Incident on board First Capital Connect train at Kentish Town station - 26 May 2011

[whole diary]

[Chris from Nailsea]

From the Hertfordshire Advertiser:

A mother-to-be has spoken of the terrifying ordeal she underwent when trapped on a First Capital Connect train for over three hours last Thursday night.

The woman, who asked to be known only as Mrs Roberts, is five months pregnant. She was eventually attended to by paramedics but not before the frantic commuter attempted to escape the sweltering conditions on board the stranded train by jumping from her carriage.

The train, which had suffered a power failure, had ground to a halt close to Kentish Town station with half of its carriages inside a tunnel. Commuters on the overcrowded carriages were left frustrated when no information was forthcoming and many turned to FCC^▸ (First Capital Connect)^s Twitter feed for information.

Mrs Roberts says she asked, via Twitter, for help after the situation became unbearable but none was sent. When a fellow passenger broke a door to get fresh air into the carriage, the pregnant commuter decided she would have to get herself off the train.

She said: ^The heat was unbearable and with just one window per carriage in these new trains, which opened just five centimetres, the condensation was dripping down the windows.

^It was pitch black and we were there for over three hours. The driver spoke to us just once, very early on, to tell us that there would be a train along in 10 minutes. I had some phone signal and ended up communicating with FCC through Twitter.

^I know I shouldn^t have got off the train but I was feeling dizzy and desperately needed some water. I was shaking. I was asking for help and being told by FCC to ^sit tight^

Her train had ground to a halt close to Kentish Town after a loud bang and what Mrs Roberts described as an explosion further down the train. Soon after stopping, the lights went out.

The Twitter feed responded to individual questions but when Mrs Roberts asked for assistance, she says she was told an ambulance would be waiting for her on the platform.

Dehydrated and beginning to feel claustrophobic, Mrs Roberts described jumping from the train and then watching in horror as the train began to move. ^I was really conscious of being between the train and the wall and of course, the line could have been live, but I was that desperate.^

Staff encouraged her to get back onto the train and when she did, she collapsed and was assisted by other passengers.

She added: ^The only reason the paramedics eventually came was because my husband, who had driven to the station to get me and was on the platform with them, demanded that someone come and get me.^

The dramatic events began when the FCC train first pulled into St Pancras and some passengers described hearing an explosion and seeing people on the platform running away from the train. Worried passengers on board tried to open the doors but found them locked.

An announcement then advised all passengers heading to Luton or Bedford to take an alternative route but many St Albans-bound commuters remained on board, only to be told as the train pulled out of the station that it would terminate at Kentish Town.

When Mrs Roberts spoke with customer services last Friday she says she was informed that FCC staff had known the train would terminate at Kentish Town before it pulled out of the station, but had failed to tell passengers.

A tired and frantic Mrs Roberts was eventually reunited with her husband at Kentish Town but chaotic scenes meant it took them 20 minutes to get off the platform. Unable to face train travel on Friday and weakened by her ordeal, she was forced to take the day off work. ^FCC really need to learn from this but I bet they won^t.^

A spokesperson for FCC said: ^We^d like to sincerely apologise to any customers who experienced delays on Thursday evening. A train failed near Kentish Town which caused major delays throughout the evening for our Thameslink route customers.

^Any customers who experienced delays should contact a customer relations advisor or visit our website for information on how to claim their compensation.

^There will now be a full review carried out by an independent railway consultant, the findings of which will be made public.

^We made every effort to keep customers updated and our Twitter manager was busy talking directly to customers affected. Our customers^ safety was our number one priority throughout this disruption. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.^

[dog box]

if as this article seems to suggest this Train was DOOP , just proves a guard is essential on all passenger trains, leaving passengers to there own devices and to actually detrain on to a live Railway is totally unacceptable.
In this situation it would seem that a controlled emergency evacuation of the train would have been appropriate and this is what a guard  assisted by other on board staff are trained to organise and implement.

[readytostart]

In my training, a controlled and an emergency evacuation are two separate things, a controlled evac is when you have the assistance on site of the emergency services and an emergency evacuation is when there is an imminent threat to life.
As passenger safety notices usually say, it is safer to remain on the train, once passengers get onto the lineside they have a habit of wondering off and touching things they've been told not to.
XC^▸ (Cross Country Trains (franchise)) policy is to arrange the opening of external doors on the safest side, providing 'baby gate' barriers at the open doors and competent persons to watch over them. If temeperatures become extreme then the emergency windows at the end of the coach can be broken.
On HST^▸ (High Speed Train) and Voyager stock the public address system is on the 110v system which remains operational even with a power loss so communication can still be maintained.
I think drivers of DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) trains have a hard job to juggle the operational aspects of the movement of their train and the more customer service orientated aspects in dealing with the occupants of the coaches. PIS^▸ (Passenger Information System) is wonderful for telling people where they are and what the next stop is, but cannot deal with out of course situations and provision of up to the minute information in the same way that a dedicated guard could.

