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Lumo train passengers' panic after emergency stop

[snip]

Billie Rainer, 25, said she was left "shaken" by the incident after she caught the train from Newcastle to visit friends in the capital.

"The train was swinging from side to side as it went around the corner very fast," she told the BBC.

"I felt like a massive jolt and I was lifted out of my seat. I wasn't injured but other people were, by falling items. A woman was limping because she'd been hurt.

"The train tipped to the side a bit, then loads more. My suitcase fell to the floor and a couple of people fell off chairs.

"After the train swung from side to side it came to a massive halt and stopped at Peterborough station for an hour and a bit.

"It did feel like the train had approached the corner way too fast. It was so much worse than plane turbulence."

From other forums and social media I've been reading that the train took a diverging route at excess speed. A plain line emergency stop shouldn't result in injuries to seated paasengers. Lurching over points on the other hand...

If someone could give a quick explanation of how the railway manages locations on fast lines but which have two differing approach speeds (e.g. one for "Straight on" and another for "turn left") depending on circumstances, that would be appreciated. Does this depend on driver route knowledge and is there backup from automatic protection of some sort?

Thanks

Mark

Automatic Protection generally only kicks in if the signal was showing yellow/red lights. Again, reports say the signal was green, so no protection kicked in.

The late running 1Y16 to Kings Cross, which was booked to stop at PBO p3. It seems the Lumo service was changed to pass via p1 rather than its normal p3.

The late running 1Y16 to Kings Cross, which was booked to stop at PBO p3. It seems the Lumo service was changed to pass via p1 rather than its normal p3.

For those of you that haven’t experienced an emergency brake application from a relatively high speed on an 800 series unit, it’s completely different to that experienced on an HST or modern EMU. If you are standing up or not sitting securely in your seat, you will be at risk. Luggage will move too, depending on size and how it is stowed.

Timings on RTT for the 0820 Newcastle - Kings Cross (1Y80) show that it was 4 minutes early at New England North Jcn (passed 1017, scheduled 1021) but was 40 late through Peterborough and then took 46 minutes from Peterborough to Fletton Jcn (scheduled to take ½ minute). One possibility I would have suggested, if it hadn't already been commented that the signal was green, would have been an Adverse Change Of Aspect on the signal.

I will be interested to see what the RAIB report says on this one.

Dave

3. I note this comment from Clarence Yard on railforums (he's in GWR fleet management, but Lumo is a "TOC-lite" so relies on expertise from the rest of First Group):

I guess that implies that, with good adhesion, the combination of regenerative (traction motor) and friction braking can manage significantly more than 1.2 m/s/s - even from high speeds, where older high-speed trains struggle. Mind you, this was not really from high speed.

At around 10:20 hrs on 17 April 2022, the 08:20 hrs Newcastle to King’s Cross service, operated by Lumo, passed over three sets of points at the north end of Peterborough station at a speed of 75 mph (121 km/h). This was above the maximum permitted speed limit for these points of 25 mph (40 km/h). Passing over the points at this speed meant that the train suddenly lurched sideways.

The sudden movement of the train resulted in some passengers being thrown from their seats and in luggage falling from the overhead storage in the passenger compartments. This resulted in a number of minor injuries being sustained by passengers. The train subsequently came to a stand beyond the far end of Peterborough station. The train did not derail during the incident, and no damage was caused to the infrastructure of the railway, or to the vehicles involved.

The train involved in the incident was not due to call at Peterborough and had originally been approaching the station on a fast line, before being routed onto a slower line via the points where the overspeed occurred. The route onto this slower line was being displayed on the signal situated on the approach to the points.

Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events which led to this incident. It will include consideration of:

    the way in which the train was driven
    any factors which may have influenced the actions of the driver of the train
    the condition of the signalling system at the time of the incident
    the nature of the reported injuries
    any underlying management factors.

RAIB have - a bit later than you'd expect - announced an enquiry into this incident:

Urgent Safety Advice 02/2023: Overspeeding through Spital Junction
Published 25 May 2023

1. Safety issue

Suitable arrangements may not be in place to mitigate the risk of trains travelling southbound through Spital Junction at excessive speeds when signalled from the Up Fast line onto the Up Slow lines at Peterborough station.

P468 signal, which controls this junction, is located 700 metres on the approach to the point of divergence. The signal is fitted with a position light junction indicator informing drivers of their signalled route. Under certain circumstances, the signal clears from red as a train approaches when a diverging route is set. The maximum permitted speed through the diverging junction is initially 30 mph (48 km/h), before reducing further to 25 mph (40 km/h).

Drivers who rarely experience being routed towards the slow lines when approaching Peterborough station from the north, and whose trains are not scheduled to stop at the station, may develop an expectation that their train will remain on the Up Fast line and miss some of the information provided at P468 signal when their train is being signalled onto the diverging route.

