Potential industrial action over IEP introduction

[whole diary]

[Network SouthEast]

Then there is also the question of making PA^▸ (Public Address) announcements - are you supposed to do them while on the move?

Yes and no. FGW^▸ (First Great Western)'s policy for announcements made by the driver is summarised

No if:
* You are braking for a station stop
* You are running on cautionary signals
* You are between Kensal Green and Paddington

Yes if:
* None of the above apply and you feel it is safe to do so

Sometimes there might be an enthusiastic driver or a guard travelling in the back cab who might make an announcement(s) on behalf of the driver.

You can't use the cab to cab or make/answer a call to the signaller (unless an emergency) if you are running on cautionary signals or stopping for a station either.

These rules, whilst protecting drivers from distractions, make it difficult for drivers to pass on service disruption information to passengers.

[Network SouthEast]

I happened to be in the right place to shout a warning.

At least you had an opportunity to shout a warning. You wouldn't have had the same luck if a driver was in their cab with the window shut, would you?

[chrisr_75]

I happened to be in the right place to shout a warning.

At least you had an opportunity to shout a warning. You wouldn't have had the same luck if a driver was in their cab with the window shut, would you?

Why can't they just have a door enabling system as per LUL^▸ (London Underground Ltd)? It requires stopping exactly on the mark, but most Tube drivers seem to manage this 99% of the time and when not, it involves just a small nudge forwards and all doors are in exactly the right place at every platform and reduces the likelihood of wrong side doors being unlocked or opened, any that are unable to be opened due to short platforms remain closed/locked. I don't see why this sort of system wouldn't be able to be used on the national rail network, given suitably equipped rolling stock of course (IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.) would seem an ideal opportunity).

[Tim]

I find it odd that we are arguing over small theoretical differences (der Narzi^mus der kleinen Differenzen) in safety between DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) and conventional operation when both systems are extremely safe.  There is a certain inconsistency in arguing that DOO is unsafe and catching a bus to the station where the bus driver is driving, operating the doors and taking the fares.

If DOO can save costs (or protect revenue) then do not forget that that in itself will result in lives saved.  A cheaper railway means more passengers and fewer people killed on the roads.  A railway that requires less taxpayer's money means more money to spend elsewhere such as the NHS where increased spending will save a huge number of lives.

[Network SouthEast]

Why can't they just have a door enabling system as per LUL^▸ (London Underground Ltd)? It requires stopping exactly on the mark, but most Tube drivers seem to manage this 99% of the time and when not, it involves just a small nudge forwards and all doors are in exactly the right place at every platform and reduces the likelihood of wrong side doors being unlocked or opened, any that are unable to be opened due to short platforms remain closed/locked. I don't see why this sort of system wouldn't be able to be used on the national rail network, given suitably equipped rolling stock of course (IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.) would seem an ideal opportunity).

There's no reason why there can't be. I'm sure in the fullness of time there will be across the network.

It just requires the additional hardware and expense to do so.

The SDO^▸ (Selective Door Opening) system employed on Electrostars doesn't prevent doors being opened out of course.

I know SWT^▸ (South West Trains) have installed balaises on the track for their Desiro fleet which are supposed to prevent any unplatformed doors from opening but trials have not gone well and the system is not used yet.

[stuving]

The IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.) specification calls for an all-singing and tap-dancing SDO^▸ (Selective Door Opening) system capable of automatic operation. I'll quote it at length, as I did wonder whether the RMT^▸ (National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers) really had to wait until now to say they known what's coming.

4.13 Selective Door Operation

TS296 IEP Trains must be fitted with an SDO system to allow for longer IEP Trains operating in single or Multiple Working formation to stop at short platforms.

N032 The SDO system shall include the facility to enable each power operated door along the length of an IEP Train to be separately included/excluded from the door release pattern at each station.

N033 An SDO system able to use SDO data provided by the ETCS^▸ (European Train Control System) system must be fitted to the IEP Train.
If the ETCS system provides data which allows the IEP Train to determine on which side of the IEP Train the platform is located, the SDO system must prevent release of the doors on the side of the IEP Train where there is no platform.

N058 An SDO system able to use SDO data provided by Eurobalises using Packet 44 must be fitted to the IEP Train.
If the Eurobalise provides data which allows the IEP Train to determine on which side of the IEP Train the platform is located, the SDO system must prevent release of the doors on the side of the train where there is no platform.