[broadgage]

The heat on modern trains can rapidly become unpleasant, and could well be dangerous, if the power goes off.
The priority of railway staff and the BTP^▸ (British Transport Police) seems to be to keep people confined on the train, almost regardless of how dangerous the heat becomes.

Evacuation needs to be considered sooner rather than later in such cases.
In my view, it should be a legal requirement for all new and refurbished electric trains to have plenty of large openable windows.
On air conditioned stock, these should of course be shut normally, but released in case of power loss.
Whilst electric trains are an excellent idea in many respects, they are certainly unpleasant and potentialy dangerous when the wires come down or something breaks, as happens frequently on FCC^▸ (First Capital Connect).

I have had a number of unfortunate experiences on FCC especialy as regards the absence of lighting or fresh air when the power fails.

In all but the smallest public buildings, emergency lighting for 3 hours is a legal requirement. Yet on trains it seems to be optional.



I have experienced a number of power failures on FCC services, and have NEVER known the battery lighting to work for more than a few minutes.

FGW^▸ (First Great Western) may have their faults, but are not that bad.
FCC are among the worst TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company), with a general attitude of "you are lucky to get a train at all"

[ChrisB]

Now being investigated by the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)

The RAIB is investigating an incident which took place between London St Pancras International (Low Level) and Kentish Town stations, on 26 May 2011.  At approximately 18:00 hrs the 16:30 hrs Brighton to Bedford service, formed of two Class 377 units (a total of eight carriages), stopped close to the northern portal of Kings Cross Tunnel with the rear two carriages within the tunnel.  The train had stopped because of an electrical problem on the train itself that had caused the overhead line^s electrical protection equipment to trip, cutting off power to several trains in the area. At this time the train, which had a seating capacity of 476, was fully loaded, with many standing passengers.
Another train of the same type was sent to assist the failed train, and was eventually coupled to it at 20:20 hrs. By this time some passengers had used the emergency release handles to open the train doors in an attempt to improve ventilation (the air conditioning and lighting systems were no longer functioning). The train began to move at 21:03 hrs but this movement was immediately stopped because passengers were getting out onto the railway from the carriages within the tunnel. The passengers were escorted back onto the train, which was then authorised to move forward again at 21:12 hrs. Three sets of doors towards the rear of the train were still fully open while it travelled approximately one mile to reach Kentish Town station, where all the passengers left the train. 

The RAIB investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the movement of the failed train with open doors.  Factors for consideration will include the design and operation of the trains, the management of the incident and the information available to the passengers and staff who were involved.

The RAIB^s investigation is independent of any investigations by the British Transport Police or the safety authority (the Office of Rail Regulation).

The RAIB will publish a report, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of its investigation. This report will be available on the RAIB website.

[EBrown]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have published a reasonably damning report of FCCs^▸ (First Capital Connect) contingency plans and the actions on the day. It's available here. It's some 63 pages long, but here is the summary of the factors and cause of the "safety incident".

Immediate cause
189 The driver moved train 1W95 when it was not safe to do so, with passengers
standing in the vicinity of one or more sets of open doors (paragraph 48).

Causal factors
190 The causal factors were:
a. Despite the problems experienced on train 1W95 at St. Pancras, FCC allowed
it to continue to Kentish Town with passengers on board, despite the risk
that the train might fail (paragraph 55, see paragraphs 196a and 201i, no
recommendation).   
b. Foliage had become lodged around the rear pantograph of train 1W95 while
the pantograph was not in use, which caused electrical tripping after the train
left Farringdon with the pantograph raised and the subsequent immobilisation
of the train at Dock Junction (paragraph 50, no recommendation).
c. FCC gave only limited consideration to a range of possible strategies for
rescuing train 1W95 and its passengers and at an early stage focused solely
on the use of an assisting train for moving train 1W95 and its passengers
to Kentish Town (paragraph 59, see paragraphs 196c, 196d, 198a and
Recommendation 1).
d. The arrival of the train provided to assist train 1W95 into Kentish Town was
affected by a series of delays (paragraph 69, Recommendation 1).
e. The conditions for passengers within train 1W95 became increasingly
uncomfortable as time wore on.  In an attempt to make conditions more
tolerable, some passengers opened doors and, later, some alighted
from the train (paragraph 75, see paragraphs 196d, 201b, 198i and
Recommendation 2).
f. Only limited information was provided to the passengers on train 1W95
during the first 45 minutes of the incident and no information was provided
after that time (paragraph 92, see paragraphs 196d, 201b 201h, 202 and
Recommendation 1).
g. The driver of train 1W95 moved the train with some doors open because he
had been informed that train doors were closed and his in-cab display could
not be relied upon to establish the exact status of doors because it had been
affected by the loss of power (paragraph 100, see paragraph 201a, no
recommendation).
h. FCC^s policy for handling incidents involving stranded trains was not applied
(paragraph 114, see paragraphs 196, 201 202 and Recommendations 1
and 2).

191 The following factor was possibly causal:
a. The class 377/5 units were not equipped with screens to allow doors to
be opened without compromising passenger safety (paragraph 85, see
paragraph 201b, no recommendation).

