Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Chris from Nailsea at 16:34, 12th August 2025 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From the BBC:
'Action still needed' five years after fatal derailment

Donald Dinnie, Christopher Stuchbury and Brett McCullough died in the 2020 crash
"Urgent action" is still needed to improve rail safety after the Stonehaven train derailment which left three men dead five years ago, a union has warned.
The Aberdeen to Glasgow train derailed at Carmont in Aberdeenshire on 12 August 2020 after hitting a landslide following heavy rain.
Driver Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62, died. Network Rail was fined £6.7m in 2023 after admitting a series of failings which led to the deaths.
The RMT union said eight of 20 safety recommendations still remained incomplete. Network Rail said "meaningful progress" had been made.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) annual report for 2024, published earlier this year, revealed eight of its 20 safety recommendations remained "open".
These included control room capability and drainage design. It was based on information provided by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) about work carried out before 31 March this year.
"Open" is described as the recommendation being taken into consideration and action being taken to implement it.
The ORR said the rail industry had taken "significant steps", and recommendations which remained open had "agreed plans to implement the recommended actions".

On the 5th anniversary, RMT general secretary Eddie Dempsey said: "Our thoughts are with the families of Donald, Brett and Chris, and with those injured and traumatised in the crash. But remembrance alone is not enough - there must be action, and it needs to be urgent. It is outrageous that five years after the accident took place, and three years since the RAIB set out what needed to change, that so many safety recommendations are still outstanding."
He added: "We demand better - for those we lost, for those who survived, and for the safety of every worker and passenger going forward."
Network Rail also said its thoughts were with everyone involved in the Carmont tragedy. "Since August 2020, we've been working hard to make our railway safer for passengers and colleagues," a statement said. "We're investing more than £400m in projects to strengthen the railway's resilience to increasingly unpredictable weather."
It added: "Meaningful progress has been made on the recommendations from the Carmont investigation, which includes co-ordinated action across all Network Rail routes, and we continue to work closely with the ORR, train operators, and other key stakeholders."
(BBC article continues)

Donald Dinnie, Christopher Stuchbury and Brett McCullough died in the 2020 crash
"Urgent action" is still needed to improve rail safety after the Stonehaven train derailment which left three men dead five years ago, a union has warned.
The Aberdeen to Glasgow train derailed at Carmont in Aberdeenshire on 12 August 2020 after hitting a landslide following heavy rain.
Driver Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62, died. Network Rail was fined £6.7m in 2023 after admitting a series of failings which led to the deaths.
The RMT union said eight of 20 safety recommendations still remained incomplete. Network Rail said "meaningful progress" had been made.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) annual report for 2024, published earlier this year, revealed eight of its 20 safety recommendations remained "open".
These included control room capability and drainage design. It was based on information provided by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) about work carried out before 31 March this year.
"Open" is described as the recommendation being taken into consideration and action being taken to implement it.
The ORR said the rail industry had taken "significant steps", and recommendations which remained open had "agreed plans to implement the recommended actions".

On the 5th anniversary, RMT general secretary Eddie Dempsey said: "Our thoughts are with the families of Donald, Brett and Chris, and with those injured and traumatised in the crash. But remembrance alone is not enough - there must be action, and it needs to be urgent. It is outrageous that five years after the accident took place, and three years since the RAIB set out what needed to change, that so many safety recommendations are still outstanding."
He added: "We demand better - for those we lost, for those who survived, and for the safety of every worker and passenger going forward."
Network Rail also said its thoughts were with everyone involved in the Carmont tragedy. "Since August 2020, we've been working hard to make our railway safer for passengers and colleagues," a statement said. "We're investing more than £400m in projects to strengthen the railway's resilience to increasingly unpredictable weather."
It added: "Meaningful progress has been made on the recommendations from the Carmont investigation, which includes co-ordinated action across all Network Rail routes, and we continue to work closely with the ORR, train operators, and other key stakeholders."
(BBC article continues)
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Electric train at 18:07, 8th September 2023 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Network rail to be prosecuted over Stonehaven accident.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
A huge fine for Network Rail in respect of their fatal errors in this incident......but given that they are nationalised, who pays the fine? (Ultimately the taxpayer I guess?) And to whom?
BBC News - Stonehaven crash: Network Rail fined £6.7m over fatal derailment
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-66749546
It's a hugely awkward question. I find myself wondering if the effect is to pull nearly £7 million out of the rail budget / industry and pass it to the Treasury. It's not compensation to the people effected, is it? Nor will it come out of the pockets of managers who got it wrong or shareholders or directors. But then "Network Rail" - in whatever guise they are represented - cannot be a law unto themselves and consequences need to be there.
Fines paid by NR come out of its overall budget, the ORR will still expect NR to continue to fund renewals and to operate the system normally. In other words it has to find the money internally.
There has been a very high level internal investigation into the root cause, as a result investments in other assets have been diverted into the Geotech assets
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 12:04, 8th September 2023 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Network rail to be prosecuted over Stonehaven accident.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
A huge fine for Network Rail in respect of their fatal errors in this incident......but given that they are nationalised, who pays the fine? (Ultimately the taxpayer I guess?) And to whom?
BBC News - Stonehaven crash: Network Rail fined £6.7m over fatal derailment
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-66749546
It's a hugely awkward question. I find myself wondering if the effect is to pull nearly £7 million out of the rail budget / industry and pass it to the Treasury. It's not compensation to the people effected, is it? Nor will it come out of the pockets of managers who got it wrong or shareholders or directors. But then "Network Rail" - in whatever guise they are represented - cannot be a law unto themselves and consequences need to be there.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TaplowGreen at 11:48, 8th September 2023 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Network rail to be prosecuted over Stonehaven accident.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
A huge fine for Network Rail in respect of their fatal errors in this incident......but given that they are nationalised, who pays the fine? (Ultimately the taxpayer I guess?) And to whom?
BBC News - Stonehaven crash: Network Rail fined £6.7m over fatal derailment
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-66749546
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TaplowGreen at 10:31, 7th September 2023 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 13:02, 22nd August 2023 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Network rail to be prosecuted over Stonehaven accident.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-65017289
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by paul7575 at 11:50, 4th September 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I think there was a question about who’s responsibility it was at Carmont, with some debate at the time about the BTP being sidelined. But I also think Scottish fatal accident law is perhaps different to English law, and as I’m no expert maybe others can chip in?
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 14:24, 3rd September 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Thanks for the information. I believed that the police only investigated if there was a suspicion of crime, and not as a matter of routine for any fatal accident.
The police will always be involved in a fatal accident of any kind, if only to make sure that no foul play was involved before letting the appropriate experts - fire, RAIB, AAIB, Health and Safety Executive, whoever - get on with their own investigation. There is seldom an accident with a single cause, and any one of the pieces that add up to the whole thing could have involve criminal action or inaction.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 03:59, 1st September 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Why was a police inquiry even needed ?
We regularly hear that the police have not the resources to investigate most crimes, so why spend a substantial amount on investigating a railway accident when the RAIB are the acknowledged experts in such matters.
We regularly hear that the police have not the resources to investigate most crimes, so why spend a substantial amount on investigating a railway accident when the RAIB are the acknowledged experts in such matters.
RAIB do not apportion blame, or prosecute if laws are broken. They police should always investigate when there's loss of life, lest any negligence or deliberate actions causing those deaths go unpunished.
It would be a huge disservice to the families of victims if there were no police investigation to determine if anyone were at fault.
Thanks for the information. I believed that the police only investigated if there was a suspicion of crime, and not as a matter of routine for any fatal accident.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 20:11, 31st August 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
RAIB do not apportion blame, or prosecute if laws are broken. They police should always investigate when there's loss of life, lest any negligence or deliberate actions causing those deaths go unpunished.
It would be a huge disservice to the families of victims if there were no police investigation to determine if anyone were at fault.
In addition, the Procurator Fiscal, who performs the functions of an English coroner, does not investigate as such. The RAIB report will inform him of the causative factors, with the police investigation helping to establish a verdict. I would assume BTP will have been involved, and they will have some expertise in such matters.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by JayMac at 19:50, 31st August 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Why was a police inquiry even needed ?
We regularly hear that the police have not the resources to investigate most crimes, so why spend a substantial amount on investigating a railway accident when the RAIB are the acknowledged experts in such matters.
We regularly hear that the police have not the resources to investigate most crimes, so why spend a substantial amount on investigating a railway accident when the RAIB are the acknowledged experts in such matters.
RAIB do not apportion blame, or prosecute if laws are broken. They police should always investigate when there's loss of life, lest any negligence or deliberate actions causing those deaths go unpunished.
It would be a huge disservice to the families of victims if there were no police investigation to determine if anyone were at fault.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 19:33, 31st August 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Why was a police inquiry even needed ?
We regularly hear that the police have not the resources to investigate most crimes, so why spend a substantial amount on investigating a railway accident when the RAIB are the acknowledged experts in such matters.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 21:56, 30th August 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From the Press and Journal
Police confirmed they have now concluded their “complex investigation” and submitted the report to the procurator fiscal.
The report compiled by Police Scotland, British Transport Police and the Office of Rail and Road is one of two investigations which was launched following the derailment in August 2020.
