ on the control panel
    The signalling rules and regulations should be reviewed in full, with reference to an appropriate risk assessment
    Simulators should more extensively in training, which should also address the issues portable media devices and distraction.
    The use of the Zs-1 ersatzsignal should be subject to a risk-based reassessment.