Great Western Main Line electrification - ongoing discussion

[whole diary]

[bradshaw]

The impression I get, from the NAO report and the Minister's statement, is that the lines are deferred only just to CP6^▸ (Control Period 6 - The five year period between 2019 and 2024). Tables in the report give this impression.
It would seem, therefore, that the plan is to focus all resources on getting to Cardiff. After that one might expect the deferred lines will be re-instated, probably sequentially, in order of greatest return: ?Parkway to Temple Meads, thence to Swindon. Oxford may be done after the NR^» (Network Rail - home page) upgrades have all taken place in the Station.
Electrification to Swansea is probably not looking to good though, unless funded by the Welsh Goverment.

[onthecushions]

What has happened to our planning, logistics and engineering expertise?

98 years ago my grandfather helped push a numerically superior German Army out of France in just 100 days.

The planning and logistics for that were enormous 1 million men in France. They make GWML^▸ (Great Western Main Line) electrification look trivial especially as nobody's shooting at the engineers.

....but the British Army's learning curve was four years long and cost c750 000 lives before it twigged how to integrate an infantry attack supported by tanks under a creeping artillery barage with mass tactical air support overhead. That's what beat the German Army economically in August 1918. This, combined with the terror felt by the German Navy at the prospect of being sent to sea against a painfully re-educated but now supremely competent Royal Navy, drove Germany to revolutionary collapse.

We promptly forgot the lessons of 1918 only to have the Germans play them back to us 20 odd years later.

From which I deduce that had we a proper railway with an established chief electrical engineer's department able to manage investment, renewals and maintenance, then we could be zipping around an electrified Western very soon.

Remembrance

OTC

[onthecushions]

I don't think the flat-out speed of an 800 matters much in itself, so much as the lousy acceleration up to (say) 160 km/hr. The acceleration at low speeds is limited by adhesion (and sometimes by the drive as well), up to a threshold above which it is power-limited. That threshold is lower when less power is available.

Peering at the back of my (Microsoft-supplied) envelope, it looks roughly like this:                 

	Threshold, km/hr	seconds to 160 km/hr
800, electric	61	113
802, diesel	29	226
800, diesel	37	312
HST▸ (High Speed Train)	60	262

Some of the parameters that were used in that are only estimatesguesses, bit the general trend should be right. And that says ... worse than an HST. And that down-rating really hurts.

Gradients make less difference than you'd expect, at least on this flat track. Once up to speed at below 180km/hr, there is enough power in hand for 1 in 100. (Re)accelerating up any gradient will always be slower, though.

 Just found a loco performance log for King Edward 5 + 8, departing Bath, reached 54mph in 5 miles but down to 35mph at the top of the grade, Box Tunnel Eastern portal.

OTC

[stuving]

Looking at this, from the NAO report:

The Department has instructed Network Rail to defer electrification on some stretches
of the route for longer, reflecting between £146 million and £165 million of spending,
because it cannot meet the costs within the current funding package. It still intends to
electrify these sections, during the next rail investment period, which runs from April 2019
to March 2024.

There's no need to know whether that's a sincere intention to complete the plan, since such an intention could change before then anyway. Then there is this:

2 .11 The Department’s May 2016 decision to procure all the new Intercity Express trains
for Great Western as bi-modes, rather than a combination of bi-modes and electric trains,
affects the assumptions underpinning the March 2015 business case. This recent change
calls into question whether the full extent of electrification under the programme is still
justified, as the new trains will now all be able to run on non-electrified route sections.

In other words, there is now an alternative and the costs and benefits can be compared, not just within DfT^» (Department for Transport - about) but by anyone else.

[Kenny]

National Audit Office 09/11/16

https://www.nao.org.uk/report/modernising-the-great-western-railway/

Modernising the Great Western railway

The cost of modernising the Great Western railway is estimated to be £5.58 billion, an increase of £2.1 billion since 2013, and there are delays to the electrification of the route of at least 18 to 36 months. The Department for Transport and Network Rail have begun to improve the management of the programme but they have more to do to protect value for money in the future.