On the two year anniversary of the crash, politicians urged them to finish their probe as soon as possible to help “heal the pain” of the families.
The other investigation was published by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) back in March.
The report compiled by Police Scotland, British Transport Police and the Office of Rail and Road is one of two investigations which was launched following the derailment in August 2020.
On the two year anniversary of the crash, politicians urged them to finish their probe as soon as possible to help “heal the pain” of the families.
The other investigation was published by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) back in March.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Electric train at 07:20, 16th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Fatalities are almost always the result of more than one factor.
When learning to fly, I was taught that no accident has a single cause. Since then, I haven't seen a single accident that had only a single cause, whereas there were lots before.
Often referred to as the 'Swiss cheese' model.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 15:33, 15th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Fatalities are almost always the result of more than one factor.
When learning to fly, I was taught that no accident has a single cause. Since then, I haven't seen a single accident that had only a single cause, whereas there were lots before.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by ellendune at 17:52, 13th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
We should also not overlook the cause of the incident was an incorrectly installed drainage system that had gone undetected for a decade. As usual there are many pieces which contribute to the overall picture.
I quite agree, but crashworthiness of vehicles still has to be considered. Fatalities are almost always the result of more than one factor.
I may be a lone voice here, and swimming against the tide, but I have a very uneasy feeling that the report provides a very convenient way to justify the final withdrawal of HSTs based on safety against which no-one dare argue without being accused of not caring about someone's life. The HSTs have - overall - a good track record (and I am aware, close to home, of members actually in the most appalling disasters) and have not suddenly become so dangerous they must be withdrawn as quick as possible - or are we being told that they have become more dangerous because there's now a greater chance of infrastructure failure from Network Rail, requiring more robust trains?
I am mindful however that whatever it once was, the crashworthiness of the HSTs may have been degraded by the corrosion issues that are also highlighted in the report. When the recommendation to investigate what level of corrosion is acceptable has been carried out, we may find that more HSTs either need expensive heavy repairs to extend their lives. Bearing in mind that IIRC they are already more expensive to maintain than new stock and this will get worse as the numbers in service decrease, such heavy repairs might not be considered economic. Is that an excuse? No it is cold hard economics at a time when the railway is under considerable pressure to reduce costs.
And of course the climate emergency is now very last year, so no need to worry about the carbon emissions from the extra driving and flying.
Of course there are those who do not see the importance of this, but the need to be self sufficient in energy and not dependent on Russian oil and gas, is now a necessity that pushes us in the same direction as net zero. Those who say we should continue to rely on fossil fuels could now be said to be unpatriotic.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 14:47, 13th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I agree that the report is or will be used as a very convenient way to remove HSTs from service.
The future is shorter, less comfortable trains, with reduced facilities, all in the interests of safety of course.
This might save a few lives per century in railway accidents. Total lives lost in transport accidents will increase as people are driven from the railways and into much more dangerous cars.
And of course the climate emergency is now very last year, so no need to worry about the carbon emissions from the extra driving and flying.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bobm at 09:25, 13th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
We should also not overlook the cause of the incident was an incorrectly installed drainage system that had gone undetected for a decade. As usual there are many pieces which contribute to the overall picture.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 09:02, 13th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Paragraph 487 from the report. Does it suggest that this may have been unsurviveable for the driver in a train built to current standards e.g. an Azuma? (Of course the entire train would likely behave in a different way so many variables here.)
Personal comment - not the view of the forum ...
Indeed it does. I may be a lone voice here, and swimming against the tide, but I have a very uneasy feeling that the report provides a very convenient way to justify the final withdrawal of HSTs based on safety against which no-one dare argue without being accused of not caring about someone's life. The HSTs have - overall - a good track record (and I am aware, close to home, of members actually in the most appalling disasters) and have not suddenly become so dangerous they must be withdrawn as quick as possible - or are we being told that they have become more dangerous because there's now a greater chance of infrastructure failure from Network Rail, requiring more robust trains?
That said, Mark, while the driver of an Azuma might not have survived in the circumstances, perhaps the other two who died might have done?
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Mark A at 08:42, 13th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Paragraph 487 from the report. Does it suggest that this may have been unsurviveable for the driver in a train built to current standards e.g. an Azuma? (Of course the entire train would likely behave in a different way so many variables here.)
487 The cab was subjected to severe impact conditions. The speed of impact was significantly beyond the collision speeds for which even modern cabs are designed to provide protection for occupants. For example, the cab ends of more modern trains (since around 2000) were designed to absorb energy and protect the driver in collisions with an identical train at a closing speed of up to 60 km/h (37 mph).53 Later train designs (since around 2010) were designed for a closing speed of up to 36 km/h54 (22 mph), in line with European Technical Specifications for Interoperability. These design collision speeds are equivalent to a single train colliding with an immovable object (or plane of symmetry) at half the design speed. The estimated speed of impact between the power car and the ground at Carmont (paragraph 484) was over twice the higher of the equivalent design speeds into an immovable object. Given the severity of the collision conditions, significant damage to this or any other cab’s structure was inevitable.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by JayMac at 20:53, 12th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Perhaps bimodes. Both Hitachi and Stadler have suitable products. Loco hauled Mark 5a carriages could also be a possibility.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bradshaw at 20:28, 12th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Do they go with bimodes, possibly from Hitachi, with the intent that electrification can follow after?
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by JayMac at 19:41, 12th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
It would appear that ScotRail Trains (the nationalised operator from 1st April 2022) are looking to withdraw their HSTs as soon as practicable.
https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/homenews/19984106.stonehaven-rail-crash-ministers-look-removal-old-high-speed-trains-amidst-safety-review/
Questions to be asked. Can safety be improved? Can survivability in the event of an accident be improved? How can this be achieved?
My answer would be to replace near 50 year old rolling stock with more modern trains. Particularly after accident investigators concluded that it was; "more likely than not that the outcome would have been better if the train had been compliant with modern crashworthiness standards."
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 14:37, 12th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I would go as far as to say that "nostalgia and stock shortages" SHOULD override safety, provided of course that the risk to safety is very small as appears to be the case.
Rail travel is very safe, and HSTs have a reasonable safety record if considering the numbers in use and the huge mileages covered, often at high speeds.
I would be happy to travel in an HST even if something newer, shorter, and less comfortable is slightly safer.
I would be happy to drive an HST, after proper training of course.
The safest train is one that never leaves the depot.
The next safest is probably one limited to low speeds, and with only backwards facing seats, all with seatbelts. No food or drink of course, and luggage to be checked in and conveyed in a dedicated area as on aircraft.
Or we could all stay at home, though that carries risks.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by IndustryInsider at 14:18, 11th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I can not support the withdrawal of HSTs simply because a newer and safer alternative is available.
Fatal accidents are extremely rare, Stonehaven was the first for many years.
Fatal accidents are extremely rare, Stonehaven was the first for many years.
The trouble is of course, should an extremely rare accident happen again, and recommendations have been made to retire the fleet ASAP or instigate very expensive examinations and repairs on a very old fleet, if you're the one who made the decision that said 'Disregard those recommendations, it's highly unlikely to happen again' then you'll have some extremely difficult questions to answer. So I can understand nervousness...even if I agree with you in principle.
Advice, whether official or otherwise, was to duck or crouch down if accident was imminent.
The unofficial advice was to leg it as far as you could into the clean air compartment behind the cab and lie on the floor!
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 13:29, 11th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
My understanding is that the cab of an HST is of substantial construction, but ONLY UP TO THE HEIGHT OF THE CONTROLS. Advice, whether official or otherwise, was to duck or crouch down if accident was imminent.
In the Lavington accident, the driver did this and escaped with only slight injuries, a broken wrist and numerous minor cuts IIRC. The damage suggested that remaining seated could have had very serious consequences.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Mark A at 12:17, 11th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Punches are not pulled in the accompanying article:
"The HST cab is essentially an upturned bath tub mounted facing outwards with a driver inside it.
"There is zero crash structure for the cab – absolutely zero crashworthiness whatsoever.
"Zero protection for the driver.
"All there is the base of the front of the HST with a fibreglass shell over the front.
"There is no crash structure at all."
"There is zero crash structure for the cab – absolutely zero crashworthiness whatsoever.
"Zero protection for the driver.
"All there is the base of the front of the HST with a fibreglass shell over the front.
"There is no crash structure at all."
The 'Upturned bathtub' analogy seems to have gained traction but I'm surprised that it's made it into print. Next, it'll be said that the HST windscreen is a standard domestic double glazing unit.
While I'd wish the experience on no member of railway staff: it's worth revisiting the RAIB report on the July 10th 2010 Lavington accident. (Ash tree vs HST cab at 90 miles an hour).
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/547c8feced915d4c10000159/R082011_110407_Lavington.pdf
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by JayMac at 02:01, 11th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Had the leading power car remained attached to the rest of the train then I can see the possibility of the impact forces after coming off the bridge being lessened. It would have had 200 odd tonnes of train still attached to it, slowing it, anchoring it. With it still attached and no overriding, damage to the leading vestibule area of Coach D may also have been lessened.
Whether that would have prevented the fatal injuries to the conductor and driver from secondary impacts is of course impossible to know.
