Fire on train near Twyford - 18 May 2016

[whole diary]

[JayMac]

And I suppose how you define 'fire'. Ladbroke Grove fire was the result of a collision.

I'm struggling to recall any on train incidents in the last 20 years where fire was the only cause of death.

[IndustryInsider]

And I suppose how you define 'fire'. Ladbroke Grove fire was the result of a collision.

I'm struggling to recall any on train incidents in the last 20 years where fire was the only cause of death.

There was this one - though believed to be a suicide:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-13063549

Going back further, there was this infamous one:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taunton_sleeping_car_fire

Perhaps the fact there haven't been many serious ones is a little bit down to luck as well as modern safety practices?

[JayMac]

And if it's luck or modern safety practices then there's no evidence for the RMT^▸ (National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers) stance of, "guard saved the day" or the that DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) is inherently dangerous.

[IndustryInsider]

I don't necessarily disagree with that, but I do think that having a guard (or other trained member of staff) on each service proves beneficial in the majority of on-train emergencies; equipment failure (like today), medical, or a more serious incident such as a derailment or collision.

In some cases it's beneficial only in an organisational sense with one person dealing with the train and the other the passengers.  Over the years I've dealt with a total failure scenario on both DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) and non DOO services and I can tell you that a drivers blood pressure is much lower when there's someone to take care of dealing with the passengers, whilst the driver assesses and deals with the fault (whilst liaising with signallers, control etc.) than when you're responsible for everything.

In other cases it could, in the right circumstances, be life saving.

[JayMac]

One has to take the role of Devil's Advocate when it comes to countering the RMTs^▸ (National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers) utterances.

I've little time for that particular union. They always seem to shoot first and ask questions later.

Emergency situations are, by their very nature, unpredictable. Proven statistics that additional trained staff save lives are hard to come by. We're it proven by the HSE^▸ (Health and Safety Executive) et al that DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) is an unsafe way to operate trains then we wouldn't have it.

There's nothing wrong with the RMT wanting to protect their members jobs, but using 'safety' as the main argument is flawed.

[Trowres]

Worth reading this RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report
https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/547c8fe040f0b6024100016d/R072012_120523_Kentish_Town.pdf

The driver of train 1W95 was not given adequate support during the incident,
which affected his ability to manage the conditions on board the train

The whole report is very long but makes fascinating reading, with a "perfect storm" of faults beyond the capabilities of the diagnostic computers, communication difficulties, incompatible train couplers, passenger communication equipment that failed (loss of power) when it was most needed... and a train full & standing with no aircon for not far off three hours.

[ChrisB]

Not much then that another staff member might have been able to do, (except provide assurance) for those pax,.

[Chris from Nailsea]

With thanks to Trowres for posting details of the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report on the Kentish Town incident of 26 May 2011, may I also offer a link to the discussion we had here on the Coffee Shop forum at that time, at http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=9027.0 

[Electric train]

Train looks like a 180, under frame engine units have very effective fire suppression systems and fire barrier.  I suspect most of what was seen was some smoke from the fire but majority would be the fire extinguisher discharge.

Does a "Train Guard" add any more to safety than a "Train Manager" in this type of incident? 

On some of the project work I was involved in for Canal Tunnels evacuation plan the addition of one extra member of train crew over the drive when there can be up to a 1000 passengers on board does very little to aid the evacuation process

[IndustryInsider]

The train concerned was back out in service the next day, indicating it wasn't much of an incident at all, and was dealt with very swiftly.

[ChrisB]

Does a "Train Guard" add any more to safety than a "Train Manager" in this type of incident? 

Or even the GTR equivalent that they want to introduce as "On-Train Supervisors"

[Oxman]

I don't know if it is still the case, but when I joined FGW^▸ (First Great Western) back in the early noughties all staff were trained in train evacuation as part of their induction course. This involved a trip to SPM^▸ (St Philip's Marsh (Bristol depot)) where they had a carriage that could be filled with smoke to simulate a fire. We were trained in lateral evacuation (moving customers down the train away from the smoke), how to deal with customers in such a situation, the location of the emergency alarms and equipment, and how to safely evacuate passengers to the track side if needed. This was given to all staff, so I would expect any member of staff on board to have some idea what to do in this situation. Many staff were also trained to make emergency telephone calls - all station staff received an annual brief on this.

Train Managers/guards are safety critical staff and have two additional qualifications.

Firstly they are trained in PTS^▸ (Personal Track Safety) - Personal Track Safety. This sounds as if it ought to be mainly about how to keep yourself safe when on or about the track, and it certainly includes that. The main element though is about train protection in an emergency - knowing where and how to place detonators and track circuit clips to protect a stricken train. If a train derailed, the first duty of the driver and the guard is to inform the signaller and then protect the train, by walking down the line and placing detonators. Only then should they turn to helping customers. Incidentally, there are quite a lot of staff who have PTS certification to assist with their job. It was a two day course when I did it with a biannual competency test.

Secondly, they are of course trained in the safety critical aspects of train operation, the most obvious being train dispatch. They also must have route knowledge and traction safety training (eg, how to do a brake test on an HST^▸ (High Speed Train)). Competence managers will regularly audit their performance and they have a biannual competency exam.

I retired a few years ago, so things may have changed. But my own feelings are that it is highly desirable to have a second person on board a long distance service, primarily for customer service. However I see no need for them to be safety critical on trains that can be operated DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)). Safety training, including PTS, should be provided to all on board staff, so that they can assist in an emergency. But it should not be a requirement to have such a person on every train, all of the time.

Its time the RMT^▸ (National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers) joined the real world.

[a-driver]

The train concerned was back out in service the next day, indicating it wasn't much of an incident at all, and was dealt with very swiftly.

180108 stopped tonight with fire bells ringing! 

[eightf48544]

And I suppose how you define 'fire'. Ladbroke Grove fire was the result of a collision.

I'm struggling to recall any on train incidents in the last 20 years where fire was the only cause of death.

There was the Maidenhead incident where a fire was caused by a ruptured HST^▸ (High Speed Train) fuel tank. A passenger was killed alighting from the train onto the Up Main into the path of another train. But as you say the fire wasn't strictly the cause of death.

Re the 180 it is suggested that the incident wasn't a fire on the train as such but was caused by a polythene bottle blown from the track and caught in the engine and smouldering.  So it's Network Rail to pay GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway).