Terrible accident at Santiago de Compostela, northern Spain - 24 July 2013

[whole diary]

[stuving]

Both openness, and keeping things confidential have their merits.

In the UK^▸ (United Kingdom), criminal prosecutions are normally held in open court, anyone including the press, may make use of the public gallery and report as to whom said what.
Inquiries into serious accidents are sometimes held in view of the public via either the coroners court, or a public inquiry.

Other inquiries, especially if potentially leading to disciplinary action against an individual are normally private.

It would seem that the Spanish approach favours more openness than the UK, this may or may not be a good thing, but should not be criticised for being simply different to the UK approach.
There is very considerable interest in this awful accident and the causes thereof, and in my view openness as to the on-going inquiries and evidence revealed is a good thing, it will certainly reduce the amount of ill informed speculation and rumour.

I agree with all of that - I was really only commenting on the release of part of the audio recording of the driver's interview with the judge. Releasing facts about the accident is one thing, but the tape did seem to me to go too far (though I imagine a British lawyer would deny that any fact is so objective as not to be prejudicial).

I wasn't making a comparison with the British situation. In fact, I did initially jump to the conclusion that the rules would be like France, as the system is also based on an examining judge leading a team of judicial police. In France such investigators are bound by the principle of secret d'instruction so you don't get much released officially. Mind you the leaks to the media are routine and often very detailed, and leakers are only pursued in highly political cases. As journalists' sources are also protected by law, we have seen a farcical situation where one judge is investigating a leak while another is investigating the first one for spying on or raiding a newspaper.

That background has a side effect that the French have been discussing whether to scrap this secrecy, and why they have it in theory. The reason they give is roughly the same as used to justify our sub judice rules: that publicity, always selective, would prejudice a jury.

Now the driver is described as "not formally charged", but clearly he is under investigation for specific crimes, and there may be no step corresponding to a charge in our system. I suppose that in Spain any trial may not involve a jury, which would remove this concern - at least if you buy the theory that a judge could never be prejudiced or swayed by what's in the press...

Actually, I am not sure the tape was officially released - I have only ever seen it credited to El Pa^s. I imagine that press freedom and sources are well-protected in Spain as part of the post-Franco sweeping away of anything that looked dictatorial. 

[ChrisB]

 
Rail Professional (@RailProMag)

21/08/2013 15:02
Spanish train crash investigation - judge in charge has presented preliminary charges against state-run rail infrastructure company, Adif.

[stuving]

El Pa^s (http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/08/20/inenglish/1377008922_780191.html) puts it a bit differently, more like a subpoena:

The judge investigating the train accident that killed 79 people near Santiago de Compostela on July 24 believes that Adif, the state-owned railway manager, may have some responsibility in a tragic event that has so far been blamed on the driver.

Although he stated that the direct cause of the accident was the excessive speed of the train as it entered a sharp curve, Judge Luis Al^ez now wants to question the Adif employee in charge of safety for the stretch of track between Ourense and Santiago. The date of the court statement has not been set yet as Adif has yet to identify the individual who held this responsibility.

They also report (http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/08/22/inenglish/1377198453_943657.html) an outbreak of finger-pointing among the politicians, based on late changes made (I think to the signalling, but this is not explained) so as to allow the line to be opened at the time of the last general election.

[ChrisB]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page)

A recording has emerged in Spanish media of a phone call made by a train driver moments after his train derailed in northern Spain, killing 79 people.

Francisco Jose Garzon is heard telling a colleague he was travelling at 190km/h (118 mph) instead of 80km/h and became distracted.

He also said he had previously complained that the bend, where the accident happened, was "inhuman".

The driver and the state-owned railway firm Renfe are on trial over the crash.

Magistrate Luis Alaez has charged Mr Garzon with "79 counts of homicide and numerous offences of bodily harm committed through professional recklessness". The driver is not in jail but remains under court supervision.

The accident, which happened during the evening on 24 July near the Galician city of Santiago de Compostela, is one of the worst rail disasters in Spanish history.

