Very poor planning if a single power failure can cause this scale of disruption.
What exactly has failed ? If the incoming supply from the DNO▸ has failed, then network rail should have a functioning emergency generator to supply signalling and other critical loads.
If the incoming supply is functioning, and the fault lies in network rail internal infrastructure, then this should have been duplicated, with two supplies to critical loads, via different routes and preferably from different substations.
Presumably the DC▸ traction supply is still available ? Did no one think of installing a backup supply to signalling, this being derived from the traction current supply.
And as a last resort, what about a hired generator ? These are available on short notice from Agreko, MEMs power and many others. They also hire cables and distribution equipment.
The Southern Regions power supplies are generally very robust, signalling power supply points have 2 supplies available from the
NR» internal high Voltage distribution network which can be feed from 2 or more DNO /
TNO▸ bulk supply points, in the London area a dedicated 400V DNO supply as a back up. It's not usual to have generators because of the 3 sources of supply, generators are notoriously unreliable ie never work when you need them.
There are UPS on the power supply system these are designed and size to only cover the time it takes to change from supply to another, there are smaller ones to cover a local power outage but these are only to allow systems to transfer or shut down safely.
Like all power supply systems there are weak points which are designed out as far as posible but you can never achieve a 100%. A small piece of equipment fire in a relay room for instance can have a major impact, this may be the relay room etc.
The power supply to signalling systems in large and complex