On the issue of the future of HSTs, nostalgia and potential stock shortages should not come before safety.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 00:18, 11th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I can't quite get my head around the concept that the fixed head, Alliance "Buckeye" coupling used within many sets is suddenly unsafe. Accidents are rare and so are coupling breaks.
I accept that the MU future is Dellner and Tightlock, but at the ends of new stock. Could anything survive a high speed derailment on a curve? If a replacement is really sought would not the in-set bar coupler suffice?
OTC
I accept that the MU future is Dellner and Tightlock, but at the ends of new stock. Could anything survive a high speed derailment on a curve? If a replacement is really sought would not the in-set bar coupler suffice?
OTC
I know what you mean. I can remember it being said that Buckeye couplings had kept derailed trains largely upright, in particular after Morpeth Curve - where that is debatable. But the report is rather confused on this subject.
It does identify the couplings as more likely to break than those on newer trains, but the main advantage it gives is the prevention of overriding. That seems fair enough: if there are large longitudinal forces between vehicles, they are less destructive if the vehicles stay in line.
As to whether keeping the vehicles attached in a string as they start to concertina is a good idea, they suggest it is. Paragraph 533 directly addresses this question, in the context of the leading power car running off the bridge. They conclude that on balance staying coupled would have limited the power car's deviation off line so it would probably crossed the bridge before leaving the formation. I can't see that, myself.
Thus their conclusion is that couplings that stayed intact would have given a better outcome in this accident. Probably. But accidents vary greatly, and the part played by collisions with solid objects in derailments might be secondary or dominant. If you design a coupling to collapse, then break, at force levels you have chosen, I can't help feeling that the first accident that happens will be the one that proves you chose the wrong values! Like Neville Hill, for example.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by onthecushions at 20:48, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I can't quite get my head around the concept that the fixed head, Alliance "Buckeye" coupling used within many sets is suddenly unsafe. Accidents are rare and so are coupling breaks.
I accept that the MU future is Dellner and Tightlock, but at the ends of new stock. Could anything survive a high speed derailment on a curve? If a replacement is really sought would not the in-set bar coupler suffice?
OTC
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by ellendune at 20:39, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
It depends what corrosion criteria they come up with. If they do a proper assessment on that it could lead to more being scrapped.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 19:17, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I can not support the withdrawal of HSTs simply because a newer and safer alternative is available.
Fatal accidents are extremely rare, Stonehaven was the first for many years.
Apart from my personal preferences, rail travel is demonstrably very much safer than driving. Any reduction in rail capacity, or downgrading of comfort and facilities on trains will drive people away from very safe trains and into much less safe cars.
I am aware of people who would take the train, but who choose to drive because the trains are overcrowded, uncomfortable, or hugely expensive.
Despite all the above, I fear that HSTs will be withdrawn from general use. The Stonehaven accident is a splendid excuse to reduce capacity by withdrawing serviceable trains, and to downgrade from inter city trains to types more suited for local services.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Electric train at 18:56, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I seem to remember the crash-worthiness of the Mark 3's being highly praised after Bushey, Morpeth etc. The identification of a further marginal improvement is no argument for premature scrappimg, which only leads to less rolling stock, fewer train seat miles, more road journeys and more travel deaths.
I am surprised that thorough inspection of vehicle body condition (as in MoT tests!) is not done, or provided for in design and construction, either by access viewing or "oil rig" coatings.
Weren't the Mark 3's built out of "Corten", BSC's higher tensile, lower corrosion steel?
The drain design owed more to a rigid design spec than common sense. Every drain will overflow and gravity must win, so let it!
OTC
The weakness of the HST Mk3 is the inter vehicle coupling. Mk3 use buckeye type of couplings which loose attachment in the event of a severe vertical movement, which looks like the case in this accident.
I think what RAIB were questioning had a full risk assessment been carried out for the change of how the trains were configured.
The part that is damming is the signing off of contractors work and the control of CDM Health and Safety File. One of the major failing of the current contract arrangements is the contractor has received 90% of the contract payments when a project is commissioned.
Both NR and the contractors project teams have often moved onto other projects after the commissioning happens so the project close out process along with as built drawings, operation and maintenance manuals can take years to get back to the NR Asset Manager and Maintainer. Part of this hand back process in to place the asset into the Asset Maintenance system if hand back does not happen assets get left out of the system.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by onthecushions at 17:23, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I seem to remember the crash-worthiness of the Mark 3's being highly praised after Bushey, Morpeth etc. The identification of a further marginal improvement is no argument for premature scrappimg, which only leads to less rolling stock, fewer train seat miles, more road journeys and more travel deaths.
I am surprised that thorough inspection of vehicle body condition (as in MoT tests!) is not done, or provided for in design and construction, either by access viewing or "oil rig" coatings.
Weren't the Mark 3's built out of "Corten", BSC's higher tensile, lower corrosion steel?
The drain design owed more to a rigid design spec than common sense. Every drain will overflow and gravity must win, so let it!
OTC
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 14:03, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Bradshaw's comments above would also apply to the 769s which use 1980s class 319 bodyshells too.
Indeed, when the 319s were stripped to modify them to add the motor/generators, many were found to have serious rust in the sole bars. That's the main lengthwise structural member of the body, so they had to be patched up by welding. No doubt other types approaching their age will also have corrosion if you can get in to find it.
Switching to aluminium alloy won't necessarily help, as their Achilles' metallurgical process is fatigue cracking. That too can be hard to spot, and needs good access to check for it. In both cases you first need to know you have to look for something, of course.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by eightonedee at 13:40, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Bradshaw's comments above would also apply to the 769s which use 1980s class 319 bodyshells too.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by paul7575 at 13:10, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Given the report’s concerns on the HSTs the plans of GWR to replace them with IETs seems to be a sound judgement.
Note that a risk assessment has to be carried out on the HST relating to their further use and to ALL pre-1994 rolling stock(the date that the crashworthiness standards came in. That covers all the 15x series, 165 and 166. This might have implications for the GWR and the WoE lines 159s.
Presumably the Sleeper coaches are Mk3 and have the same issue of unsecured bogies? (The context being that restrained bogies can dig into the ballast and decelerate the coaches.)Note that a risk assessment has to be carried out on the HST relating to their further use and to ALL pre-1994 rolling stock(the date that the crashworthiness standards came in. That covers all the 15x series, 165 and 166. This might have implications for the GWR and the WoE lines 159s.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bradshaw at 09:04, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Given the report’s concerns on the HSTs the plans of GWR to replace them with IETs seems to be a sound judgement.
Note that a risk assessment has to be carried out on the HST relating to their further use and to ALL pre-1994 rolling stock(the date that the crashworthiness standards came in. That covers all the 15x series, 165 and 166. This might have implications for the GWR and the WoE lines 159s.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by ellendune at 08:05, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
This report does not offer much comfort for those who would like to see HSTs continue in service.
Among other things it recommends:
1)
Establish criteria for the allowable extent of corrosion in safety critical areas of rolling stock
2)
Assessment of the additional risk to vehicle occupants associated with the lack of certain modern crashworthiness features on HSTs, and the development of industry guidance for assessing and mitigating the risk associated with the continued operation of HSTs and other types of main line passenger rolling stock designed before the introduction of modern crashworthiness standards in 1994
I wonder if when these are done for HSTs we might find a few more of them going for scrap.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 06:51, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Summary ...
Now published.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-60654251
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-60654251
Headlines:
A series of failures contributed to a rail crash in Aberdeenshire which claimed three lives, an investigation has found.
A report said the train hit a landslide near Stonehaven in August 2020 after heavy rain in an area where a drainage system had been incorrectly installed.
Investigators also highlighted problems with operational procedures in dealing with the effects of severe weather.
A report said the train hit a landslide near Stonehaven in August 2020 after heavy rain in an area where a drainage system had been incorrectly installed.
Investigators also highlighted problems with operational procedures in dealing with the effects of severe weather.
The full report can be read here:
https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/report-02-slash-2022-derailment-of-a-passenger-train-at-carmont
At 298 pages it would appear to be one of the most comprehensive investigations ever conducted by the RAIB.
https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/report-02-slash-2022-derailment-of-a-passenger-train-at-carmont
At 298 pages it would appear to be one of the most comprehensive investigations ever conducted by the RAIB.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by JayMac at 01:27, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
The full report can be read here:
https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/report-02-slash-2022-derailment-of-a-passenger-train-at-carmont
At 298 pages it would appear to be one of the most comprehensive investigations ever conducted by the RAIB.
A video summary, including animation of the derailment, has also been uploaded to YouTube:
Also on YouTube is a visualisation of the drainage in place at the time of the incident, with animation showing how the washout occurred and how the topography contributed to washout debris making its way onto the railway:
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by MVR S&T at 00:16, 10th March 2022 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Now published.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-60654251
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 12:17, 8th November 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From the BBC:
Stonehaven derailment: Crash report delayed until 2022
A final report into the fatal train derailment near Stonehaven will not be ready this year, BBC Scotland understands.
Three people died when a train left the tracks after hitting a landslip in August 2020.
An interim Rail Accident Investigation Branch report said a signaller was not aware of any obstruction on the line.
But the final report, which had been expected this autumn, will not be published until January...
A final report into the fatal train derailment near Stonehaven will not be ready this year, BBC Scotland understands.
