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2M48 stalled departing Lewisham

Those who know the area will understand that the signal protecting Platform 4 and the Down North Kent at Lewisham is right on top of the platform, so 2M48's getting just far enough forward to clear the overlap allowed 2M50 to approach behind and then sit on the diamond crossover.

2S54 was allowed to come up the Tanners Hill flydown towards Lewisham but clearly was too long for the pointwork at Tanners Hill Junction trapping 2H00, 2H02, 2R46, 2R48 and 2S56.

Passengers started self-evacuating at North Kent East Junction, New Cross, Lewisham and St Johns in separate incidents.

Controlled evacuations seemingly only started at about 20:15/20:30 despite it being almost 3 hours since it all started.

General consensus from all concerned is that the entire situation has been shambolic. The "Kentish Town effect" of passengers egressing, the trains stopping, more egressing instead of letting the train move etc. has created significant problems.

2M48 finally went black about 21:15 running out of battery power for emergency lights etc; more of the same on other trains.

Passengers left on trains who didn't egress and walk up the track then had open doors letting the cold in which made things yet worse.

What a shambles !
It does seem that in case of breakdown or delay, that the first priority is to keep passengers on the trains, "no matter what"
...

Surely that is a reasonable first priority, combined with trying to get the trains moved somewhere better. The question is more whether you can talk about a first priority any more after three hours of failing to move the stranded trains. 

We in this country need to realise that when extream weather is forcast we should suspend services, close motorways in advance to prevent people who do not heed the warnings from traveling.

Interesting idea - how would you propose essential workers/emergency services get to work and get around?

How would you address the implications of your suggestion for (for example) Heathrow Airport?

If the weather is that bad, is Heathrow really essential? 

Probe launched over passengers on Lewisham train tracks

An investigation has been launched after passengers forced their way on to the track from a broken-down train.

Passengers got off the train after being stranded for up to three hours on the Southeastern service on Friday.

British Transport Police have issued a warning urging passengers to stay on board stranded trains, where they are "far safer".

Southeastern and Network Rail have hired an independent investigator to review the matter.

The incident has been referred to the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB).

Passengers complained of being cold, tired and stranded for up to three hours on a broken down train without heating, lights or use of the toilet,

Southeastern said passengers could have been killed on the live tracks.

In a tweet, British Transport Police said: "Self-evacuating from trains is never a good idea as it places you and others at significant risk. You are risking your life trespassing on live tracks."

In a statement, Southeastern said: "We'd like to sincerely apologise to all our passengers who were caught up in the disruption.  Although events of this nature are extremely rare, we are determined to learn lessons that we can apply at all levels to prevent and mitigate future incidents."

The RAIB said it would now consider investigating the incident.

From the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-43270403):

Southeastern are ready to learn lessons are they? They could start by reading the RAIB recommendations after the Kentish Town uncontrolled evacuation.

If you leave people on a train with little or no information, just yards from a station, then there will always be one person who decides its time to act for themselves rather than wait for assistance. In this incident I believe one person decided an hour was long enough to wait and so off they went. That then meant traction current had to be switched off. That person was in the wrong, but the train operators need to understand the human factors that lead to such action. Understanding before blame, threats of prosecution and dire warnings of death, after the event.

Once the traction current was off there was really no excuse to then keep everybody else on board for several further hours.

What this incident appears to show us is that nothing has been learned by the rail industry after Kentish Town.

And yes, this incident is very different to the one on the New Forest, where passengers did stay on board. Those folk were out in the boonies miles from the nearest station on a much less crowded train. They were kept well appraised of the situation, fed and watered until buffet stock was depleted, and could use toilets until the tanks were full. Its telling that the human factors in this case didn't see folk resorting to leaving the train.

People really shouldn't be stranded for 3 or more hours, with no food or drink, or toilet access, in sight of a station in the biggest city in the land.

Once the traction current was off there was really no excuse to then keep everybody else on board for several further hours.

Except that live traction current running through conductor rails is only one of the hazards that could be encountered. Ok, they might not get electrocuted, but they could still trip over the conductor rail, get their foot caught between the conductor rail and running rail and break an ankle, or trip over balises, TPWS grids, point machines, catch pits, or just uneven ballast - not forgetting that some of these things could have been hidden by snow.

