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TonyK
Global Moderator
Hero Member
Posts: 6438
The artist formerly known as Four Track, Now!
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« Reply #136 on: March 09, 2016, 21:58:14 » |
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That RAIB▸ makes for sobering reading, but amply demonstrates a law of rail, air, and marine accidents, and probably of road traffic accidents:
No accident ever has only one causal factor.
In practice, there are usually at least three. In this case, the AWS▸ system was effectively switched off, the portable magnet for the TSR▸ was positioned closer to the permanent magnet for the AWS, and the driver's view from the windscreen was obscured. Put any one of those right, and the SPAD▸ may not have occurred (but if my auntie had nuts, she'd be my uncle). Fortunately, there were couple of lucky breaks in this case - Tangmere left home a few minutes late, meaning the HST▸ was gone when she passed the signal, and the route had been set after the HST had passed, even though the signal remained at danger, meaning no damage.
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Now, please!
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JayMac
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« Reply #137 on: March 09, 2016, 22:01:49 » |
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Worth reiterating that the RAIB▸ doesn't apportion blame and that their final report is on hold. There is an ongoing criminal case. Caution needed here when making comment.
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"Build a man a fire and he'll be warm for the rest of the day. Set a man on fire and he'll be warm for the rest of his life."
- Sir Terry Pratchett.
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TonyK
Global Moderator
Hero Member
Posts: 6438
The artist formerly known as Four Track, Now!
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« Reply #138 on: March 09, 2016, 22:53:41 » |
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I ran my last post past my legal adviser before hitting the button.
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Now, please!
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eightf48544
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« Reply #139 on: March 10, 2016, 04:14:41 » |
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Out of interest on a steam engine footplate, were there is normally more than one person, is it the driver who carries ultimate responsibility for the safe operating of the train?
Technically the Guard is in charge of the train, the driver takes responsibility for the safe working of the locomotive, obeying signals and maintaining the schedule. In steam loco days there would have been 2 on the footplate driver and fireman with the occasional Inspector, route learner, footplate pass holder and on quieter lines the odd small boy. But on steam specials there will usually be a Traction Inspector possibly a Network Rail Rep an owners representative plus others it can get quite crowded. |
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« Last Edit: March 11, 2016, 03:29:09 by eightf48544 »
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Western Enterprise
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« Reply #140 on: March 10, 2016, 11:27:32 » |
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on quieter lines the odd small boy.
 LOL▸ - must have been used in times past to clean the chimney.....  |
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Chris from Nailsea
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« Reply #141 on: March 20, 2016, 01:30:01 » |
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In the meantime, UK▸ Railtours have pointed out, in their Newsletter 186: TIMINGS NOW CONFIRMED FOR THE DEVON BELLE SATURDAY 2 APRIL 2016 Main Line Steam operated by DB» Schenker UK Railtours are agents for the A1 Steam Locomotive Trust  The issues with West Coast Railway Company don^t affect us, so you can still enjoy Main Line Steam. Here are the timings for The Devon Belle, hauled by 60163 ^Tornado^ throughout: |
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William Huskisson MP▸ was the first person to be killed by a train while crossing the tracks, in 1830. Many more have died in the same way since then. Don't take a chance: stop, look, listen.
"Level crossings are safe, unless they are used in an unsafe manner." Discuss.
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Adelante_CCT
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« Reply #143 on: March 23, 2016, 12:58:53 » |
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Until the next incident....
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Chris from Nailsea
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« Reply #144 on: March 23, 2016, 18:09:34 » |
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Hmm.  As ORR» Director of Railway Safety and HM Chief Inspector of Railways Ian Prosser said, ^We shall continue to closely monitor WCR over the coming period to ensure that their approach is embedded into the culture of the company and that they fully comply with all the commitments they have made."
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William Huskisson MP▸ was the first person to be killed by a train while crossing the tracks, in 1830. Many more have died in the same way since then. Don't take a chance: stop, look, listen.
"Level crossings are safe, unless they are used in an unsafe manner." Discuss.