Three people died when a train left the tracks after hitting a landslip in August 2020.
An interim Rail Accident Investigation Branch report said a signaller was not aware of any obstruction on the line.
But the final report, which had been expected this autumn, will not be published until January...
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by didcotdean at 20:50, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
You can never have everything up to the current new build standards. I don't really want to make too strong a point over this but I was somewhat surprised particularly of the choice to introduce the short HSTs in Scotrail. Less so by GWR as this was more of a direct repurposing within a organisation familiar with them over decades.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Oxonhutch at 19:55, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
As someone who was in the HST at Ladbroke Grove I think there is a need to develop a retirement schedule for them by the rail companies and/or the DfT.
I raise my cap sir. I believe I was in the last down HEX that passed you in close proximity before your collision. I wish you well.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by IndustryInsider at 17:53, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I can certainly see how anyone directly involved in Ladbroke Grove, or one of the other crashes involving HSTs, would have that opinion. But presumably you would then have to have the same opinion about the Turbo that was a write off in that same crash, and anything else constructed during the last century.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by didcotdean at 17:25, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I for one would much prefer a "proper HST" to the modern alternative. The risk of a serious accident is so minute that from my point of view it is far below passenger comfort and facilities.
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
I know someone who was in the HST at Ladbrook Grove I don't think I will ask her opinion.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 16:56, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Punches are not pulled in the accompanying article:
"The HST cab is essentially an upturned bath tub mounted facing outwards with a driver inside it.
"There is zero crash structure for the cab – absolutely zero crashworthiness whatsoever.
"Zero protection for the driver.
"All there is the base of the front of the HST with a fibreglass shell over the front.
"There is no crash structure at all."
"There is zero crash structure for the cab – absolutely zero crashworthiness whatsoever.
"Zero protection for the driver.
"All there is the base of the front of the HST with a fibreglass shell over the front.
"There is no crash structure at all."
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bradshaw at 16:37, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Here is the link to Gareth Dennis's Twitter feed on the subject
https://twitter.com/garethdennis/status/1389853928104284166?s=21
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by ellendune at 16:08, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I for one would much prefer a "proper HST" to the modern alternative. The risk of a serious accident is so minute that from my point of view it is far below passenger comfort and facilities.
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
I know someone who was in the HST at Ladbrook Grove I don't think I will ask her opinion.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 15:34, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I for one would much prefer a "proper HST" to the modern alternative. The risk of a serious accident is so minute that from my point of view it is far below passenger comfort and facilities.
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
I dare say they would, but they ain't having them.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by broadgage at 15:10, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I for one would much prefer a "proper HST" to the modern alternative. The risk of a serious accident is so minute that from my point of view it is far below passenger comfort and facilities.
Perhaps Scotland would some nice new IETs ? in return for some HSTs ?
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by IndustryInsider at 15:02, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
There’s no question that the chances of surviving a crash in a Mk III is less so than in something more modern, but of course the risk of being involved in a crash in the first place is incredibly small. On balance I think allowing them to carry on in service is an acceptable risk.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 13:44, 5th May 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
The Sotsman carries an impassioned argument from a rail engineer for the removal from service of all HSTs working in Scotland.
Scrap ScotRail train fleet involved in Stonehaven crash, rail engineer demands
The type of ScotRail train involved in the fatal Stonehaven derailment should be withdrawn from service because of their lack of crashworthiness, a rail engineer has urged.
Gareth Dennis said the “High Speed Trains” (HSTs), which are based on a 50-year-old design, should no longer operate because of the lack of protection they offered in a crash compared to more modern trains, including for drivers.
While other companies such as LNER have scrapped their fleets, ScotRail operator Abellio has acquired and refurbished the trains for use on inter-city services.
One of the trains derailed last August after it hit stones washed onto the tracks by heavy rain, killing the driver, Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and a passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62.
he six other people on the train – five passengers and a conductor travelling to join another train – were injured.
An interim report into the incident at Carmont, south west of Stonehaven, by the UK Department for Transport’s rail accident investigation branch (RAIB), said its main areas of investigation included the “crashworthiness of rail vehicles in high energy accidents”.
Mr Dennis told The Scotsman: “The HST has no modern crashworthiness features – none at all.
"I think it’s pretty appalling that we’re still using those trains in front line service.”
He said of particular concern was the lack of protection for drivers, which he described as “unacceptable”.
The engineer said of the HST on his latest Rail Natter podcast: "I adore it but it's a museum piece.
"It shouldn't be running in regular service any more.
"Drivers should not be operating these trains. It is as simple as that.
The type of ScotRail train involved in the fatal Stonehaven derailment should be withdrawn from service because of their lack of crashworthiness, a rail engineer has urged.
Gareth Dennis said the “High Speed Trains” (HSTs), which are based on a 50-year-old design, should no longer operate because of the lack of protection they offered in a crash compared to more modern trains, including for drivers.
While other companies such as LNER have scrapped their fleets, ScotRail operator Abellio has acquired and refurbished the trains for use on inter-city services.
One of the trains derailed last August after it hit stones washed onto the tracks by heavy rain, killing the driver, Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and a passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62.
he six other people on the train – five passengers and a conductor travelling to join another train – were injured.
An interim report into the incident at Carmont, south west of Stonehaven, by the UK Department for Transport’s rail accident investigation branch (RAIB), said its main areas of investigation included the “crashworthiness of rail vehicles in high energy accidents”.
Mr Dennis told The Scotsman: “The HST has no modern crashworthiness features – none at all.
"I think it’s pretty appalling that we’re still using those trains in front line service.”
He said of particular concern was the lack of protection for drivers, which he described as “unacceptable”.
The engineer said of the HST on his latest Rail Natter podcast: "I adore it but it's a museum piece.
"It shouldn't be running in regular service any more.
"Drivers should not be operating these trains. It is as simple as that.
The article continues with more detailed reasoning. It will not be a view held by those devotees of the HST for whom the class is perfect and can do no wrong, but it does raise the question of whether fondness for the HST has blinkered judgment.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 11:01, 19th April 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Interim RAIB report at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/978504/IR012021_210419_Carmont.pdf
59. The train derailed after colliding with stones washed out onto the track from the gravel-filled crest drain and from the adjacent ground. Post-accident surveys of the track found no evidence suggesting the derailment occurred on the approach to the debris on the track, and verified pre-accident inspections which had found no track defects in this area. RAIB has not found any evidence of a train fault that could have played a part in its derailment.
61. The washout was caused by unusually heavy rain (paragraph 19) which washed stone from the gravel-filled crest drain near catchpit 18, and from surrounding ground, onto the adjacent track leaving the perforated drainage pipe exposed. Local ground topography directed large amounts of surface water onto the steeply sloping drain in the area from which gravel was washed (figure
. Although surface water flow alone can dislodge gravel, and stones of other sizes, RAIB is continuing to investigate whether other factors, such as the drainage system’s design or the quality of installation, contributed to the displacement of material.
61. The washout was caused by unusually heavy rain (paragraph 19) which washed stone from the gravel-filled crest drain near catchpit 18, and from surrounding ground, onto the adjacent track leaving the perforated drainage pipe exposed. Local ground topography directed large amounts of surface water onto the steeply sloping drain in the area from which gravel was washed (figure

Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 15:54, 20th March 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
You may recall that two task forces were set to work after the accident, and their reports have now been published. There's also an update on resilience from Andrew Haines and a letter. I'm not going to attempt a summary - but then the earthworks management report is 420 pages, mostly the main text.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 20:34, 27th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-55828368
The rail line between Stonehaven and Montrose will be closed until 22 February after a bridge wall collapsed, Network Rail has said.
The 24m (79ft) section of side wall broke on 15 January, about a mile north of where three people died in last year's derailment.
The line had reopened in November, nearly three months after the tragedy.
Network Rail said full structural assessments had been completed by specialist engineers.
Plans are now in place to repair the bridge and reopen the line late next month.
The 24m (79ft) section of side wall broke on 15 January, about a mile north of where three people died in last year's derailment.
The line had reopened in November, nearly three months after the tragedy.
Network Rail said full structural assessments had been completed by specialist engineers.
Plans are now in place to repair the bridge and reopen the line late next month.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 18:46, 18th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I think the new stuff below the ballast at Carmont is ?L shaped? concrete blocks, (on their side ie wide base, low wall), presumably for speed of build, but implicit in that is a much stronger parapet.
(Second link in reply #89, or reply #100 is what I?m thinking of.)
Paul
(Second link in reply #89, or reply #100 is what I?m thinking of.)
Paul
There is a better view in the NR news item - but even the full resolution image doesn't make that 100% clear. Behind the parapet might be concrete "planks" with the wall segments attached, or a poured slab, or even whatever the top of the bridge looks like when cleared but still with some gravel and stuff on it.
I did originally think there was no point going for a much more robust parapet, since having a train at full speed stop more suddenly on the bridge isn't likely to lead to a significantly better outcome. However, stopping a slower derailed train falling off is clearly a good thing, so I can see that the rigidity provided by reinforcement (even if it is only at the base) is worth having.
