Collision between two trains at Plymouth Station - 3 April 2016 - merged topic

[whole diary]

[bobm]

GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) have 119 power cars and, from the last set of diagrams I saw, need 108 in service each day to cover the timetable.

That leaves 11 "spare" - some of which may already be in need of major overhauls or been sent away to be refurbished/repainted.

The next few days may give a clue to how much of an effect losing 43160 will have.  Look out for the 07:15 London Paddington to Cardiff Central and return at 09:55 being cancelled - that's the usual favourite when things are tight.

[TonyK]

Latest on the injuries:

3 heavily injured
5 walking wounded
10 minor injuries

Driver is one of the walking wounded.

The injuries will likely be more serious as people would have been standing, getting ready to disembark. Hopefully, all are now on the way to full recovery.

I suspect you might have fallen foul of the forum's broken "Show unread posts since last visit" function.

I thought it had been removed, rather than broken. If it still works, tell me where I find it!

[Sam290893]

3 people still remain in hospital, and there were no serious injuries thank goodness, now just for RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) to find out what has happened.

[LiskeardRich]

A photo on the south west railways and heritage Facebook group shows the 2nd carriage and possibly the 1st were fouling the points blocking 6,7,8 from Cornwall end,
The HST^▸ (High Speed Train) was pulled almost to the Cornwall end of the platform so no way the 150 was getting into the platform.

[Sam290893]

A photo on the south west railways and heritage Facebook group shows the 2nd carriage and possibly the 1st were fouling the points blocking 6,7,8 from Cornwall end,
The HST^▸ (High Speed Train) was pulled almost to the Cornwall end of the platform so no way the 150 was getting into the platform.

I saw this photo, I think either way the train wouldn't have been able to fit, we shall see what RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) find. Just good news that there was no serious injuries.

[Chris from Nailsea]

I suspect you might have fallen foul of the forum's broken "Show unread posts since last visit" function.

I thought it had been removed, rather than broken. If it still works, tell me where I find it!

It's the link on the first line on the right, next to your profile, whenever you're logged in to the Coffee Shop forum:

http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?action=unread

 

[TonyK]

It's the link on the first line on the right, next to your profile, whenever you're logged in to the Coffee Shop forum:

Ha! All I had to do was to click the little "+" sign next to the date, and I'm back in the room! I must have clicked the little "-" sign one time.

[ChrisB]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) are investigating

At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 35 people, including the driver of one of the trains were injured, some seriously.

The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not, because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had one member of staff on board.

Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 60 passengers on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working, and is allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.

Approaching Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 14 mph (22 km/h) approaching signal P15 on the approach to Plymouth station. This signal cleared from red (meaning stop) to an indication meaning that the train may proceed into platform 6, but that the driver must be prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. Signal P15 is located around 333 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood.

The train then accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h) and as train 2E68 approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train^s fixtures and onto the floor.

Our investigation will include examination of:
^the actions of staff involved
^the signalling and platform working arrangements at Plymouth station
^the performance of the train during the collision
^any underlying management factors.

[JayMac]

Pretty much as I privately suspected. Whilst not the final report and not the RAIBs^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) job to apportion blame, it does show where the evidence is pointing.

[ChrisB]

It'll be interesting to see if that becomes the end of permissive working on that platform

[SandTEngineer]

Pretty much as I privately suspected. Whilst not the final report and not the RAIBs^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) job to apportion blame, it does show where the evidence is pointing.

Where might that be then?  The remit looks quite broad to me at the moment.

[Tim]

Pretty much as I privately suspected. Whilst not the final report and not the RAIBs^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) job to apportion blame, it does show where the evidence is pointing.

Where might that be then?  The remit looks quite broad to me at the moment.

And there seems to be a number of contributing factors, both in the design of "the system" and the behaviour of both the Signaller and the Driver.  Whilst it may be possible to attach "blame" in a legal sense to a single individual, I suspect that the RAIB (who do not seek to apportion blame) will make recommendations impacting on multiple areas of operation/behaviour. 

[chrisr_75]

Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train^s fixtures and onto the floor.

And this is the lesson for the passengers, well known fact from previous incidents that in collisions such as this that standing pax are usually the worst injured. Well worth staying seated if possible until the train (or bus, tram etc) has come to a complete stop

[TaplowGreen]

Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train^s fixtures and onto the floor.

And this is the lesson for the passengers, well known fact from previous incidents that in collisions such as this that standing pax are usually the worst injured. Well worth staying seated if possible until the train (or bus, tram etc) has come to a complete stop

................worth bearing in mind the next time the standard GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) line is trotted out about overcrowded trains with multiple standees not presenting a risk to health and safety...........

[JayMac]

Pretty much as I privately suspected. Whilst not the final report and not the RAIBs^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) job to apportion blame, it does show where the evidence is pointing.

Where might that be then?  The remit looks quite broad to me at the moment.

And there seems to be a number of contributing factors, both in the design of "the system" and the behaviour of both the Signaller and the Driver.  Whilst it may be possible to attach "blame" in a legal sense to a single individual, I suspect that the RAIB (who do not seek to apportion blame) will make recommendations impacting on multiple areas of operation/behaviour. 

I'm free to attribute blame to many, one, none. Individuals or entities. Based on the evidence presented thus far. That attribution of blame may differ from that of the BTP^▸ (British Transport Police), ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) and the employers of the staff involved. I suspect it won't in this case though, unless the sequence of events is vastly different to that laid out in the RAIB Bulletin.