All eight carriages of the train careered off the tracks into a concrete wall as they sped around the curve on the express route between Madrid and the port city of Ferrol on the Galician coast.

Some 170 people were wounded in the crash.

'Poor passengers'
 
El Pais newspaper obtained a recording of the phone call Mr Garzon made to activate the emergency protocol after the Alvia train smashed into the wall, caught fire, and derailed on 24 July.

"There must be many injured, [the train] has turned over, I can't get out of the cabin," he is heard telling a colleague at Madrid's central station.

During the conversation, Mr Garzon repeatedly says "poor passengers", adding: "I hope no-one has died."

He also admitted going too fast at the time of the crash.

"I got distracted and I [was meant] to be going at 80, but I was going at 190," Mr Garzon said.

Wreckage of the train near Santiago de Compostela (27 July) The train was said to be travelling at more than twice the speed limit
"I had already mentioned to the safety people that this [curve] was dangerous, that one day something like this could happen."

Judicial authorities earlier said the train was travelling at 192km/h (119mph) on the bend where it derailed.

Crash investigators opened the train's "black-box" data recorder to find the cause of the crash.

Meanwhile, another recording has emerged of the driver's pre-trial questioning, the BBC's Tom Burridge, in Madrid, reports.

In the recording, Mr Garzon is heard giving evidence about a phone-call he received from a train conductor moments before the crash, in which they discussed which platform they would pull into.

The driver told the court he lost a sense of where the train was during the call. By the time he had engaged the train's electric and pneumatic brakes, it was too late, Mr Garzon said.

The investigation into the crash will also consider why there was no automatic braking system on the curve in question, our correspondent reports.

The safety mechanism has since been installed at the scene of the accident.

[TonyK]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page)

The safety mechanism has since been installed at the scene of the accident.

Stable door bolted? In the forthcoming proceedings, this detail will be seized upon by all sides to make different points.

Mod Note: Edited to fix quote

[stuving]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page)

The safety mechanism has since been installed at the scene of the accident.

Stable door bolted? In the forthcoming proceedings, this detail will be seized upon by all sides to make different points.
Mod Note: Edited to fix quote

And so it has. The emergency installation of ASFA balises to support automatic braking was reported last month -

In Angrois curve line Ourense-Santiago where Alvia derailed, the maximum speed is limited to 30 kilometers per hour. Until now, the limit was 80. Also operating as the new automatic braking system installed in the area, which starts four miles before the accident.

ADIF technicians have placed three beacons ASFA system with staggered speed limitations. The first (accompanied by a poster installed in the track) is at km 79/769, and limits the speed to 160 km / hour. Another beacon placed at km 81/669 (about three miles before the crash), with its accompanying poster, limits the speed to 30 km / hour, and the latter, in turn, is protected by another previous mark (called notice), approximately 300 meters, which limits the speed to 60 km / hour. If the train exceeds the speed limit, the ASFA system will trip and automatically brake the train, avoiding accidents such as occurred on July 24.

and all sides have indeed been sharpening every pointy thing they can find.

I was a bit surprised the "escaped" recordings made the news - they add little to what we thought we knew already. On the other hand, there is a new report from El Pa^s in English http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/09/06/inenglish/1378468502_039832.html which is new. It reports that the black box shows the "automatic brake" (driver's safety device) being applied twice after leaving Orense, in one case slowing from 110 to 48 km/hr. That raises two questions: what was the driver doing that stopped him cancelling the warning sooner, and why did none of the passengers say anything about it?

[Chris from Nailsea]

From the Belfast Telegraph:

Train crash driver now only suspect


79 people died in the train crash (AP)

The man who was driving the train which was involved in a crash that killed 79 people in Spain is the only person likely to face trial after a court dropped its investigation of 22 officials from rail infrastructure firm Adif.

A statement from the court said there was nothing to indicate that the officials could be considered suspects for having let the train run on the stretch of track near Santiago where the crash happened July 24.

The driver has admitted from the beginning that he was going too fast when the crash occurred and has been provisionally charged with multiple counts of negligent homicide.

The Adif officials included the company's three most recent presidents, board members and managers in charge of safety.