In that picture you can also see that, when that NR release said "a considerable amount of engineering work is also being carried out to repair and extend drainage systems on the railway track and lineside embankments at the site", they weren't kidding.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by paul7575 at 16:56, 18th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I think the new stuff below the ballast at Carmont is ?L shaped? concrete blocks, (on their side ie wide base, low wall), presumably for speed of build, but implicit in that is a much stronger parapet.
(Second link in reply #89, or reply #100 is what I?m thinking of.)
Paul
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 14:54, 18th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
It all suggests to me that it?s actually a quite different problem to Carmont, where a power car or coaches on their side are believed to have broken away the parapet. There will be hundreds if not thousands of similarly constructed parapet walls having to cope with a side load from the track formation, and that load may well have been gradually increasing over many years.
Is there usually going to be any sort of lateral reinforcement, or will the standard design be a simple wall, either brick or stone blocks on mortar courses?
Paul
Is there usually going to be any sort of lateral reinforcement, or will the standard design be a simple wall, either brick or stone blocks on mortar courses?
Paul
That's pretty much how I see it. The force that pushed it off was quite diffferent, but rebuilding is the same problem. If the formation comes higher up this time, so it's more of a retaining wall, how much difference does that make? Mind you, we don't know whether the new bit at West Carmont is pinned into the formation.
But that does raise an even more general question about such a structure, even further down where it looks solid and only the outside is visible. Just what is behind the neat masonry? How stable is it, and does rainwater get in? You'd hope those looking after them know this sort of thing, though I suspect they may not for some that have never been a problem. But it could turn into another of those circular e-mails dreaded by NR local managers - e.g. "urgent examination required of all masonry acting as a retaining wall even as a secondary function".
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by paul7575 at 12:48, 18th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
It all suggests to me that it?s actually a quite different problem to Carmont, where a power car or coaches on their side are believed to have broken away the parapet. There will be hundreds if not thousands of similarly constructed parapet walls having to cope with a side load from the track formation, and that load may well have been gradually increasing over many years.
Is there usually going to be any sort of lateral reinforcement, or will the standard design be a simple wall, either brick or stone blocks on mortar courses?
Paul
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 00:27, 18th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
NR Scotland's Twitter feed has an aerial picture, showing that in fact none of the lost section of parapet/wall is on the bridge proper:
It's also clear from their comments that "closed for week" does not imply anything about the date of reopening.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 21:44, 17th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From the Evening Express
A north-east railway line will be closed this week after part of a bridge wall collapsed ? close to the site of a fatal train crash.
Around 24 metres of the side wall of the bridge at Tewel near Stonehaven gave way on Friday.
It was less than a mile from the site of a fatal derailment which caused the deaths of Donald Dinnie, Brett McCullough and Christopher Stuchbury last August.
Network Rail said it was making good progress on the damage, which it had earlier described as "extensive".
Engineers are facing a number of challenges getting access to the site, including the height and location of the bridge.
As a result, the line between Stonehaven and Montrose will be closed for at least the next week.
Around 24 metres of the side wall of the bridge at Tewel near Stonehaven gave way on Friday.
It was less than a mile from the site of a fatal derailment which caused the deaths of Donald Dinnie, Brett McCullough and Christopher Stuchbury last August.
Network Rail said it was making good progress on the damage, which it had earlier described as "extensive".
Engineers are facing a number of challenges getting access to the site, including the height and location of the bridge.
As a result, the line between Stonehaven and Montrose will be closed for at least the next week.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 12:17, 17th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I?m referring just to the latest incident. AFAICT the BBC photo (reply #97) shows fairly clearly it?s on the outside of a curve?
Yes - what I meant was that so was the one rebuilt at West Carmont (not clear as worded, I admit).
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by paul7575 at 11:54, 17th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I wonder if they?ve increased the track cant to improve overall line speed? Does the other side of this bridge still have a bit more parapet above the ballast?
Would be pretty scary if they?ve just generally increased the ballast depth and it?s introduced a failure mode...
Paul
Would be pretty scary if they?ve just generally increased the ballast depth and it?s introduced a failure mode...
Paul
I thought that was part of it - being on the inside of a curve rather than the outside - but I don't think that's even true. Hard to be sure..
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 22:34, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I wonder if they?ve increased the track cant to improve overall line speed? Does the other side of this bridge still have a bit more parapet above the ballast?
Would be pretty scary if they?ve just generally increased the ballast depth and it?s introduced a failure mode...
Paul
Would be pretty scary if they?ve just generally increased the ballast depth and it?s introduced a failure mode...
Paul
I thought that was part of it - being on the inside of a curve rather than the outside - but I don't think that's even true. Hard to be sure..
There is a third bridge, between those two, but I can't find a picture nor even what it's called. The names I used were railscot's - basically the nearest house named on the OS map - and on that basis it's either East Carmont or Upper Wyndings. It's even possible the collapse was there, but then the distances given would be even less accurate.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 18:01, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Never rains but it pours and keeps pouring
From the Inverness Courier
A COLLAPSED embankment has forced the cancellation of all trains on part of the Far North Line.
Network Rail Scotland has warned that the closure is expected to remain in place for at least the rest of the Saturday, after an embankment "alongside the line" came away between Fearn and Tain.
Network Rail Scotland has warned that the closure is expected to remain in place for at least the rest of the Saturday, after an embankment "alongside the line" came away between Fearn and Tain.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 17:56, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From The Scotsman
Posting on Twitter, ScotRail wrote: "One of our trains has struck a stag between Blair Atholl & Dalwhinnie.
"It's caused a fault, which our crew are working to fix so we can get the train moving again."
"It's caused a fault, which our crew are working to fix so we can get the train moving again."
Pictured ... an HST
With the double track mainline to Aberdeen blocked by the bridge collapse, the only way up north is the single track via Pitlochry and Aviemore .... strikes me as a bit similar to rail to The West with a dual track via Taunton, with a single track and hilly alternative via "The Mule" if the main line is down ... what I was writing on this morning.
HSTs were designed to manage the sea wall at Dawlish, but perhaps the outcome in confrontation with a Stag wasn't one of the original design principles!
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by paul7575 at 17:55, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
On second thoughts (or rather looks), I think it is "just" the parapet that's gone. Now, what's going to be the current Network Rail way of repairing that? Rebuilt it out of masonry as original? An engineered system, such as a steel wall pinned to the other side (with long pins, obviously)? It's not clear "the usual suspect" - reinforced concrete - is going to be any easier here.
Looking at the attached photo of the derailment site after repair they have replaced the stone with reinforced concrete.
...actually I think there's a subtle difference between the two bridges, similar though they look. At West Carmont, the parapet taken off by the train was about half above the track level. This time, it's almost all below track level, retaining a deeper bed of fill. So I would not be surprised if NR feel they need to pin (or nail) the wall (not a true parapet) into the formation.
Would be pretty scary if they?ve just generally increased the ballast depth and it?s introduced a failure mode...
Paul
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 17:33, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
They appear to have reinforced the river bank as well (unless that had been done previously, but it looks new).
I think that was part of the same work at both bridges, starting well before the accident, to protect them from scour.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Bmblbzzz at 17:31, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
They appear to have reinforced the river bank as well (unless that had been done previously, but it looks new).
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 16:58, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
On second thoughts (or rather looks), I think it is "just" the parapet that's gone. Now, what's going to be the current Network Rail way of repairing that? Rebuilt it out of masonry as original? An engineered system, such as a steel wall pinned to the other side (with long pins, obviously)? It's not clear "the usual suspect" - reinforced concrete - is going to be any easier here.
Looking at the attached photo of the derailment site after repair they have replaced the stone with reinforced concrete.
Concrete blocks yes, but reinforced? You can string blocks together for strength, but those look like big separate blocks used as quick-build masonry. But if they've been practicing on the bridge next door, and already have them, no doubt that's exactly what they will do.
...actually I think there's a subtle difference between the two bridges, similar though they look. At West Carmont, the parapet taken off by the train was about half above the track level. This time, it's almost all below track level, retaining a deeper bed of fill. So I would not be surprised if NR feel they need to pin (or nail) the wall (not a true parapet) into the formation.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyN at 16:46, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
On second thoughts (or rather looks), I think it is "just" the parapet that's gone. Now, what's going to be the current Network Rail way of repairing that? Rebuilt it out of masonry as original? An engineered system, such as a steel wall pinned to the other side (with long pins, obviously)? It's not clear "the usual suspect" - reinforced concrete - is going to be any easier here.
Looking at the attached photo of the derailment site after repair they have replaced the stone with reinforced concrete.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 13:46, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
On second thoughts (or rather looks), I think it is "just" the parapet that's gone. Now, what's going to be the current Network Rail way of repairing that? Rebuilt it out of masonry as original? An engineered system, such as a steel wall pinned to the other side (with long pins, obviously)? It's not clear "the usual suspect" - reinforced concrete - is going to be any easier here.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by IndustryInsider at 12:26, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Great view of the stratification of a railway line there.

Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 12:17, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Now reported on the BBC, with a picture:
Part of rail bridge collapses near fatal Stonehaven derailment site

A 24m section of the bridge parapet collapsed one mile from where a fatal crash took place
Part of a rail bridge has collapsed near the site of the fatal Stonehaven train derailment.
A 24m (79ft) section of the side wall has fallen from the bridge, about a mile north of where three people died when a train left the track and crashed last August.
