Infrastructure problems in Thames Valley causing disruption elsewhere - ongoing, since Oct 2014

[whole diary]

[bobm]

Disruption now forecast to be over by 1430, which is better news.

And less encouragingly, now 16:30 though actual disruption being reported on JourneyCheck does seem minimal.

Hmmm ... Can't help wondering if this (and earlier cancellations) are from the same "operational incident" ... looks like 2 diagrams not running in the evening peak.

19:52 Reading to London Paddington due 20:46
19:52 Reading to London Paddington due 20:46 will be cancelled.
This is due to an operational incident.

Trains are being talked past one signal on the up relief so it may be a case of thinning out the service to reduce overall delays.

[TaplowGreen]

.......delays now back to 1830!

[CMRail]

A massive moan on twitter this morning, some blaming GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) as a company for their mistake, others thinking GWR are responsible for running the tracks and signalling.

[Electric train]

https://twitter.com/networkrailwest/status/1067340871799119872?s=21

Pictures tweeted by NR^» (Network Rail - home page)

As this is a electric traction unit ……….. you could say the unit has a earth fault 

Derailment like this don't happen too often these days, used to be quite common in BR^▸ (British Rail(ways)) days. 

Whilst this will lead to some disruption to passengers due to the unit not being available (for a while) at least the railways safety system protected everyone for serious injury … or worse.

[TaplowGreen]

A massive moan on twitter this morning, some blaming GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) as a company for their mistake, others thinking GWR are responsible for running the tracks and signalling.

It would appear that GWR's Driver is responsible, and GWR are accountable...………...but no doubt the bruvvers are marshalling already to blame the management, the Government, the weather and anyone/thing else who springs to mind.

"Massive moans" are hardly surprising from those who are delayed and inconvenienced (once again) by the chaotic nature of our railways...…………..but I'm sure you didn't mean that in a deprecating way towards its customers?

[SandTEngineer]

A massive moan on twitter this morning, some blaming GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) as a company for their mistake, others thinking GWR are responsible for running the tracks and signalling.

It would appear that GWR's Driver is responsible, and GWR are accountable...………...but no doubt the bruvvers are marshalling already to blame the management, the Government, the weather and anyone/thing else who springs to mind.

"Massive moans" are hardly surprising from those who are delayed and inconvenienced (once again) by the chaotic nature of our railways...…………..but I'm sure you didn't mean that in a deprecating way towards its customers?

Thats a bit unfair TG.  We don't yet know the facts behind the derailment (there could be several reasons not of the drivers making).  When carrying out investigations into such incidents you are always taught 'never assume anything'.

[TaplowGreen]

A massive moan on twitter this morning, some blaming GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) as a company for their mistake, others thinking GWR are responsible for running the tracks and signalling.

It would appear that GWR's Driver is responsible, and GWR are accountable...………...but no doubt the bruvvers are marshalling already to blame the management, the Government, the weather and anyone/thing else who springs to mind.

"Massive moans" are hardly surprising from those who are delayed and inconvenienced (once again) by the chaotic nature of our railways...…………..but I'm sure you didn't mean that in a deprecating way towards its customers?

Thats a bit unfair TG.  We don't yet know the facts behind the derailment (there could be several reasons not of the drivers making).  When carrying out investigations into such incidents you are always taught 'never assume anything'.

That's why I said "It would appear", rather than presenting it as a fact, but I do look forward to a statement from GWR confirming all the facts and what caused the SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger).

[IndustryInsider]

The root cause was driver error, but of course there are likely to be mitigating factors, such as familiarity with that signalling move, training, the weather, the location of the signals and method of signalling, the amount of rest the driver had before starting work, how long they’d driven before the incident, the last time they’d had something to eat and so on and so on.  The driver would also have been screened for alcohol and drugs. 

The SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger) review will be both thorough and fair and if any lessons are to be learned they will be.  The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) will also determine what, if any, involvement they will have.

[Electric train]

The root cause was driver error, but of course there are likely to be mitigating factors, such as familiarity with that signalling move, training, the weather, the location of the signals and method of signalling, the amount of rest the driver had before starting work, how long they’d driven before the incident, the last time they’d had something to eat and so on and so on.  The driver would also have been screened for alcohol and drugs. 

The SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger) review will be both thorough and fair and if any lessons are to be learned they will be.  The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) will also determine what, if any, involvement they will have.

Totally agree, i know how through these type of investigations are, the railway industry is constantly holding investigations into what some would say are minor events, although this is not minor but its not major either.


If anyone is concerned about how safe the railways are then compare the railways with this sad event - https://leamingtonobserver.co.uk/news/bus-driver-who-killed-two-people-in-sainsburys-crash-spared-jail-and-midland-red-fined-2-3m-10141/

[a-driver]

The root cause was driver error, but of course there are likely to be mitigating factors, such as familiarity with that signalling move, training, the weather, the location of the signals and method of signalling, the amount of rest the driver had before starting work, how long they’d driven before the incident, the last time they’d had something to eat and so on and so on.  The driver would also have been screened for alcohol and drugs. 

The SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger) review will be both thorough and fair and if any lessons are to be learned they will be.  The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) will also determine what, if any, involvement they will have.