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old original
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« Reply #145 on: March 23, 2016, 20:56:25 » |
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well that makes me feel safe.....  |
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8 Billion people on a wet rock - of course we're not happy
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Chris from Nailsea
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« Reply #146 on: May 05, 2016, 12:15:54 » |
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The Rail Accident Investigation Branch ( RAIB▸ ) has now published the full report, available on their website: Signal passed at danger (SPAD▸ ) on the approach to Wootton Bassett Junction, Wiltshire, 7 March 2015
At around 17:25 hrs on Saturday 7 March 2015, train reporting number 1Z67, the 16:35 hrs steam hauled charter service from Bristol Temple Meads to Southend, passed signal SN45 at danger. Signal SN45, which is situated on the approach to Wootton Bassett Junction, was being maintained at danger to protect the movement of a scheduled passenger train. At the time that the incident occurred, this scheduled passenger train had already passed through the junction. No injuries, damage or derailment occurred as a result of the incident.
Train 1Z67 was operated by West Coast Railways and consisted of the steam locomotive ^Tangmere^ and 13 coaches. Although Tangmere is a heritage locomotive, it is fitted with modern safety systems including the Automatic Warning System (AWS▸ ) and the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS▸ ).
RAIB^s investigation has found that signal SN45 was passed at danger because the driver did not reduce the train^s speed on approach to the signal. This meant that he was unable to stop the train in time, once he realised it was at danger. The driver had not reduced the train^s speed because he had not seen the preceding signal, which was at caution and should have alerted him that SN45 was at danger. He missed this preceding signal because he had become distracted by activity within the cab and possibly also because he was experiencing a higher workload than normal.
Train 1Z67 also passed signal SN45 at danger because the TPWS system was unable to reduce the speed of the train by automatically applying the brakes. This was because TPWS had been rendered ineffective by Tangmere^s crew when they had isolated the AWS system in order to by-pass an automatic brake application which had occurred at a speed restriction. Isolating AWS in this way was in contravention of the relevant rules but the RAIB has found that it had almost certainly become an accepted practice among some train crews on this locomotive. This was probably because warnings from AWS were not always apparent to drivers, who were also anxious to avoid delays resulting from brake demands. Measures intended to prevent the misuse of AWS isolations had either not been adopted by West Coast Railways or had not been effectively implemented.
The RAIB found three underlying factors. These were that the AWS system on Tangmere was installed in a way which meant that warnings from the system were not always apparent to drivers. In addition, the investigation found that a speed restriction which was in place on approach to the junction was based on incorrect information and had been implemented in a way which did not conform to the relevant rules and standards. The investigation also found that West Coast Railways had a weak safety culture and that this had affected the way its staff observed rules and instructions.
As a result of this incident, RAIB has made five recommendations. One recommendation is addressed to RSSB▸ , working in conjunction with steam train operators and Network Rail, and relates to a review of the arrangements intended to assess, prevent and mitigate the risks associated with steam movements.
Three recommendations are addressed to West Coast Railways. These relate to a review of its safety management system and safety culture; the implementation of industry best-practice concerning the management of drivers^ knowledge of operating routes; and the arrangements for maintaining on train data recorders.
One recommendation is addressed to Network Rail. This concerns the way that emergency and temporary speed restrictions are designed and implemented.
RAIB has identified one key learning point. This is that allowing safety critical systems such as AWS and TPWS to function without improper interference is vital to the safe operation of the railway. By-passing safety systems, or isolating them other than in accordance with the requirements of the relevant rules, can have catastrophic consequences.
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William Huskisson MP▸ was the first person to be killed by a train while crossing the tracks, in 1830. Many more have died in the same way since then. Don't take a chance: stop, look, listen.
"Level crossings are safe, unless they are used in an unsafe manner." Discuss.
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Adelante_CCT
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« Reply #148 on: May 05, 2016, 20:04:30 » |
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bobm
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« Reply #149 on: May 05, 2016, 20:55:46 » |
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With thanks to Adelante_CCT for pointing it out, I have now merged the two topics for ease of reference.
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