Network Rail said it was a "structural fault" and not caused by a landslip.
The line between Aberdeen and Dundee remains closed while structural engineers assess the fault.
The structure is located three miles north of Carmont signal box. The collapse was discovered just before 10:00 on Friday.
The rail company said the damage to the parapet was "extensive" and that the line was expected to be closed for a "significant" period of time while repairs to the bridge take place.
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.View original tweet on Twitter
1px transparent line
The Network Rail Twitter account told followers engineers would be working around the clock to complete repairs.
Specialist staff are also checking similar bridges as a precaution.
The line between Aberdeen and Dundee had just reopened in November, nearly three months after the Stonehaven derailment.

A 24m section of the bridge parapet collapsed one mile from where a fatal crash took place
Part of a rail bridge has collapsed near the site of the fatal Stonehaven train derailment.
A 24m (79ft) section of the side wall has fallen from the bridge, about a mile north of where three people died when a train left the track and crashed last August.
Network Rail said it was a "structural fault" and not caused by a landslip.
The line between Aberdeen and Dundee remains closed while structural engineers assess the fault.
The structure is located three miles north of Carmont signal box. The collapse was discovered just before 10:00 on Friday.
The rail company said the damage to the parapet was "extensive" and that the line was expected to be closed for a "significant" period of time while repairs to the bridge take place.
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.View original tweet on Twitter
1px transparent line
The Network Rail Twitter account told followers engineers would be working around the clock to complete repairs.
Specialist staff are also checking similar bridges as a precaution.
The line between Aberdeen and Dundee had just reopened in November, nearly three months after the Stonehaven derailment.
It's really nearer two miles north-east, at East Croft of Carmont. Now, work was going on in the river Carron to protect that bridge's abutments from scour, from before the accident and finishing in September. There's a picture here on railscot showing it from below.
The collapse appears to be more off the bridge itself than on, where there does seem to be a lot of soil fill under the track. So presumably that got wet and pushed the parapet wall - and the sidewall of the bridge lower down - off. Of course Story's works may also have given it a bit of a shoogle to help it along.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 09:35, 16th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From National Rail
Disruption between Aberdeen and Dundee expected until the end of service on Sunday 17 January
Urgent repairs to a bridge between Laurencekirk and Stonehaven due to damage caused by severe weather has resulted in all lines being closed.
Disruption is expected to continue until at least the end of service on Sunday 17 January.
Urgent repairs to a bridge between Laurencekirk and Stonehaven due to damage caused by severe weather has resulted in all lines being closed.
Disruption is expected to continue until at least the end of service on Sunday 17 January.
and from the Evening Express (Aberdeen) reported at 17:30 on 15.1.2021
Shock as part of north-east rail bridge collapses close to site of Stonehaven train tragedy
A trade union says the situation on Scotland?s railways is ?becoming terrifying? after part of a bridge collapsed approximately one mile from the site of the Stonehaven train derailment.
Train services from Aberdeen were disrupted earlier today after the side wall of a bridge near Stonehaven gave way ? close to the scene of the crash at Carmont last August, which left three men dead.
Unlike August?s tragedy, the most recent incident was not caused by a landslip.
Network Rail said the bridge was damaged ?due to weather conditions?.
[continues]
A trade union says the situation on Scotland?s railways is ?becoming terrifying? after part of a bridge collapsed approximately one mile from the site of the Stonehaven train derailment.
Train services from Aberdeen were disrupted earlier today after the side wall of a bridge near Stonehaven gave way ? close to the scene of the crash at Carmont last August, which left three men dead.
Unlike August?s tragedy, the most recent incident was not caused by a landslip.
Network Rail said the bridge was damaged ?due to weather conditions?.
[continues]
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 18:54, 9th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I thought the line speed through there was 75 mph before the restriction?
Where "there"? At the accident site the limit was 65/HST75, but if (as implied by the RAIB text) the restriction applied over a longer section of track, higher limits would apply there. Through Laurencekirk it's 90/HST100, and through Portlethen it's 80/HST100, and elsewhere in between it's between 75 and 100. (Actually those are from 2016, but unlikely to have been changed.)
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by FarWestJohn at 18:15, 9th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I thought the line speed through there was 75 mph before the restriction?
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 10:47, 9th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Just after I posted than, found this in the Press and Journal
'Outrageous negligence': Sister of tragic driver hits out as trains reach double the speed limit amid landslip fears on north-east line
Rail bosses have come under fire after train drivers were clocked at 100mph on tracks where a 40mph emergency limit had been put in place amid landslip fears.
The drivers, who were on the Aberdeenshire stretch of line where there was a fatal crash just four months before, had not been told about the need to slow down due to the conditions by higher-ups.
Last night, the family of Brett McCullough, the driver killed in August's derailment, branded the dangerous incident in December "outrageous negligence" so soon after the tragedy which cost his life.
Rail bosses have come under fire after train drivers were clocked at 100mph on tracks where a 40mph emergency limit had been put in place amid landslip fears.
The drivers, who were on the Aberdeenshire stretch of line where there was a fatal crash just four months before, had not been told about the need to slow down due to the conditions by higher-ups.
Last night, the family of Brett McCullough, the driver killed in August's derailment, branded the dangerous incident in December "outrageous negligence" so soon after the tragedy which cost his life.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 10:38, 9th January 2021 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
from the RAIB via email notifications linking to ((here))
Between about 06:35 hrs and 07:40 hrs on 4 December 2020, two passenger trains passed through an emergency speed restriction located between Laurencekirk and Portlethen stations, at speeds of up to 100 mph (160 km/h), significantly exceeding the temporary maximum permitted speed of 40 mph (64 km/h). The first train was travelling north from Dundee to Inverness, the second was travelling south from Inverness to Edinburgh. The emergency restriction had been introduced as a precaution in case forecast heavy rainfall caused ground movements affecting the safety of the railway.
Neither of the train drivers was aware of the emergency speed restriction at the time they drove their trains over the affected section of track. The events were identified after a Network Rail signaller noticed the relatively short time taken for the second train to pass through the area. The first overspeed was then identified using electronic records of train movements. There were no injuries or damage as a result of these incidents.
Neither of the train drivers was aware of the emergency speed restriction at the time they drove their trains over the affected section of track. The events were identified after a Network Rail signaller noticed the relatively short time taken for the second train to pass through the area. The first overspeed was then identified using electronic records of train movements. There were no injuries or damage as a result of these incidents.
Our investigation will determine the sequence of events that led to the incidents and include consideration of:
* the processes for advising train drivers of emergency speed restrictions
* any overlap with issues identified during the on-going RAIB investigation of the fatal accident on 12 August 2020 at Carmont, a location within the area covered by this emergency speed restriction (although there was no emergency speed restriction at Carmont on the 12 August)
* any relevant underlying factors.
* the processes for advising train drivers of emergency speed restrictions
* any overlap with issues identified during the on-going RAIB investigation of the fatal accident on 12 August 2020 at Carmont, a location within the area covered by this emergency speed restriction (although there was no emergency speed restriction at Carmont on the 12 August)
* any relevant underlying factors.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bradshaw at 17:35, 2nd November 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Two trains run over the section today as shown on RTT
https://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/search/detailed/CAARMNT/2020-11-02/0200-0159?stp=WVS&show=all&order=wtt
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 14:55, 2nd November 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From Rail Advent
Tomorrow, Tuesday, November the 3rd, will see the railway line reopen between Aberdeen and Dundee after repair works following the tragic derailment near Stonehaven back in August.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bradshaw at 08:17, 17th October 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Updated photos can be found here
https://twitter.com/philatrail/status/1317076825387008000?s=21
https://twitter.com/networkrailscot/status/1317197371357364225?s=21
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 20:51, 16th October 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From The Scotsman
Network Rail engineers are now relaying over 500 metres of track following the recent completion of work to repair the bridge and embankment damaged in the accident.
Work will continue into November as engineers remove and replace the damaged track and relay 400 metres of telecoms cables.
Work will continue into November as engineers remove and replace the damaged track and relay 400 metres of telecoms cables.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by bradshaw at 08:16, 12th September 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
According to Phil Haigh on Twitter the power car and two coaches have been lifted clear, with UKRail forums reporting the power car arriving at the old Springburn works in Glasgow
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 06:07, 12th September 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
It looks like it's still some time before the line will re-open past the accident site.
Scotrail have started an Aberdeen to Stonehaven shuttle service - https://www.scotrail.co.uk/about-scotrail/news/scotrail-introduces-stonehaven-shuttle-service-keep-customers-moving . From the south, trains are terminating at Dundee - in view of the Stonehaven shuttles, can we expect a shuttle from Dundee to Arbroath and Montrose - both sizeable towns in their one rights, and (with the Stonehaven shuttle) deducting the rail gap from 66 miles to 23.
Scotrail have started an Aberdeen to Stonehaven shuttle service - https://www.scotrail.co.uk/about-scotrail/news/scotrail-introduces-stonehaven-shuttle-service-keep-customers-moving . From the south, trains are terminating at Dundee - in view of the Stonehaven shuttles, can we expect a shuttle from Dundee to Arbroath and Montrose - both sizeable towns in their one rights, and (with the Stonehaven shuttle) deducting the rail gap from 66 miles to 23.