The cost of modernising the Great Western railway is currently estimated to be £5.58 billion, an increase of £2.1 billion since 2013, and there are delays to the electrification of the route of at least 18 to 36 months. Delays to the electrification programme will cost the Department up to £330 million. These cost increases and recent changes to the new trains order mean that the value for money of the programme needs to be reassessed, and the extent of electrification reconsidered, according to a report today by the National Audit Office.

The Great Western route has some of the most overcrowded services in England and Wales and has forecast passenger growth of 81% between 2013-14 and 2018-19. The modernisation programme involves complex infrastructure works, new trains and service changes. These aim to improve services along the rail route, which connects London with west and south-west England and south Wales and passes through heritage areas and areas of outstanding natural beauty.

Before 2015, the Department did not plan and manage all the projects which now make up the Great Western Route Modernisation industry programme in a sufficiently joined up way. The Department did not produce a business case bringing together all elements of the programme until March 2015, more than two years after ordering the trains and over a year after Network Rail began work to electrify the route. When the Department entered into a contract to buy the Intercity Express Trains, creating fixed deadlines for electrification, the infrastructure planning work was still at a very early stage of development. This is illustrated by the fact that Network Rail had only just identified that it would need to develop a new type of electrification equipment. The electrification timetable was not based on a bottom-up understanding of what the works would involve.

In 2015 Network Rail re-planned the infrastructure programme after it became clear that costs were increasing and the schedule could not be met. Electrification between Maidenhead and Cardiff is now expected to cost £2.8 billion, an increase of £1.2 billion (70%) against the estimated cost of the programme in 2014.

Network Rail’s 2014 cost estimate was unrealistic. It was too optimistic about the productivity of new technology. It underestimated how many bridges it would need to rebuild or modify and also the time and therefore costs needed to obtain planning permission and other consents for some works. Failings in Network Rail’s approach to planning and delivering the infrastructure programme further increased costs. It did not work out a ‘critical path’ – the minimum feasible schedule for the work, including dependencies between key stages – before starting to deliver electrification. It also did not conduct sufficiently detailed surveys of the locations for the structures, which meant that some design work had to be repeated.

Delays to the electrification programme will cost the Department up to £330 million. The Department intends to vary its order of Intercity Express trains so that they can operate under both diesel and electric power. The Department will also receive less income from the Great Western franchise between September 2015 and March 2019. This is because the train operator will bear the costs of providing extra trains and leasing depots, as well as higher running costs from operating diesel trains for longer, while also receiving less revenue from passengers than expected.

Some passengers in the north and west of England may have to wait longer, some nine months and up to two years respectively, to see improvements such as increased capacity in services because of the delays to the programme. Any additional delays would be difficult to address and put pressure on the Department’s rail franchising programme.

Network Rail has a challenging task to deliver the main benefits from the infrastructure programme, within the current schedule and budget. The schedule for electrification contains some ambitious assumptions while the budget for the electrification programme between London and Cardiff currently has less funding available to manage risk than Network Rail believes it needs.

Some passengers will have to wait longer to see the full benefits of modernisation because of budget constraints. The Department has delayed electrification on some stretches of the route as the costs cannot be met within the funding package. The Department currently intends to electrify these sections but not until the next rail investment period, which runs from April 2019 to March 2024.

[grahame]

National Audit Office 09/11/16

https://www.nao.org.uk/report/modernising-the-great-western-railway/

Modernising the Great Western railway

The cost of modernising the Great Western railway is estimated to be £5.58 billion, an increase of £2.1 billion since 2013, and there are delays to the electrification of the route of at least 18 to 36 months. The Department for Transport and Network Rail have begun to improve the management of the programme but they have more to do to protect value for money in the future.

[snip]

Welcome to the forum, Kenny - your first post  .    What do you make of all this?

[Oberon]

Looks like everything left to do has been scoped into CP6^▸ (Control Period 6 - The five year period between 2019 and 2024).

In a way this is unbelievable, a nightmare scenario, I remember when the ECML^▸ (East Coast Main Line) was electrified in the 1980s everything seemed to happen quickly and the total cost was under budget. I suspect, although I do not know, that the GW^▸ (Great Western) scheme has been massively over-engineered. My suspicion is that our old friend Health & Safety is probably at the root of it all.

