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A spokesman for British Transport Police said: "At 15.35 today, Sunday, 3 April, we were called to Plymouth railway station following reports that two passenger trains had been involved in a low speed collision at the station.

"Our officers are currently at the station, alongside colleagues from South Western Ambulance Service, Devon and Cornwall Police and Devon and Somerset Fire and Rescue Service.

^A number of people, including the driver of one of the trains, have sustained injuries as a result of the collision and are being treated by paramedics at the scene.

^At this stage we believe that a moving train collided into the back of a stationary train on platform 6 at the station and we are currently looking into the circumstances to determine how this happened.

^The incident is likely to result in delays to passengers travelling through the Plymouth area. Please check before with National Rail Enquiries before you travel.^

18 injured in 'low impact' Plymouth train crash

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The driver of one of the trains was among the injured, British Transport Police said

Eighteen people have been injured when two trains collided at a railway station.

Devon and Cornwall Police said the crash at Plymouth Railway Station was a "low impact collision" and they were not aware of any serious injuries.

Emergency services were called to the scene at about 15:35 BST on Sunday.

Eight casualties were going to Derriford Hospital but all were stable, South Western Ambulance said.

"At this stage we believe that a moving train drove into the back of a stationary train on platform 6 at the station, and we are currently looking into the circumstances to determine how this happened", British Transport Police said.

Police have advised people to avoid the station if possible, and said delays were likely for passengers travelling through the Plymouth area.

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British Transport Police said they were investigating the cause of the crash

Bit surprised that no one else has posted re this.

Bit surprised that no one else has posted re this.

EDIT to add, I was unaware of the existing thread when I posted, reports by others are more detailed and/or up to date.

I suspect you might have fallen foul of the forum's broken "Show unread posts since last visit" function.

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The driver walked away with only a fractured wrist and a few cuts and bruises after the tree crashed through the windscreen of the train.

I may be wrong but I believe that 43041 got the last 'off the shelf' replacement cab.

And just to show there's nothing new under the sun, here's an image of a collision at Newton Abbot in 1994 (I am in no way comparing the specifics of the incidents though)

There have been several cab replacements since, not because of accident damage but because they were becoming life expired and for corrosion work on the frame.

the temptation to not repair must be bigger than usual this time??

With no spare HST power cars in the UK, I'm sure this one will be repaired.

4 October 1976 (Stoke Canon, Exeter). No. 1001 Western Pathfinder was working an overnight parcels train from London Paddington to Penzance when the train was in collision with a workers van at a level crossing. One workman in the van died in the accident. The locomotive was removed to Exeter St Davids depot. Despite sustaining relatively minor damage, the imminent demise of the entire fleet of Class 52's resulted in condemnation of the locomotive. Up to this point, Western Pathfinder had been a serious contender for preservation.

With no spare HST power cars in the UK, I'm sure this one will be repaired.

Latest on the injuries:

3 heavily injured
5 walking wounded
10 minor injuries

Driver is one of the walking wounded.

I suspect you might have fallen foul of the forum's broken "Show unread posts since last visit" function.

A photo on the south west railways and heritage Facebook group shows the 2nd carriage and possibly the 1st were fouling the points blocking 6,7,8 from Cornwall end,
The HST was pulled almost to the Cornwall end of the platform so no way the 150 was getting into the platform.

I thought it had been removed, rather than broken. If it still works, tell me where I find it!

It's the link on the first line on the right, next to your profile, whenever you're logged in to the Coffee Shop forum:

At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 35 people, including the driver of one of the trains were injured, some seriously.

The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not, because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had one member of staff on board.

Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 60 passengers on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working, and is allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.

Approaching Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 14 mph (22 km/h) approaching signal P15 on the approach to Plymouth station. This signal cleared from red (meaning stop) to an indication meaning that the train may proceed into platform 6, but that the driver must be prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. Signal P15 is located around 333 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood.

The train then accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h) and as train 2E68 approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train^s fixtures and onto the floor.

Our investigation will include examination of:
^the actions of staff involved
^the signalling and platform working arrangements at Plymouth station
^the performance of the train during the collision
^any underlying management factors.

Pretty much as I privately suspected. Whilst not the final report and not the RAIBs job to apportion blame, it does show where the evidence is pointing.

Where might that be then?  The remit looks quite broad to me at the moment.

Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train^s fixtures and onto the floor.

And this is the lesson for the passengers, well known fact from previous incidents that in collisions such as this that standing pax are usually the worst injured. Well worth staying seated if possible until the train (or bus, tram etc) has come to a complete stop

And there seems to be a number of contributing factors, both in the design of "the system" and the behaviour of both the Signaller and the Driver.  Whilst it may be possible to attach "blame" in a legal sense to a single individual, I suspect that the RAIB (who do not seek to apportion blame) will make recommendations impacting on multiple areas of operation/behaviour. 

................worth bearing in mind the next time the standard GWR line is trotted out about overcrowded trains with multiple standees not presenting a risk to health and safety...........

I'm free to attribute blame to many, one, none. Individuals or entities. Based on the evidence presented thus far. That attribution of blame may differ from that of the BTP, ORR and the employers of the staff involved. I suspect it won't in this case though, unless the sequence of events is vastly different to that laid out in the RAIB Bulletin.