A month on ... Scotrail reports
A new shuttle service between Montrose and Edinburgh will be introduced from Monday, 14 September to allow customers travelling in the north east to complete their journey by rail.
The service will run Monday to Saturday between Montrose and Edinburgh, and between Montrose and Dundee on Sundays.
It follows the introduction of a rail shuttle service between Aberdeen and Stonehaven last week.
Existing replacement bus services between Dundee and Aberdeen remain in place for customers travelling beyond Montrose.
Network Rail has begun work to reopen the railway at Stonehaven following the derailment on 12 August, however the full timescale for completion is not yet known.
The service will run Monday to Saturday between Montrose and Edinburgh, and between Montrose and Dundee on Sundays.
It follows the introduction of a rail shuttle service between Aberdeen and Stonehaven last week.
Existing replacement bus services between Dundee and Aberdeen remain in place for customers travelling beyond Montrose.
Network Rail has begun work to reopen the railway at Stonehaven following the derailment on 12 August, however the full timescale for completion is not yet known.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by Electric train at 18:51, 10th September 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
There has been an "emergency" change to "The Rule Book" which adds some clarification and addition actions on how track workers, drivers etc should report land slips, washouts, flooding etc how signallers and control should respond.
There has always been items in the Rule Book regarding this, the change reinforces some Rules, clarifies actions and responses
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 11:30, 10th September 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
From the BBC
Network Rail has admitted that the impact of climate change on its network "is an area that is accelerating faster than our assumptions".
It said a fatal derailment near Stonehaven on 12 August showed that the industry must improve its response to extreme weather.
It said a fatal derailment near Stonehaven on 12 August showed that the industry must improve its response to extreme weather.
Reference to Report from Network Rail to DfT
The derailment of a passenger train near Carmont on 12 August 2020 was a tragedy for the families and friends of the three people who lost their lives and will have a lasting effect on those injured and involved in responding, as well as the wider railway industry. It has raised questions about the resilience and safe performance of the railway, and how the risk of such an event happening again can be minimised.
Emerging findings from the investigations suggest that a significant contributing factor to the derailment was heavy rainfall washing material onto the track. Therefore, this report commissioned by the Secretary of State for Transport seeks to provide an initial review of the resilience of rail infrastructure, in particular in the context of severe weather. Because of the nature of events that led to the derailment at Carmont, the report focuses on the resilience of earthworks and drainage infrastructure to heavy rainfall.
It is critical to understand fully what went wrong, what is being done now and what more can and should be done. This report in no way pre-empts the outcome of formal independent investigations. It is a look at our current approach, procedures and risk; our immediate and longer- term plans and actions; and initial consideration of next steps.
Emerging findings from the investigations suggest that a significant contributing factor to the derailment was heavy rainfall washing material onto the track. Therefore, this report commissioned by the Secretary of State for Transport seeks to provide an initial review of the resilience of rail infrastructure, in particular in the context of severe weather. Because of the nature of events that led to the derailment at Carmont, the report focuses on the resilience of earthworks and drainage infrastructure to heavy rainfall.
It is critical to understand fully what went wrong, what is being done now and what more can and should be done. This report in no way pre-empts the outcome of formal independent investigations. It is a look at our current approach, procedures and risk; our immediate and longer- term plans and actions; and initial consideration of next steps.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 06:56, 1st September 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
It looks like it's still some time before the line will re-open past the accident site.
Scotrail have started an Aberdeen to Stonehaven shuttle service - https://www.scotrail.co.uk/about-scotrail/news/scotrail-introduces-stonehaven-shuttle-service-keep-customers-moving . From the south, trains are terminating at Dundee - in view of the Stonehaven shuttles, can we expect a shuttle from Dundee to Arbroath and Montrose - both sizeable towns in their one rights, and (with the Stonehaven shuttle) deducting the rail gap from 66 miles to 23.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 06:54, 29th August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Yesterday's Scotsman
The site of a ScotRail train derailment in which three people died and six were injured will not re-open for at least another month, an industry source has told The Scotsman.
However, it is also understood that no significant problems have been found in checks at other at-risk sites across the Scottish network which were ordered in the wake of the crash.
However, it is also understood that no significant problems have been found in checks at other at-risk sites across the Scottish network which were ordered in the wake of the crash.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 19:50, 26th August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I do believe there is a JustGive page set up for the tragedy, maybe something to look into?
Something of a discussion on several funds in "Frequent Posters" ((here)). You are very welcome to follow up those posts. The utter support for the families and friends of those who lost their lives, and those hurt physically and mentally too, should go without saying (but I'll say it again anyway). How we can best deliver that or help others to do so is not so clear.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by at 19:26, 26th August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Good to see someone posting the truth, obviously the family is bound to know more than the rest of us ...
The reposting of the message posted on Stephanie Mccollough's account onto the forum was 100% correct - and it's a message that stands well on its own. Not, actually, obvious southwest that family is bound to know more about railway safety. My wife would not have claimed to have understood mutable and immutable objects which I was involved with many times while working. But the post is a good one - indeed a remarkable one in the circumstances.
I ... wondered ... whether to follow up on Facebook with a personal note of sympathy and condolence onto that account. In the end, I held back. Seeing floods of support and messages and suspecting that even more might overwhelm - an educated guess on my part, and no more, and I don't know if I got it right.
But I am going to add here, in public, my condolences, respect and sympathy for the families and friends of all three people who died. And add my admiration for the way that Facebook message was handled by Steph (I call her that, because it's how she signed it) and those closely assisting her. This message of respect, admiration and sympathy should remain here on this forum. It may be found in a year or a decade's time and perhaps may bring sollace long, long after the spotlight has moved on, by friends and families of all. And, perhaps at a time when the message will not be part of a flood, and the more welcomed for that.
I do believe there is a JustGive page set up for the tragedy, maybe something to look into?
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 14:54, 25th August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Network rail have announced two task forces to provide expert advice on the weather and earthworks, with specific reference to the effects of the one on the other:
Network Rail launches task forces in wake of Stonehaven tragedy
Region & Route: National
Network Rail has launched two independent task forces, led by world renowned experts, to help it better manage its massive earthworks (cuttings and embankments) portfolio and its understanding and response to severe weather events.
It follows the tragic events near Stonehaven on 12 August, where a train derailment led to driver Brett McCullough, conductor Donald Dinnie and passenger Christopher Stuchbury sadly losing their lives.
Dame Julia Slingo FRS, former chief scientist at the Met Office and a world-renowned expert in climatology, will lead a weather action task force with the objective of better equipping Network Rail to understand the risk of rainfall to its infrastructure, drawing on the latest scientific developments in monitoring, real-time observations and weather forecasting.
Meanwhile, Lord Robert Mair CBE FREng FRS will spearhead an earthworks management task force to see how Network Rail can improve the management of its massive earthworks portfolio, looking at past incidents, latest technologies and innovations and best practice from across the globe.
Network Rail's current safety management system provides a framework for the management of cuttings, embankments, structures and drainage. These have helped the company to limit the effects of rainfall on its infrastructure, but the events at Stonehaven on 12 August have shown that more understanding is needed to help mitigate the risks further.
Andrew Haines, Network Rail chief executive, said: “The Stonehaven tragedy resulted in three people losing their lives - this is a stark reminder that we must never take running a safe railway for granted.
“With more and more extreme weather and tens of thousands of earthwork assets across Great Britain, our challenge is massive. And while we are making record investment in these areas, we have asked world renowned experts, Dame Julia Slingo and Lord Mair, to help us address these issues as effectively as possible, and at pace.”
Region & Route: National
Network Rail has launched two independent task forces, led by world renowned experts, to help it better manage its massive earthworks (cuttings and embankments) portfolio and its understanding and response to severe weather events.
It follows the tragic events near Stonehaven on 12 August, where a train derailment led to driver Brett McCullough, conductor Donald Dinnie and passenger Christopher Stuchbury sadly losing their lives.
Dame Julia Slingo FRS, former chief scientist at the Met Office and a world-renowned expert in climatology, will lead a weather action task force with the objective of better equipping Network Rail to understand the risk of rainfall to its infrastructure, drawing on the latest scientific developments in monitoring, real-time observations and weather forecasting.
Meanwhile, Lord Robert Mair CBE FREng FRS will spearhead an earthworks management task force to see how Network Rail can improve the management of its massive earthworks portfolio, looking at past incidents, latest technologies and innovations and best practice from across the globe.
Network Rail's current safety management system provides a framework for the management of cuttings, embankments, structures and drainage. These have helped the company to limit the effects of rainfall on its infrastructure, but the events at Stonehaven on 12 August have shown that more understanding is needed to help mitigate the risks further.
Andrew Haines, Network Rail chief executive, said: “The Stonehaven tragedy resulted in three people losing their lives - this is a stark reminder that we must never take running a safe railway for granted.
“With more and more extreme weather and tens of thousands of earthwork assets across Great Britain, our challenge is massive. And while we are making record investment in these areas, we have asked world renowned experts, Dame Julia Slingo and Lord Mair, to help us address these issues as effectively as possible, and at pace.”
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by grahame at 16:07, 24th August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Good to see someone posting the truth, obviously the family is bound to know more than the rest of us ...