Underlying factors
192 The underlying factors were:
a. The driver of train 1W95 was not given adequate support during the incident,
which affected his ability to manage the conditions on board the train
(paragraph 126, see paragraphs 196b, 198b, 201a, 201e, 201g and 202, no
recommendation). 
b. FCC had not briefed its policy on stranded trains to all key staff prior to
the incident  (paragraph 131, and see paragraphs 196d, 201d and
Recommendation 2).
c. FCC^s competence management regime did not equip staff involved in
the incident with the skills to perform some of the necessary key tasks
(paragraph 134, see paragraphs 196d, 197, 201a and Recommendation 2).
d. Between 2009 and 2011, FCC had investigated a number of incidents
involving trains becoming stranded for extended periods of time,
but had not implemented measures to improve its handling of such
incidents (paragraphs 146, 179, see paragraphs 196e and 201f, no
recommendation).
e. Relevant safety lessons had been identified in performance-focused reviews
on a number of occasions before the incident at Kentish Town on 26 May
2011, but no action had been taken (paragraph 163, Recommendation 3).
f. FCC^s management had not identified or addressed deficiencies in the
processes for emergency preparedness prior to the incident (paragraph 179,
see paragraphs 196f and 202 and Recommendation 2).

Factors affecting the consequences of the incident
193 A factor that possibly affected the consequences of this incident was the
availability and use of information from social networking sites by passengers
as an input to their decisions to self-evacuate from the train (paragraphs 182 to
184, see paragraph 201h and Recommendation 1).

[Tim]

just proves a guard is essential on all passenger trains,

I'd like to agree with you that a guard would have been useful on this train.  But when you have one member of staff (the driver) who failed to provide communication and reasurance to the passengers for 2 1/4 hours, what guarentee is there that a guard would not have been equally useless in this respect?

[Southern Stag]

The driver had to be in contact with control and the signaller to find out what was happening and to make arrangements for the rescue of the train, it's not primarily his job to look after the passengers. If there was  a guard on board they could have concentrated on looking after and communicating with the passengers.

[brompton rail]

If the safety of passengers is not the primary responsibility of the driver of a Driver Only Operated train, then pray, who carries that responsibility?

[Southern Stag]

Obviously the safety of the passengers is his responsibility but when a train fails the driver is going to be busy with other things so he won't be able to give as much time and attention to the passengers needs as guard would be able to.

[Brucey]

Obviously the safety of the passengers is his responsibility but when a train fails the driver is going to be busy with other things so he won't be able to give as much time and attention to the passengers needs as guard would be able to.

Off-duty guards who work for another TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company)?  https://twitter.com/FirstCC/status/206039551175704576

[dviner]

Things that I picked out of the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report were:

• The PA^▸ (Public Address) system had packed up shortly after the train came to a stand in the tunnel
• The driver was on the receiving end of abuse from the passengers as he was moving through the train dealing with the passcom alerts, closing the door that passengers had opened, and opening the vents
• The passengers kept re-opening the doors and operating the passcom, even after being asked not to
• The train stock being used (Class 379) did not have the "enhancements" that the previous type of stock had, which would have helped in this circumstance, namely:
  
  • Door Screens (which would allow the doors to be left open for ventilation, while preventing the passengers from getting off)
  • An auxiliary power input for the PA

There were other things that didn't help - the train designated to go and hook up to the broken down unit had to split, and the driver injured herself while carrying out the decoupling, which delayed its arrival on scene, as well as several poor decisions (like keeping the unit in service after it had initially failed at St Pancras).

I've got considerable sympathy with the driver here.

[bobm]

I have considerable sympathy with the driver.  As the only member of railway staff on hand he got the brunt of the increasing anger from the passengers so much so that I suspect anything he said would have been met with vocal abuse as the incident continued.  He was badly let down by those elsewhere who should have come to his assistance.

[John R]

Although the tone of RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) reports is never to apportion blame, the number of times that FCC^▸ (First Capital Connect) is noted not to have carried out recommendations arising from similar incidents is pretty disturbing. If First Group really believe that safety is their highest priority then I suggest the culture in place at FCC needs a bit of a shake up.

[broadgage]

I have been caught in 2 major FCC^▸ (First Capital Connect) breakdowns and inumerable minor ones.
I have NEVER known the battery lighting or the PA^▸ (Public Address) to function for more than a few minutes.

There seems to be a view in FCC that hundreds or even thousands of people trapped, sometimes below ground, for hours is "just one of those things"
The age or condition of the class 319s was regularly blamed, but the new trains dont seem any better.
The old signalling was also blamed, though delays seem to have increased after the recent resignalling.

Regular victims of FCC frequently observe that it is a "weekday only, fair weather only railway"
"you cant expect trains if it rains heavily" and even the forecast of snow anywhere in Southern England seems to result in closure.

The first priority is to confine everyone on the trains, and when they eventually escape the whole problem is blamed on "trespassers"


FCC are the worst train operator of any that I use regularly.
FGW^▸ (First Great Western) could perhaps do better at times, but are IME^▸ (in my experience) far better than FCC.