In these circumstances the distance from which a proceed aspect on P468 signal can be seen by approaching trains, and the distance from the signal to the junction, is sufficient to result in some trains being able to accelerate to speeds which could lead to derailment by overturning when passing through the junction.

2. Safety advice

Duty holders should take immediate steps, either operationally, or by technical means, to mitigate this risk.

3. Issued to:

Network Rail and transport undertakings who operate trains on the East Coast Main Line through Peterborough station.

4. Background

On 17 April 2022, the driver of a Lumo service from Newcastle to London King’s Cross did not observe and react to the junction indicator on P468 signal which showed that the train was being signalled towards the slow lines at Spital Junction. Believing that his train was going to stay on the Up Fast line, he accelerated the train towards the junction and passed over it at 76 mph (122 km/h) instead of the 30 mph (48 km/h) maximum permitted speed.

On 4 May 2023, the driver of a Grand Central service from Sunderland to London King’s Cross did not observe and react to the junction indicator on P468 signal which showed that the train was being signalled towards the slow lines at Spital Junction. Believing that his train was to stay on the Up Fast line, he accelerated his train towards the junction and passed over it at 65 mph (105 km/h).

Station CCTV image of the train slowing down at Peterborough platform 1 following the overspeeding incident (courtesy of LNER).

At around 13:00 hrs on 4 May 2023, the 09:54 hrs Sunderland to King’s Cross service, operated by Grand Central, passed over three sets of points at Spital Junction on the northern approach to Peterborough station at a speed of around 65 mph (104 km/h). This was above the maximum permitted speed over the junction which is initially 30 mph (48 km/h) reducing to 25 mph (40 km/h).

The excessive speed over the points led to the train lurching sideways. This resulted in a number of minor injuries being sustained by passengers, with some being thrown from their seats.

The train subsequently came to a stand at Peterborough station under emergency braking. The train did not derail during the incident, and subsequent inspections found that no damage was caused to the infrastructure of the railway, or to the vehicles.

The train involved in the incident was not due to call at Peterborough. It had been approaching the station on a fast line, before being routed onto a slower line via the points where the overspeed occurred. The route onto this slower line was being displayed by the junction signal situated on the approach to the points.

Report 06/2023: Train overspeeding at Spital Junction

Train overspeeding at Spital Junction, Peterborough, 17 April 2022.

Summary

At around 10:20 hrs on 17 April 2022, the 08:20 hrs Lumo service from Newcastle to London King’s Cross, passed over three sets of points at Spital Junction at the northern approach to Peterborough station at excessive speed. The maximum permitted speed over the junction is initially 30 mph (48 km/h) reducing to 25 mph (40 km/h). The data recorder from the train indicated that the points had been traversed at a speed of 76 mph (122 km/h).

The speed of the train over the junction resulted in sudden sideways movements of the coaches. This led to some passengers being thrown from their seats and luggage falling from the overhead storage, with some passengers receiving minor injuries. Although the train did not derail, and no damage was caused, post-incident analysis has indicated that the train was close to a speed that would have led to it overturning, and it was likely that some of the wheels of the vehicles lifted off the rails.

RAIB’s investigation found that the overspeeding was caused by the driver of train 1Y80 not reacting appropriately to the signal indication they had received on approach to the junction. This signal indication was a warning that the train was to take a diverging route ahead which had a lower speed limit than the straight-ahead route which they were expecting to take. The driver’s awareness of the signal conditions that could be presented on approach to this junction and their training were not sufficient to overcome this expectation.

RAIB found that Lumo had not assessed and controlled the risk associated with trains being unexpectedly routed on a slower, diverging route at this location and that it had not adequately trained the driver to prepare for this eventuality. Network Rail had also neither assessed nor effectively controlled the risk of overspeeding at locations where there is a long distance between the protecting signal and the junction itself. The investigation also found that half of the passenger injuries were as a result of falling luggage that had been stowed in the overhead luggage racks.
Recommendations

RAIB has made four recommendations. The first recommendation is for Lumo to review its processes to ensure that it effectively controls the risk of overspeeding at diverging junctions. The second recommendation asks Network Rail to identify junctions where there is a greater potential for overspeeding to occur and to work with operators to share information on the associated risks. The third recommendation asks Network Rail and train operators to consider and implement risk control measures at those junctions identified in the second recommendation. The fourth recommendation is intended to ensure that Lumo minimises the risks from falling luggage on its services.

RAIB has also identified two learning points. These relate to the need for drivers to maintain alertness when approaching junction signals and that train operator emergency plans should specifically include processes to deal with the aftermath of overspeeding incidents.
May 2023 overspeeding incident

At around 13:00 hrs on 4 May 2023, another overspeeding incident occurred at the same location involving a Grand Central service. As a result, RAIB issued urgent safety advice to the industry and announced its intention to investigate this second incident. Further details can be found at paragraph 195 of this report.

Published 10 July 2023

Simulator training insufficiently detailed for that stretch of track?