Train struck lineside equipment in Watford tunnel, 26 October 2014

[whole diary]

[Chris from Nailsea]

From the Rail Accident Investigation Branch website:

Train struck lineside equipment in Watford tunnel, 26 October 2014

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) is investigating a collision between a train and the door of a lineside equipment cabinet within Watford tunnel on Sunday 26 October 2014. The accident occurred at approximately 07:20 hrs, and involved the 06:42 hrs service from Milton Keynes to London Euston, operated by London Midland.

The train comprised a four-car class 350 electric multiple unit and was travelling at 88 mph when the door of the cabinet struck the underframe of the third coach of the train. The impact caused the cabinet door to become detached and it subsequently hit the side of the tunnel and then a door on the rear coach of the train. This caused significant damage to the train door and penetrated the window, causing some small glass debris to enter the passenger compartment. Fortunately, there were no injuries reported by anyone travelling on the train.


Images of damaged train ^ Network Rail

When the train's door was damaged by the impact the door control system detected that the door was no longer securely closed and the brakes were automatically applied, bringing the train to a stand outside the south end of the tunnel, not far from Watford Junction station.

The RAIB's preliminary examination has established that maintenance had been taking place overnight (25/26 October) on the signalling equipment contained within the cabinet. The train which struck the cabinet door was the first train to operate over that line after the maintenance activity had been completed.

The RAIB's investigation will consider the sequence of events that led to the accident, including the planning and execution of the work associated with the signalling equipment in the cabinet that night. It will also review the way in which the operational risk to the railway was considered during the design of the cabinet and the product acceptance processes applied to it.

The RAIB's investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry or the Office of Rail Regulation.

The RAIB will publish its findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of its investigation. This report will be available on the RAIB website.

[Electric train]

This incident generated one of the longest email chains in my in box at work that I have seen in a long time, I am now having to rework risk assessments for the loc cases put tunnels I am fitting out that we had already taken this type if incident into account.

[Chris from Nailsea]

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)) has now released its report into an accident involving a train being struck and damaged by an equipment cabinet door in Watford Tunnel on 26 October 2014.

Images of damaged train courtesy of Network Rail

Summary

At around 07:19 hrs on Sunday 26 October 2014, the 06:42 hrs Milton Keynes Central to Euston passenger service struck the open door of a lineside equipment cabinet while travelling through Watford Tunnel. The cabinet door detached from its hinges, hitting the side of the train and damaging a door on the fourth carriage. The damage to the train door caused a safety circuit to detect that the door was no longer properly closed and the train^s brakes were applied automatically. Passengers in this carriage reported they had been showered by flying glass from the damaged door, but there were no injuries.

The RAIB^s investigation found that the cabinet door had opened under aerodynamic forces as the train passed, probably because the door had been left closed, but unsecured, during work that had been taking place on equipment in the cabinet overnight. A number of reasons why the door had been left unsecured were identified, including poor task lighting, no-one being allocated the responsibility for checking that cabinet doors were closed and secured and the possibility that the staff involved may have been suffering from fatigue. Siemens, the employer of the staff involved, had not fully implemented its policy on fatigue management.

The cabinet involved had been installed recently as part of a re-signalling project for the Watford area. Its doors had side hinges and had been positioned such that an open door could be struck by a train. The risk of this happening had not been identified when this design of cabinet was selected for use in Watford tunnel. Previous risk assessments undertaken during the period when the cabinet was originally subject to product acceptance were not available to the project team or Henry Williams Ltd, the manufacturer of the cabinet involved.

Recommendations

As a consequence of this investigation, RAIB has made six recommendations. Four recommendations have been made to Network Rail, covering processes for handing back sections of railway after engineering work, its policy on locating lineside equipment in areas of restricted clearance, the design of lineside equipment for areas of restricted clearance and improvements to its product acceptance processes so that previously undertaken risk assessments are available to future users of individual items of equipment. One recommendation has been made to Siemens UK^▸ (United Kingdom) Ltd in respect of its policies on staff welfare (including fatigue management), and one recommendation has been made to Henry Williams Ltd in conjunction with Network Rail to make sure that it has full details of the certification of its products used on the railways.

The RAIB has also identified two learning points. The first relates to the adequacy of task lighting and the need for staff on site to reach a clear understanding about who will be responsible for closing cabinet doors. The second is a reminder of the need for project staff to apply existing processes for risk assessment and product acceptance.