Paddington platform 9 closed 08/08/2018

[whole diary]

[martyjon]

JourneyCheck informing that platform 9 at PAD^» (Paddington (London) - next trains) is closed some services being terminated at Reading, mainly Bedwyn services when I checked.

[a-driver]

JourneyCheck informing that platform 9 at PAD^» (Paddington (London) - next trains) is closed some services being terminated at Reading, mainly Bedwyn services when I checked.

Defective longitudinal timbers on Platform 9.

[JayMac]

This time the fault was spotted before a train fell off. 

[onthecushions]

Well spotted.

Could have been a repeat of:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-42078931

One wonders whether such track bases are laterally weak, compared with a conventional sleeper/cross-tie?

OTC

[JayMac]

Begs the question whether the inspection regime is still failing.

Should it not be proactive, finding and fixing faults during quiet hours, rather than reactive and shutting a platform through a weekday rush hour?

[Oxonhutch]

I saw it being inspected around lunchtime on Monday by a lone NR^» (Network Rail - home page) engineer, so I assume the closure was as a result of this activity. I was surprised at the time as OpenTimeTrains did not show the track as blocked.

[JayMac]

OTT^▸ (Open Train Times website) maps did show the line into P9 as 'SHUT' earlier in the day.

[bobm]

Repair work is continuing with the hope Platform 9 can be reopened towards the end of the morning peak.

[dviner]

Begs the question whether the inspection regime is still failing.

Should it not be proactive, finding and fixing faults during quiet hours, rather than reactive and shutting a platform through a weekday rush hour?

Well, it looks as though the amount of work required in order to fix the fault would have exceeded any available "quiet hours", so disruption was on the cards. If that's the case, then you just have to bite the bullet and get on with it.

[JayMac]

I appreciate its the modern way that such relatively minor works require all sorts of assessments, costings, briefings, etc. All checked and doubled checked. And not least, available staff to do the job.

But, just for comparison. In 1892, 117 miles of GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) broad gauge track, across the network, including main and branch lines, was converted to standard gauge in one weekend. Work started after the last express from Paddington to the west on Friday night, and was completed in time for the first Monday morning express.

Now surely, despite modern requirements, a short defective length of track and its supporting timbers can be identified and replaced in one overnight possession. Its not as if the fault was in a difficult hard to access location.

[ellendune]

If you read about some of the preparations carried out in advance of the 1892 works I think they would have significantly compromised the safety of passengers and I am surprised there were no accidents in the days or weeks either side. I recall reading that ballast was dug out, alternate cross timbers cut. I hope there were speed limits in force.

[Electric train]

I appreciate its the modern way that such relatively minor works require all sorts of assessments, costings, briefings, etc. All checked and doubled checked. And not least, available staff to do the job.

But, just for comparison. In 1892, 117 miles of GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) broad gauge track, across the network, including main and branch lines, was converted to standard gauge in one weekend. Work started after the last express from Paddington to the west on Friday night, and was completed in time for the first Monday morning express.

Now surely, despite modern requirements, a short defective length of track and its supporting timbers can be identified and replaced in one overnight possession. Its not as if the fault was in a difficult hard to access location.

In 1892 there was little or no regard for the safety of track workers, things were only slightly better for the safety of passengers.   In the last 6 or so years a process called Adjacent Line On (ALO) has been brought in.  This requires certain safety measure to be in place to protect both passage of trains on an adjacent line and of the staff working on the line closed to traffic.  In the situation such as Platform 9 at Padd you could not meet the ALO requirements with platform 10 open.


Funding of such repairs is not a major issue, every Route Asset Manager has a "Reactionary Works Budget" also Route Managieing Directors can authorise overspends in such circumstances.

[SandTEngineer]

We seem to be discussing this in two seperate threads.

ET, what I have commented on elsewhere is why the track was allowed to get so bad in the first place?  Surely the infrastructure inspection regieme should have picked it up, and planning taken place to undertake the work in a timely manner, been to the forefront of NRs^» (Network Rail - home page) responsibilities?

[CJB666]

We seem to be discussing this in two seperate threads.

ET, what I have commented on elsewhere is why the track was allowed to get so bad in the first place?  Surely the infrastructure inspection regieme should have picked it up, and planning taken place to undertake the work in a timely manner, been to the forefront of NRs^» (Network Rail - home page) responsibilities?

Remember when a few years back a SWT^▸ (South West Trains) train derailed at Windsor and Eton Riverside station due to rotten sleepers and the rails spreading apart out of guage. A bit like Network Rail management - rotten to the core.

https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/derailment-at-windsor-and-eton-riverside-station