At the very least, in Central London, a MOM from either the TOC or Network Rail should have got to the train well inside three hours.

Another reason why all trains should be fitted with toilets as well.

So it seems that this IS largely a UK thing and does not occur in Europe.

The two European incidents  referred to sound very rare, and not as bad as the trains had seats and toilets.

Hours of delays for commuters

Tens of thousands stranded after train failure saw passengers walking on the tracks and forcing all services halted

TENS of thousands of Paris commuters were stuck for several hours after a series of incidents on rail lines north out of the city.

RER and Transilien services to and from the Gare du Nord were paralysed when a power line failure caused a "snowball effect" that saw passengers abandoning trains and forcing rail authority bosses to cut all power as they wandered along the tracks.

The trouble started at 17.45 last night with a power transmission problem on a train between Paris and Mitry in Seine-et-Marne - but it was not until nearly eight hours later, at 1.30, that the last delayed passengers were finally on trains home.

An SNCF spokesman said only around 150 passengers were affected in the first incident and it was fixed "very quickly" but by then passengers had jumped off the train, which was stuck between two stations.

Within a couple of hours tens of thousands were stranded when all trains had to be halted on the B, D, H and K lines.

Céline Sibert, director of Transilien Paris-Nord, told reporters that with passengers walking on the lines in total darkness they could not risk running trains. That had "paralysed services".

Gare du Nord, which sees 500,000 passengers a day, was jammed with angry commuters with many complaining that they could not get information on what was happening.

Some buses were brought in to help clear the station but many passengers did not reach their destinations until after midnight.

High-speed Eurostar and Thalys trains were also affected, facing delays averaging around an hour.

Published 13 March 2018
From:    Rail Accident Investigation Branch

Following a preliminary examination of the circumstances surrounding the events near Lewisham on Friday 2 March 2018, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has decided to launch a full investigation. Further details of the investigation and its scope will be published on the RAIB’s website within the next fortnight.

With the Lewisham incident, allowance has to be made for the quite horrendous weather on the evening in question, but it must be considered a given that these sorts of incidents are most likely to occur during periods of major disruption and control centres (both NR and TOC) should be staffed appropriately and local operations staff available at key locations so that these sorts of instances can be dealt with better.  Neither is the case at the moment.

Somewhat belatedly, RAIB have announced ...

Stranding of trains and self-detrainments at Lewisham

Investigation into the stranding of trains and self-detrainments at Lewisham, 2 March 2018.

At about 17:30 hrs on Friday 2 March 2018, the delayed 15:56 hrs Southeastern service from London Charing Cross to Dartford encountered difficulty in drawing electric current due to ice on the conductor rail, while attempting to depart from platform 4 at Lewisham station.

The following train, the delayed 16:26 hrs Southeastern service from London Charing Cross to Dartford, was then held at a red signal on the approach to platform 4 at Lewisham station. This train was held around a coach length from platform 4, because the track section that included that platform was still occupied by the 15:56 hrs service.

The train behind that, the delayed 17:06 hrs Southeastern service from London Charing Cross to Orpington, was consequently held at a red signal on the incline between Tanners Hill junction and Lewisham Vale junction. This train was 12 coaches long and its rear coaches blocked the fast lines at Tanners Hill junction. A total of four trains heading away from London and two trains heading towards London were stopped on the fast lines as a result of this. Two further trains were held on the slow lines in St Johns and Lewisham stations as a result of the congestion.

The 15:56 hrs service continued to make insufficient progress out of Lewisham station to clear the track section for the signalling to allow the 16:26 hrs service into platform 4. By 18:30 hrs Network Rail staff had arrived to help clear the ice from the conductor rail ahead of the 15:56 hrs service. The signaller and electrical operators were making preparations to locally isolate the power to allow the de-icing to start.

In advance of the power being switched off, the signaller was in the process of seeking special permission to allow the 16:26 hrs service to pass the red signal into platform 4. This would allow detrainment of the passengers onto the platform. However, during this discussion, the signaller received an emergency call from the driver of the 16:26 hrs service advising that some passengers had opened the doors and were getting out onto the track. The signaller immediately asked the electrical control operator to switch off the power to the conductor rail in the area.

The train driver, assisted by Network staff on the track, attempted to persuade passengers to re-board the train or to get clear of the track; they also advised those still on board to remain there. A short time later, British Transport Police, London Fire Service and London Ambulance service staff were called to Lewisham to assist with the passengers who were on the track. However, passengers continued to exit the 16:26 hrs service, and others alighted from the 15:56 and 17:06 hrs services. Passengers also alighted from trains that had stopped near New Cross station.

A controlled evacuation of the 15:56 and 16:26 hrs services to the Lewisham station platforms took place between about 20:00 hrs and 20:45 hrs. It then took some time for Network Rail and the emergency services to confirm that all passengers and staff were clear of the track in the affected area. Power was restored at 21:36 hrs and most trains were back on the move by about 22:00 hrs.

Our investigation into the incident will determine the sequence of events and the actions of those involved. It will also include consideration of:

the reasons for the trains becoming stranded and measures used to manage this
the emergency preparedness arrangements for cold weather
the processes used to manage the stranded trains and how standard rail industry guidance was applied
how passengers were briefed and kept informed, including the part played by mobile phones and social media
the plan for managing the safety of detrained passengers and recovering railway operation, and how this was applied (including liaison with the emergency services)
the high level management of the event by Network Rail and Southeastern
Although the investigation will focus on the events near Lewisham, it will also identify other serious stranding events that occurred on the UK rail network during the 1 and 2 March 2018.

Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation. This report will be available on our website.

Looking ahead, it is my view that all new trains should have toilets. And that all new electric trains should have batteries or diesel engines to permit of limited movement in case of snow, ice, wires down etc.

There is sense in that sort of thing, provided that it does not raise the cost of the train so high that it prices out marginal services.

Is there room for an accessible toilet on a 139?

I ask the following of any railway employees reading this. Talking not of generalities, but of this actual incident, after what time should passengers have been allowed off the train?

Given what I know about the incident, and how close the train was to the platform at Lewisham, I would suggest a that roughly an hour is the maximum length of time the train should have been stopped before a controlled evacuation was attempted.  After approximately 30 minutes it would be wise to start the preparations for an evacuation - i.e. notification to the emergency services and any local staff that may be able to assist (including station staff).

Easy to have these rules and/or guidelines though and far more difficult to enforce them rigidly.  Even controlled evacuations are not without hazards and takes a long while to complete if you have several hundred people to get off.  Stuving makes some sensible suggestions in his earlier post.

The mistake I believe was actually to attempt to run trains at all given the conditions, however NR and the ToC would have been slated for taking that decision; from what I understand if such conditions happen again next year it is possible the decision will be taken to suspend the service, although it is accepted these conditions are a once in 20 / 30 years

At about 18:41 hrs on 2 March 2018, a passenger got out of Southeastern train 2M50 and went onto the track near Lewisham station when it was unsafe to do so. Adjacent lines were still open to traffic and the electric third rail traction power system was live. By the time that this had occurred the train had been held at a signal outside the station for over an hour because the train in front, 2M48, was having difficulty drawing power and being able to move forward due to ice accumulation on the conductor rail. Train 2M50 stopped across a key junction and caused the train that was following it, 2S54, to block another junction. This resulted in a further seven trains being unable to move.

The electric traction power was turned off in the immediate vicinity within about three minutes of the driver informing the signaller that a passenger was on the track. However, while the electrical control operator was finalising the isolation three passengers also got off train 2S54 and crossed lines that may have been live at the time. Around a further 30 passengers exited train 2M50 of their own accord and went onto the track; a few possibly did this when the lines were still live. Within 45 minutes passengers had got off at least two other trains. The uncontrolled nature of the detrainments delayed traction power reinstatement and resulted in trains being stranded for around four and a half hours. Emergency services attended and helped with incident management and recovery. Although no-one was seriously injured, conditions on all of the stranded trains became very difficult for passengers and staff.

The RAIB has made five recommendations:

Three are directed jointly at Network Rail and Southeastern and concern:
the management of conductor rail ice risk
the process for the timely identification and management of train stranding events
the visibility and communication of information to and within railway control centres
Two are directed at Southeastern and concern ensuring that it has a suitably large pool of staff to support train crews during incidents and that the essential needs of train passengers during extreme weather emergencies are reasonably met.