Totally agree, i know how through these type of investigations are, the railway industry is constantly holding investigations into what some would say are minor events, although this is not minor but its not major either.


If anyone is concerned about how safe the railways are then compare the railways with this sad event - https://leamingtonobserver.co.uk/news/bus-driver-who-killed-two-people-in-sainsburys-crash-spared-jail-and-midland-red-fined-2-3m-10141/

All SPAD data is publicly available with a list of all SPAD's on the UK^▸ (United Kingdom) railway network since January 1985.  Nationally, this year, there has been about 260 Cat A SPADs. A Cat A's is generally down to driver error, low rail adhesion etc.  Of those 260 around 3 were deemed potentially severe in that it could have caused a collision.  The one at West Ealing yesterday would be deemed 'low risk'.  It was low speed in a siding, the train was derailed on a trap sending the train away from the mainline as it is designed to do.  Most SPAD's will go unnoticed by the travelling public, and that's not because they are covered up, nothing is covered up unlike they were in BR^▸ (British Rail(ways)) days.  Everything today is logged, the signalling equipment can be downloaded, there's CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) and there's on train data recorders.  Most will go unnoticed because on a mainline a safety system will apply the trains brakes and bring the train to a stand probably nearly always within the safety overlap of a signal.  If a SPAD occurs then the train will be terminated at the next station and the driver will not be allowed to go any futher.  That will happen if you SPAD by 1cm or 1mile, they are all treated and investigation in the same manner.  If you activate a train safety system because the system thinks you will SPAD. ie. You're approaching a red signal too fast, even if you stops you before the red signal, you will still be investigated and as a driver, you will be grilled.  The outcome can be a formal warning, complete retraining, attending human factors courses, counselling right through to being sacked.   
What caused most of the disruption at West Ealing was a signalling cable was cut by the derailed train and, in order to rerail it, they needed to isolate the overheard power lines.  If the train hadn't been derailed there would have been no disruption as a result of it. 
260 Cat A sounds a lot, obviously you aim for 0 but drivers are human, they will make mistakes.  When you look at how many trains are operated nationally, both freight and passenger, 260 is a tiny percentage.  And, as with any incident on the railway, lessons are learnt and if procedures can be changed to prevent it happening again, they will.  Fatigue is one of the main things they look at.  Companies use a fatigue index calculator when it comes to rostering but if you work a lot of overtime you can easily breach it and you will get told so along with a polite suggestion to say you might want to think about taking your next rest days off.
Ultimately, we are all human, we will make mistakes and it only takes a loss of concentration for a few seconds, distracted by something out of course and you've got a possible incident... the Swiss cheese model.  This is why we have safety systems as a backup, rarely needed, but they are there and, we've extensive and regular assessments, that's why we operate the safest railway system in the world. 

[Lee]

Thanks for that, a-driver - It's really useful to have all of that information clearly explained in one place.

[Gordon the Blue Engine]

Agree with all a-driver says.  However, one lesson that has not been learnt from previous incidents - going back years - is not to put S&T^▸ (Signalling and Telegraph) cabinets, cables, electrification masts etc behind buffer stops and in the line of trap points.

[Electric train]

Agree with all a-driver says.  However, one lesson that has not been learnt from previous incidents - going back years - is not to put S&T^▸ (Signalling and Telegraph) cabinets, cables, electrification masts etc behind buffer stops and in the line of trap points.

Easy to say, easy to ask for not always easy to achieve given the available real estate to place such items.

There will always inevitably be some signalling, electrification assets in such areas, isolating the OLE^▸ (Overhead Line Equipment, more often "OHLE") is one thing that cannot be avoided and whilst section insulators and insulated overlaps are place to separate sidings and diverging lines there are again places where ideal placement cannot be achieved.


Having worked on many HazId / HazOp panels the consequences against likelihood often produce a low risk; once in 25 years does not warrant a expenditure to avoid the risk

[Gordon the Blue Engine]

Yes, clearly the high cost of putting in trap points is justified by mitigating the potential consequences of a SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger).  However, it may be that only a modest cost is involved in, say, moving the cable troughs a few metres.   And at Padd was there really no other option than to locate the trap points and OHLE mast (I don't know which was there first) such that the low speed SPAD in P1A by the ECS^▸ (Empty Coaching Stock) Turbo a couple of years ago brought down half the wires and caused huge disruption?

With new installations/schemes there may be no or minimal costs involved in keeping S&T^▸ (Signalling and Telegraph) and OHLE clear of trap points.

[Dispatch Box]

Agree with all a-driver says.  However, one lesson that has not been learnt from previous incidents - going back years - is not to put S&T^▸ (Signalling and Telegraph) cabinets, cables, electrification masts etc behind buffer stops and in the line of trap points.

That is true, They did just that in the 1960,s When Reading Panel was built, Some where by Goring they built a relay room at the end of a siding. In 1975 a light engine was signalled onto it, only that the driver thought he was on the relief line, only to smash through the stop block and into the relay room, It caused mayhem to a section of automatic signalling and my father was called to work at 4.20 in the morning to attend, When the signalman had a section of his panel suddenly turn all red. The section was hand signalled for about 4 weeks to allow for the room to be rebuilt.