The reposting of the message posted on Stephanie Mccollough's account onto the forum was 100% correct - and it's a message that stands well on its own. Not, actually, obvious southwest that family is bound to know more about railway safety. My wife would not have claimed to have understood mutable and immutable objects which I was involved with many times while working. But the post is a good one - indeed a remarkable one in the circumstances.
I ... wondered ... whether to follow up on Facebook with a personal note of sympathy and condolence onto that account. In the end, I held back. Seeing floods of support and messages and suspecting that even more might overwhelm - an educated guess on my part, and no more, and I don't know if I got it right.
But I am going to add here, in public, my condolences, respect and sympathy for the families and friends of all three people who died. And add my admiration for the way that Facebook message was handled by Steph (I call her that, because it's how she signed it) and those closely assisting her. This message of respect, admiration and sympathy should remain here on this forum. It may be found in a year or a decade's time and perhaps may bring sollace long, long after the spotlight has moved on, by friends and families of all. And, perhaps at a time when the message will not be part of a flood, and the more welcomed for that.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by at 15:38, 24th August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
I think this quote, posted on Facebook by the driver's widow, Stephanie Mccullough, warrants posting here............ [ edit / Grahame to add link ((here)) to the post, which is public ]
I thought I had to post this because of the recent posts on various news channels implying my lovely husband was at fault.
When Brett was at carmont, he was actually held there for 2 hours, when Brett was told to proceed back north he was told it was good to proceed at line speed that was 75mph, he was under that!! at this point in time the storm had past and the sun was shining, Brett did what he was told we know this because the “black box” recorded Brett’s speed that was under the speed limit and the communications between scotrail and Brett record everything!! we also know Brett saw the landslide because the emergence breaks were applied. Many people don’t know that you can’t just stop a train! When the breaks are applied it could take up to a mile to stop a train, it’s not instant like a car. I can’t stand people implying that my beautiful kind husband was to blame. He did everything he was told to do. I can assure you Brett loved his job and did everything by the book. Unfortunately coming round that corner there was nothing he could have done. Please don’t assume things if you don’t know how the railway works as it’s very different from driving a car. It’s extremely hurtful to think people are judging Brett when they have absolutely no idea what they are talking about. Nobody should go to work and not come home. I have 3 heartbroken children here who Brett adored. His family was his world and he cared so much about people. Nobody can say a bad word about my kind gentle husband. Steph x
When Brett was at carmont, he was actually held there for 2 hours, when Brett was told to proceed back north he was told it was good to proceed at line speed that was 75mph, he was under that!! at this point in time the storm had past and the sun was shining, Brett did what he was told we know this because the “black box” recorded Brett’s speed that was under the speed limit and the communications between scotrail and Brett record everything!! we also know Brett saw the landslide because the emergence breaks were applied. Many people don’t know that you can’t just stop a train! When the breaks are applied it could take up to a mile to stop a train, it’s not instant like a car. I can’t stand people implying that my beautiful kind husband was to blame. He did everything he was told to do. I can assure you Brett loved his job and did everything by the book. Unfortunately coming round that corner there was nothing he could have done. Please don’t assume things if you don’t know how the railway works as it’s very different from driving a car. It’s extremely hurtful to think people are judging Brett when they have absolutely no idea what they are talking about. Nobody should go to work and not come home. I have 3 heartbroken children here who Brett adored. His family was his world and he cared so much about people. Nobody can say a bad word about my kind gentle husband. Steph x
Good to see someone posting the truth, obviously the family is bound to know more than the rest of us! It doesn't raise serious questions of Scotrail/Network Rail safety culture in bad weather, I know on my commutes of years ago during heavy rain/wind GWR have always slowed the trains down often to about 75mph on the 100mph between Starcross and Exeter.
I also dread to think what was going on in Brett's head when he saw that landslip and knew he didn't have time to stop, veyr terrifying to think about what was going on in those last few minutes.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by stuving at 22:44, 23rd August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
To resume my meteorological discussion with Stuving, I think it is a bit of a jump to assume thar most or even a substantial number of the 500mm per day readings result from convectional rainfall. My guess is that most would be from the kind of conditions we experienced in the winter of 2013/4 when deep Atlantic depressions gave days of long steady rain to fill the rain gauges.
Entirely anecdotal, but as someone who records rainfall at home and have done so for about 30 years (admittedly in a rain shadow where we get low annual totals and more than an inch a day usually occurs once or twice a year at most), I can only think of one occasion when we had an intense storm producing 2 inches in a few hours, namely the exceptional storm in July 2007. That produced flash flooding and damage on a scale I have not seen before or since.
Entirely anecdotal, but as someone who records rainfall at home and have done so for about 30 years (admittedly in a rain shadow where we get low annual totals and more than an inch a day usually occurs once or twice a year at most), I can only think of one occasion when we had an intense storm producing 2 inches in a few hours, namely the exceptional storm in July 2007. That produced flash flooding and damage on a scale I have not seen before or since.
I wasn't really trying to make such a precise numeric point, apart from that genuine measured value of 50 mm/day (500 mm really would be scary!) 0.4 times per year at any random place. How concentrated that is within the 24 hours is secondary, but certainly it will vary. And even for frontal rain, it will rarely come with most of it spread over more than twelve hours. And convective cells and thunderstorms do form along fronts.
As I hinted, assuming the fraction of such intense rain days that are convective in origin is 50% is not more than the modeller's standard assumption for a parameter that must lie between 0 and 1 but otherwise nothing is known about its value. So the two-hour burst of rain might indeed be once per ten or even twenty years - but more precise definitions would be needed for that to be truly meaningful. Of course, when talking about how often I'd come across such rain or its flooding, that's not going to reflect the statistics for a single place. Driving takes you a lot of places along the route - but then the same is true of a railway line.
A further point that blurs the division between day-long and shorter rain bursts is that the response time of catchments and drainage varies a lot too. Drains (meaning pipes) have a largely fixed capacity, which they can cope with, and then anything above that flow rate has to go elsewhere. Hard surfaces provide only limited storage too; here it's the short burst that give flooding. More natural areas will respond slower, and watercourses spread progressively, and so respond to a day (or more) of rainfall (at least, on flatter land).
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by ellendune at 18:58, 23rd August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
To resume my meteorological discussion with Stuving, I think it is a bit of a jump to assume thar most or even a substantial number of the 500mm per day readings result from convectional rainfall. My guess is that most would be from the kind of conditions we experienced in the winter of 2013/4 when deep Atlantic depressions gave days of long steady rain to fill the rain gauges.
Entirely anecdotal, but as someone who records rainfall at home and have done so for about 30 years (admittedly in a rain shadow where we get low annual totals and more than an inch a day usually occurs once or twice a year at most), I can only think of one occasion when we had an intense storm producing 2 inches in a few hours, namely the exceptional storm in July 2007. That produced flash flooding and damage on a scale I have not seen before or since.
Entirely anecdotal, but as someone who records rainfall at home and have done so for about 30 years (admittedly in a rain shadow where we get low annual totals and more than an inch a day usually occurs once or twice a year at most), I can only think of one occasion when we had an intense storm producing 2 inches in a few hours, namely the exceptional storm in July 2007. That produced flash flooding and damage on a scale I have not seen before or since.
Deep Atlantic depressions generally give long periods of rainfall which. while not necessarily that intense over a short period, accumulate to large amounts because of the duration of the rainfall. These are often associated with winter river flooding though occasionally also in the summer. Since they originate in the Atlantic they are more common and usually more severe in the west of the country.
Convectional summer storms are more commonly associated with short periods of very intense rainfall which lead to flash floods. They are typically more common and more severe in the east of the country.
If you consider the average intensity of rainfall in a series of events we find a relationship of reducing intensity with increasing duration for the same probability of a rainfall event.
So for a 1 in 1 year event it is not uncommon to find a distribution of 90 mm/hr over 5 mins reducing to say 60mm per hour over 15 minutes. If the report of 52mm of rain in 4 hours (12 mm/hr) is correct it does not sound that much so i do not expect it on its own to be very significant. However the wider context of rainfall may bring more significance was this 52mm on top of a lot of previous rainfall.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by eightonedee at 17:24, 23rd August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
To resume my meteorological discussion with Stuving, I think it is a bit of a jump to assume thar most or even a substantial number of the 500mm per day readings result from convectional rainfall. My guess is that most would be from the kind of conditions we experienced in the winter of 2013/4 when deep Atlantic depressions gave days of long steady rain to fill the rain gauges.
Entirely anecdotal, but as someone who records rainfall at home and have done so for about 30 years (admittedly in a rain shadow where we get low annual totals and more than an inch a day usually occurs once or twice a year at most), I can only think of one occasion when we had an intense storm producing 2 inches in a few hours, namely the exceptional storm in July 2007. That produced flash flooding and damage on a scale I have not seen before or since.
Re: HST derailment, near Stonehaven, 12th August 2020 Posted by TonyK at 16:42, 22nd August 2020 | ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Absolutely it warrant posting here. It is a vivid reminder that we (the general community) really must not speculate let alone judge, but leave the analysis to the experts.
Couldn't agree more. If there was ever a situation where the general public doesn't know enough to be able to make a judgment, this is it.