N059 The IEP Train must be fitted with a GPS based SDO system.
The system shall use data relating to the position and length of the platform (stored in a database on the IEP Train), data related to the agreed stopping position of the IEP Train (stored in a database on the IEP Train) and data on the position of the IEP Train (from a GPS system together with other sources of data including odometry) to determine which doors may be safely released.

N060 It must be possible to configure the SDO system to make use of data from the following sources:
1. the ETCS system;
2. Eurobalises providing SDO data in Packet 44; and
3. the GPS based SDO system.
It must be possible to configure which data source should take precedence in the event that data is available from more than one source.

N061 The SDO system must be able to accommodate the following operating requirements:
^ the provision of different stopping positions in relation to a station platform for IEP Trains formed of differing numbers of IEP Vehicles. This shall allow the system to cope with circumstances where either the rear of the IEP Train, the front of the IEP Train or some point in the middle of the IEP Train is required to align with a specific point on the platform; and
^ the provision of different stopping positions in relation to a station platform for IEP Trains of the same length (in the event that, for example a signal is positioned at an intermediate point along a platform).

N035 Staff involvement in releasing the doors must be limited to the following (except in the case of failure of the IEP Train or infrastructure equipment or in certain scenarios in the case of GPS based SDO (please refer to N036)):
^ the driver shall be responsible for stopping the IEP Train in the correct position, to within an agreed tolerance;
^ the driver shall be responsible for viewing an indication from the SDO system which will identify the IEP Train^s location and the proposed pattern of door release. This indication shall appear automatically, as the train reaches a stand. Note that the driver will spend a short period of time (less than two seconds) on this activity, commensurate with the desire to optimise dwell times, and this should not be relied on to detect any but the most obvious of defects in the SDO system; and
^ the driver shall be responsible for pressing the door release buttons for the correct side so as to release the doors or in the event of DGO-G operation allow the guard to release the doors.
The SDO system should require no additional traincrew involvement other than that defined above.

N036 In the case where GPS based SDO is in use and it can be demonstrated that insufficient information is available to the SDO system to allow it to determine the location of the IEP Train to a sufficient level of accuracy to determine the correct door release pattern then staff involvement in releasing the doors shall be limited to the following:
^ the driver shall be responsible for stopping the IEP Train in the correct position, to within an agreed tolerance;
^ the SDO system will automatically, as the train comes to a stand, invite the driver to confirm, if necessary, the station at which he has stopped and/or, if necessary the specific platform at which he has stopped;
^ the driver will briefly review the information that the SDO system displays to him and confirm his location to the SDO system. This process shall take no longer than 3 seconds;
^ the driver shall be responsible for viewing an indication from the SDO system which will identify the IEP Train^s location and the proposed pattern of door release. Note that the driver will spend a short period of time (less than two seconds) on this activity, commensurate with the desire to optimise dwell times, and this should not be relied on to detect any but the most obvious of defects in the SDO system; and
^ the driver shall be responsible for pressing the door release buttons for the correct side so as to release the doors or, in the event of DGO-G operation allow the guard to release the doors.
The SDO system should require no additional traincrew involvement other than that defined above.

N034 The SDO system and PIS^▸ (Passenger Information System) must operate together so as to give passengers information regarding the operation of the SDO system. In particular the system must, as a minimum, identify to passengers whether SDO will operate and which doors will open, subject to this information being available to the systems on the train at the time the announcement is made.
If the necessary information is not available at the time an announcement is made then the system shall be designed so that a less detailed announcement can be made at that time with a second announcement made once the information becomes available.

N037 The SDO system must provide a means for the driver to manually select a door release pattern so as to allow the doors to be released at platforms where operation of the IEP Trains has not been anticipated or to accommodate failures in the system used to determine the IEP Train^s position.

Sorry the format is a bit hard to read. It's not very logically explained, either - evidently it is calling for an on-board system to deliver precise train position data, from a variety of sources. That may not be inside the SDO system, but a separate functional box in practice.

 The last item does cover the case where this system cannot supply the position, though designing a real system should come up with something better than that says.

[Network SouthEast]

I find it odd that we are arguing over small theoretical differences (der Narzi^mus der kleinen Differenzen) in safety between DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) and conventional operation when both systems are extremely safe.  There is a certain inconsistency in arguing that DOO is unsafe and catching a bus to the station where the bus driver is driving, operating the doors and taking the fares.