[stuving]

I find this news item puzzling.

Siemens, Thales to upgrade Spanish railway safety

German engineering giant Siemens and French industrial group Thales have been chosen to upgrade safety features, control systems and signals on Spain's high-speed Olmedo to Ourense track.

French and German industrial giants Thales and Siemens said Monday they had won a joint contract worth 510 million euros to revamp safety systems on a high-speed train line in Spain. The consortium was 55-percent owned by Thales with the remaining 45 percent held by Siemens.

Wide ranging upgrade
Spanish infrastructure admistrator ADIF issued the contract to modernize the control, signalling and safety equipment on the roughly 340-kilometre (211-mile) section of the high-speed line between Olmedo and Ourense in northern Spain. It includes installation of the automatic train protection and control system, telecommunication and traffic control systems, as well as system maintenance for 20 years.

Safety improvements
To improve passenger safety, Siemens will equip the high speed line with train control system ASFA (Automatic Braking and Announcement of Signals) and central control technology.
 
At least 77 dead in Spain train crash
A high-speed derailment on another section of this high-speed line in July 2013 caused 79 deaths on the outskirts of the northwestern city of Santiago de Compostela, Spain's deadliest train accident since 1944.
At 2,600 route kilometers, the Spanish high-speed railway network is the largest in Europe.
bew/uhe (AFP, Siemens)

As far as I can see, this is a new line - the train that crashed last year had to use the old line from Olmedo to Ourense. So why does this piece (and others) say they are upgrading it? My recollection is that it was the on-board systems that were lacking, not those on the already opened high-speed line.

[eightf48544]

As I understand it the crash was at the junction of the new and old lines and that there was no Balaise to warn the driver that he was coming off the high speed line and faced a drastic speed restriction.

I believe this contarct might be to provide these interfaces where high speed lines run onto old lines without full ETCS^▸ (European Train Control System).

 

[stuving]

Well, actually it is (surprise) sloppy reporting again. Here is a company press release which makes it clear that this is all new line, being fitted out just this once.

Thales is to install the ERTMS^▸ (European Rail Traffic Management System.) level 2 automatic train protection system, wayside LED light signals, axle counters for safe train detection, wheel sensors and landline telecommunications systems. Thales will also be responsible for installing new state-of-the-art electronic interlockings at several stations on the Medina del Campo-Zamora-Ourense conventional line affected by the work on the high-speed line.

The company will also provide all GSM-R^▸ (Global System for Mobile communications - Railway.) mobile communications systems, power supply for the facilities, auxiliary detection systems, equipment buildings and auxiliary building work.

Siemens, for its part, is to install its safety solution based on electronic interlockings and associated technologies, with the ASFA system, centralised traffic control, supply of balises, track circuits, video surveillance systems and access control.

This 331 km section will benefit from ERTMS level 2 standard allowing a maximum speed of 350 km/h and reducing the journey to 2 hours. In 2018, it will provide a high-speed railway link between Ourense in Galicia and Olmedo near Valladolid.

The Madrid-Valladolid section came into service in December 2007, forming the first leg of the Madrid-Galicia high-speed line, and in December 2011 passenger operations began on the Ourense-Santiago de Compostela-A Coru^a section. The Olmedo-Ourense section will complete this Spain^s main high-speed corridors ^ the North-Northwest line ^ and will link the regions of Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla Le^n and Madrid.

The Siemens version says much the same, though it appears to have been translated by a robot.

What is a lot less obvious is why they are using two different companies' interlockings, and track circuits as well as axle counters on the new line (some kit goes on the old one too).

As I recall, there was a crash programme to fit extra train protection boxes to the relevant bits of track.

[TonyK]

I feel sorry for the driver. I also feel sorry for the families of those who doed, and for those maimed by this accident. The driver clearly did not set out to cause the accident, and there are reasons to think that he was not the sole architect of the misfortune. He is being strung out to dry. As a driver of a car, I would be mortified to be blamed for a single loss of life, let alone the carnage here. The truth may tell here, but I feel that the system may be as much ro blame as the operator.