[grahame]

Looks like everything left to do has been scoped into CP6^▸ (Control Period 6 - The five year period between 2019 and 2024).

Are the new costs / dates realistic? Or might we see some things not completed within CP6 even if currently scoped there?

[TaplowGreen]

.............manana, manana, manana.............

[ChrisB]

That all depends on how much £££ the Government put into CP6^▸ (Control Period 6 - The five year period between 2019 and 2024).....I'm not sure that figure has been decided.

However, an awful lot of identified works have been deferred to CP6, and is already scoped for CP6 by NR^» (Network Rail - home page) - can anyone find any sort of list of these projects, ideally with a cost estimate? I'd be interested in knowing how much that is, so at least able to compare with other CP periods as to whether it is likely to all happen.

[ChrisB]

I wonder whether that decision was deliberate to achieve this change? Surely the bods at the DfT^» (Department for Transport - about) would have realised that the business case for electrification would change with all bi-modes?

[simonw]

I am probably not alone in feeling sorry for Network Rail.

The continued lack of proper investment in rail assets for 80+ years has left many parts of the network dilapidated, and when NR^» (Network Rail - home page) come along with the simple task of deploying electrification to a line and its primary branch line, it uncovers a lot of neglect, costs rise and rise.

It is a bit rich for the NAO/Parliament to panic at these costs. NR admitted at the start of the this that the GW^▸ (Great Western) had seen little or no investment over many years, and lots of work was needed.

I am probably not in alone in thinking that Network Rail should have a 25yr goal of electrifying the whole network, with 5 year goal of ensuring that all major conurbations should have fully electrified local trains

[Thatcham Crossing]

All this talk of making much greater use of the bi-mode capability leaves me with thinking that their ability to switch between modes is going to need to be extremely robust. Examples from my local area would be:

1. Class 8xx on it's way down the B&H^▸ (Berks and Hants - railway line from Reading to Taunton via Westbury) from Reading to points west without a Newbury stop. Presumably somewhere between Thatcham and Newbury (whilst running at 100mph linespeed), the diesels will be fired-up and engaged to power the train, the pantographs will come down and the train will proceed seemlessly away from the wires west of Newbury.

2. Class 8xx operating down semi-fast, with stop at Newbury. Train pulls into down platform under electric traction. During the stop (or maybe before it stops) diesels are fired-up, pantographs are lowered while in the station, then off it goes under diesel traction.

All sounds great in theory, if it doesn't work well GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) will get all the flack for technology they have been "forced" to make more use of due to wires that may not be where they were supposed to be for a while (or ever!)

[simonw]

Its about time that Network Rail split into a Infrastructure Inspectorate and its current function to be devolved to each primary franchisee.

All the government would gave to do is to give 25year franchises (for train, track and stations) that require full electrification. Once a commercial company has to do the work, then proper planning will be implemented and jobs would be done in the right sequence.

The chaotic linkage between Government, DfT^» (Department for Transport - about), NR^» (Network Rail - home page) and GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) has created this mess.

[didcotdean]

Yes I think that the performance of the bi-modes in practical service is going to be the key factor as to whether the  interim (if it is an interim) setup actually works. If there is an extended teething period it is going to try the patience further of everyone who have been promised so much for so long. By contrast the switch of 165/166 to 387 ought to be smoother. Well we can hope.

The background flavour of the NAO report reading between the lines is that they don't really favour from a pure monetary view of doing any more electrification seeing the bi-modes as a longer term solution, but think the government of the day will do it anyway. The Great Western has always been awkward to electrify as a system overall because of its fan nature and the bi-modes do at least allow something workable between all or nothing.

There is also the impression that if the assessment had been done ab initio with the benefit of the hindsight knowledge of time and costs it might have been very more restricted or carefully staged - conceivably only to Reading, possibly then on to DID^» (Didcot Parkway - next trains)/OXF^» (Oxford - next trains)/NBY^» (Newbury - next trains) before elsewhere.