If you read my posts carefully,  you'll note I said drivers operating train doors isn't safer.

Comparing train door operation with bus door operation is laughable.

A bus usually has one door (perhaps sometimes two or even three at most). The door is right next to the driver on a bus. The rear door(s) are very close to a bus driver. On modern buses the rear door has a camera showing ONE image on one screen. The consequences of tripping on entering or exiting a bus door are less severe than on a train door. The bus driver can see inside their bus to know if there is anyone taking a longer time to get off. The bus driver has a wider field of vision outside the bus to see who is approaching. The bus might have 90 passengers at a push, the train could have ten times this number.

No, I don't think it is a fair comparison really.

If DOO can save costs (or protect revenue) then do not forget that that in itself will result in lives saved.  A cheaper railway means more passengers and fewer people killed on the roads.  A railway that requires less taxpayer's money means more money to spend elsewhere such as the NHS where increased spending will save a huge number of lives.

If only this were true.

Has any DOO project ever resulted in any of the above? I wish I could think of a scheme where it has. But it hasn't.

I really do dispare to read of comments from people who seem to be perfectly comfortable with the thought of travelling at 125mph with hundreds of others with just ONE safety critical person responsible for their safety. And further more, this safety crtical person has to sit in the most venerable position in the train. Bravo.

[ChrisB]

Is it a fair comparison to compare DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) on TV 165/166s with crewed HSTs^▸ (High Speed Train) for safety purposes & incidents?

I agree with NSE^▸ (Network South East)'s comments above that neither is safer than the other.

Therefore one needs to realise that the RMT^▸ (National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers)'s case over safety is rather oblique & they're simply trying to protect jobs/grading of jobs.

[chrisr_75]

I really do dispare to read of comments from people who seem to be perfectly comfortable with the thought of travelling at 125mph with hundreds of others with just ONE safety critical person responsible for their safety. And further more, this safety crtical person has to sit in the most venerable position in the train. Bravo.

I'm also perfectly happy travelling at around 450mph ground speed, at an altitude at which humans cannot survive, in an aluminium & carbon fibre tube with wings (which is vastly more complex in operation than a train) with only 2 people directly responsible for my safety who occupy a similarly vulnerable position in said cigar shaped flying device because I know adequate systems and training are in place to prevent everyday occurrences & problems causing accidents. You would think that air travel brings a higher risk than travel by train, but it does not.

My point is that it's mainly about ensuring adequate training, procedures & equipment are in place to prevent mishaps.

[Network SouthEast]

That's funny. Last time I flew by plane there was a pilot, co-pilot and six cabin crew. I make that 8 people resonsible for mine and a much smaller number of passenger's safety.

[TaplowGreen]

...........here's a question for those in the know......what is there to stop a train being operated by an "auto pilot" system in the same way as planes?

[grahame]

...........here's a question for those in the know......what is there to stop a train being operated by an "auto pilot" system in the same way as planes?

The Victoria line was opened in 1968 -  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_line

The line has always been operated using automatic train operation, but all trains carry drivers.

The DLR^▸ (Docklands Light Railway) opened from 1987 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Docklands_Light_Railway

The Docklands Light Railway (DLR) is an automated light metro system ... The system uses minimal staffing on trains

[broadgage]

...........here's a question for those in the know......what is there to stop a train being operated by an "auto pilot" system in the same way as planes?

Nothing, given a suitably protected right of way and a purpose designed system.
It works reasonably well on the docklands light railway.

More challenging on the national network though due to the many different types of rolling stock and infrastructure.
What about fallen trees, track workers, and trespassers for example.
And the last minute alteration of stopping patterns due to earlier disruption. I suspect that it be quicker and simpler to tell a driver "run fast to Taunton, and then as booked" than it would be to "tell" a safety critical computer system to do the same.

[PhilWakely]

That's funny. Last time I flew by plane there was a pilot, co-pilot and six cabin crew. I make that 8 people resonsible for mine and a much smaller number of passenger's safety.

Apologies for introducing a little levity into this serious discussion..... The last (but one) time I flew, the airline was obviously using the POO system ('Pilot Only Operation') and, yes, he did appear to be flying by the seat of his pants given the amount of severe turbulence over the Grand Canyon! 

[ChrisB]

What about fallen trees, track workers, and trespassers for example.

The DLR^▸ (Docklands Light Railway) has all those....