At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 42 people, including the drivers of both trains, were injured; one passenger seriously.

The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had two members of staff on board.

Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 76 passengers and 4 members of staff on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily, as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working and was allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.

Travelling towards Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 8 mph (14 km/h) as it approached a red (stop) aspect displayed by signal P15 which is located around 330 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood. Two white lights and a numeral were then displayed adjacent to this red aspect (which remained lit) as an indication that the train was permitted to proceed to platform 6 with the driver prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. There is no evidence of any signalling malfunction.

The train then passed signal P15 and accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h). As it approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train’s fixtures and onto the floor.

Our investigation will include examination of:
•the actions of staff involved
•the signalling and platform working arrangements at Plymouth station
•the performance of the train during the collision
•any underlying management factors

18 July 2016 9:59am
Text updated around passenger/injury numbers and to clarify the meaning around the signal aspect.

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Image showing trains after the accident: 2E68 on the left (courtesy BTP)

Summary

At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, the 13:39 hrs passenger train service from Penzance to Exeter collided with an empty train which was already waiting in platform 6 at Plymouth station. The collision occurred at a speed of about 15 mph (24 km/h) and resulted in injuries to 48 people and damage to both trains.

The signaller intended that both trains should share the platform because the empty train was to form a service to London and some passengers from the Penzance service were expected to join it. Lift refurbishment work meant that without platform sharing, passengers would have needed to use the stairs and a subway when changing trains. Permissive signalling arrangements were in place at Plymouth to permit two trains to share the same platform.

The signaller misjudged the amount of space available behind the London train and wrongly believed there was room for the Penzance train. He was aware that the platform sharing arrangement required an unusual form of permissive working, but did not communicate this to the Penzance train driver, and the rules did not require him to do so.

The Penzance train driver incorrectly believed he would not be sharing a platform with the London train. There was insufficient distance to stop his train by the time he realised his mistake and had applied the emergency brake.

Great Western Railway, the operator of both trains, and Network Rail the owner of the infrastructure, had not identified the risk of a collision due to the combination of an unusual form of permissive working, the track alignment on the approach to Plymouth station, and an inexperienced driver.

Recommendations

The RAIB has made three recommendations. The first, addressed to Great Western Railway and possibly also relevant to other train operators, seeks improvements to the training and assessment of new drivers. The second, also addressed to Great Western Railway and possibly relevant to other train operators, arises from difficulties encountered during passenger evacuation and seeks improvements to emergency door release controls. The third recommendation, addressed to Network Rail and to be undertaken with the assistance of appropriate train operating companies, seeks a review of permissive working arrangements at stations.

Two learning points stress the care needed by drivers when undertaking permissive moves, and the value of preventing passengers boarding or alighting from trains when permissive movements are taking place in the same platform.

Simon French, Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents said:
This collision caused great distress to the large numbers of passengers and staff involved, particularly those who suffered injuries. It occurred when a train was routed into a platform that was already occupied by a stationary high speed train. This form of train working, known as permissive platform working is not unusual on the UK’s busy network and is usually performed safely. Platform sharing allows trains to be joined together or, as was intended in this case, can facilitate the easy movement of passengers between connecting train services.

This accident reinforces the need for drivers to take great care when signalled into an occupied platform - assumptions should never be made about the length of platform that is unoccupied. This learning applies to all drivers but is particularly applicable to those who are inexperienced or new to a route. For this reason we have today issued a recommendation to Great Western Railway concerning the training and assessment of new drivers to better prepare them for permissive platform working. I am also urging other train operators to think about how well they prepare their drivers for similar circumstances.

Although the RAIB recognises the need for permissive working in station platforms, we have recommended that Network Rail, in conjunction with train operators, carries out a review of the way it is implemented at all stations where permissive platform working is currently authorised. This should include an assessment of a range of risk factors, including the information provided to the signallers when deciding whether or not to route a train into an occupied platform.

29  Many people who were standing up waiting to get off train 2E68 were thrown into
each other, into the train’s fixtures, and onto the floor. The collision resulted in
injuries to 42 passengers and 4 members of staff on train 2E68, including one
passenger who was seriously injured...

15 Train movements approaching Plymouth station from the west (the route followed by train 2E68) are controlled by signal P15. This signal is located 270 metres from the western end of platform 6. It moved to its current position in the late 1980s and the signal’s head (displaying the coloured lights) was replaced in 2007 with a light emitting diode type signal head (known as LED). Signal P15 is capable of signalling trains into any of the platforms at Plymouth. When displaying a proceed indication, the appropriate platform number is displayed adjacent to the signal head (figure 5).

16 If a platform is already occupied, another train can be signalled into the same platform under permissive working arrangements (paragraph 32). In these circumstances signal P15 will display two white lights (known as position lights), at an angle of 45° adjacent to the red aspect.

17 There is no evidence that the functioning of signal P15 was a factor in the accident. Although the signal was re-positioned before the current Railway Group standard was introduced, the distance of 270 metres between the signal and the platform is compatible with Railway Group standard GK/RT0044 ‘Controls for signalling a train onto an occupied line’. The December 2014 version of this standard required the distance to be ‘minimised, as far as reasonably practicable’, and the previous version (February 2000) required that the spacing ‘shall not be greater than 400 metres’.