Emergency stop - 08:20 Newcastle to London (Lumo) 17.4.2022

[whole diary]

[jamestheredengine]

3. I note this comment from Clarence Yard on railforums (he's in GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) fleet management, but Lumo is a "TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company)-lite" so relies on expertise from the rest of First Group):

For those of you that haven’t experienced an emergency brake application from a relatively high speed on an 800 series unit, it’s completely different to that experienced on an HST^▸ (High Speed Train) or modern EMU^▸ (Electric Multiple Unit). If you are standing up or not sitting securely in your seat, you will be at risk. Luggage will move too, depending on size and how it is stowed.

I guess that implies that, with good adhesion, the combination of regenerative (traction motor) and friction braking can manage significantly more than 1.2 m/s/s - even from high speeds, where older high-speed trains struggle. Mind you, this was not really from high speed.

I've been on one that did an emergency stop from reasonably high speed (75mph, I think). Wednesday February 5th, 2020. This was on 1B21, the 1548 Paddington (1742 Cardiff) to Swansea. The guard had checked our tickets after we'd left Cardiff and gone into the kitchen, and we'd got our free wine (glass of red, nice) and thankfully the host had also just made it back into the kitchen with the trolley. We get to the last signal before Pontyclun and I was very glad I had a napkin under my wine to slow its journey across the table enough for me to catch it (could have been messy!). We came to a stop with First Class short of the platform at Pontyclun – very impressive. No sooner had we come to a stop than the guard emerges from the kitchen muttering "this isn't good at all", followed by a louder "is everyone okay?" What it turned out had happened was that there was a thankfully totally incompetent "distressed person" on the line in front of TfW's stationary stopping service at Pencoed (there was a steel train between them and us (yes, brilliant work from the signallers there...) – hence the quite so awkward location for an emergency stop – the natural worry there is that that's the signal where you'd find out that something had gone awry with the barriers at Llantrisant West Level Crossing, but the front of the train wouldn't have reached that). We had about a 40-minute delay as the police persuaded the distressed person to leave the railway. Everything was all right in the end (and we all got seconds of wine). But the rate at which that stopped was truly staggering.

[stuving]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have - a bit later than you'd expect - announced an enquiry into this incident:

At around 10:20 hrs on 17 April 2022, the 08:20 hrs Newcastle to King’s Cross service, operated by Lumo, passed over three sets of points at the north end of Peterborough station at a speed of 75 mph (121 km/h). This was above the maximum permitted speed limit for these points of 25 mph (40 km/h). Passing over the points at this speed meant that the train suddenly lurched sideways.

The sudden movement of the train resulted in some passengers being thrown from their seats and in luggage falling from the overhead storage in the passenger compartments. This resulted in a number of minor injuries being sustained by passengers. The train subsequently came to a stand beyond the far end of Peterborough station. The train did not derail during the incident, and no damage was caused to the infrastructure of the railway, or to the vehicles involved.

The train involved in the incident was not due to call at Peterborough and had originally been approaching the station on a fast line, before being routed onto a slower line via the points where the overspeed occurred. The route onto this slower line was being displayed on the signal situated on the approach to the points.

Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events which led to this incident. It will include consideration of:

    the way in which the train was driven
    any factors which may have influenced the actions of the driver of the train
    the condition of the signalling system at the time of the incident
    the nature of the reported injuries
    any underlying management factors.

[stuving]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have - a bit later than you'd expect - announced an enquiry into this incident:

RAIB have now issued some "urgent" safety advice, following that Lumo incident and a strikingly similar one for a GC^» (Great Central Railway - link to heritage line) train earlier this month. It all comes down one of those complicated signalling issues to do with flashing yellow aspects for turnouts, but the potential - and actual - results are far from subtle.

Urgent Safety Advice 02/2023: Overspeeding through Spital Junction
Published 25 May 2023

1. Safety issue

Suitable arrangements may not be in place to mitigate the risk of trains travelling southbound through Spital Junction at excessive speeds when signalled from the Up Fast line onto the Up Slow lines at Peterborough station.

P468 signal, which controls this junction, is located 700 metres on the approach to the point of divergence. The signal is fitted with a position light junction indicator informing drivers of their signalled route. Under certain circumstances, the signal clears from red as a train approaches when a diverging route is set. The maximum permitted speed through the diverging junction is initially 30 mph (48 km/h), before reducing further to 25 mph (40 km/h).

Drivers who rarely experience being routed towards the slow lines when approaching Peterborough station from the north, and whose trains are not scheduled to stop at the station, may develop an expectation that their train will remain on the Up Fast line and miss some of the information provided at P468 signal when their train is being signalled onto the diverging route.

In these circumstances the distance from which a proceed aspect on P468 signal can be seen by approaching trains, and the distance from the signal to the junction, is sufficient to result in some trains being able to accelerate to speeds which could lead to derailment by overturning when passing through the junction.

2. Safety advice

Duty holders should take immediate steps, either operationally, or by technical means, to mitigate this risk.

3. Issued to:

Network Rail and transport undertakings who operate trains on the East Coast Main Line through Peterborough station.

4. Background

On 17 April 2022, the driver of a Lumo service from Newcastle to London King’s Cross did not observe and react to the junction indicator on P468 signal which showed that the train was being signalled towards the slow lines at Spital Junction. Believing that his train was going to stay on the Up Fast line, he accelerated the train towards the junction and passed over it at 76 mph (122 km/h) instead of the 30 mph (48 km/h) maximum permitted speed.

On 4 May 2023, the driver of a Grand Central service from Sunderland to London King’s Cross did not observe and react to the junction indicator on P468 signal which showed that the train was being signalled towards the slow lines at Spital Junction. Believing that his train was to stay on the Up Fast line, he accelerated his train towards the junction and passed over it at 65 mph (105 km/h).

(If you look at the timeline of RAIB's outputs you'll see why I put quotes round "urgent".)

[stuving]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have today announced an investigation into the second overspeed incident (of a GC^» (Great Central Railway - link to heritage line) train on 4th May 2023). The statement refers to the earlier incident, and the urgent safety notice, but does not say anything about the investigations being combined, or even that the second one will rely heavily on the first.

Station CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) image of the train slowing down at Peterborough platform 1 following the overspeeding incident (courtesy of LNER^» (London North Eastern Railway - about)).

At around 13:00 hrs on 4 May 2023, the 09:54 hrs Sunderland to King’s Cross service, operated by Grand Central, passed over three sets of points at Spital Junction on the northern approach to Peterborough station at a speed of around 65 mph (104 km/h). This was above the maximum permitted speed over the junction which is initially 30 mph (48 km/h) reducing to 25 mph (40 km/h).

The excessive speed over the points led to the train lurching sideways. This resulted in a number of minor injuries being sustained by passengers, with some being thrown from their seats.

The train subsequently came to a stand at Peterborough station under emergency braking. The train did not derail during the incident, and subsequent inspections found that no damage was caused to the infrastructure of the railway, or to the vehicles.

The train involved in the incident was not due to call at Peterborough. It had been approaching the station on a fast line, before being routed onto a slower line via the points where the overspeed occurred. The route onto this slower line was being displayed by the junction signal situated on the approach to the points.