Man injured as train hits tractor at level crossing - Thetford, Norfolk, 10 April 2016

[whole diary]

[PhilWakely]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page)

Man injured as train hits tractor at level crossing

                                                                                                Photo courtesy of Alex Youngs
The tractor was hit by the 12:03 service between Norwich and Cambridge

A train has hit a tractor at a level crossing in Norfolk, leaving a man with serious injuries.

British Transport Police said officers were called to the collision at about 12:30 GMT at Roudham, near Thetford.

The driver of the tractor was seriously injured, while four passengers and the train driver were treated for minor injuries, according to Norfolk Police.

There were 135 passengers on board the Abellio train, which was travelling from Norwich to Cambridge.

Norfolk Fire and East of England Ambulance Trust crews are also in attendance.

A spokesman for Abellio Greater Anglia said the train was not derailed in the crash and passengers were waiting for replacement transport.

The road has been closed and train services between Norwich and Cambridge have been suspended.

[JayMac]

Some images from Twitter:




Credits:
@Tom_Smith_95
@alexyoungs

Statement from British Transport Police:

10 Apr 2016 15:06

Train and tractor collide at level crossing - Norwich

Shortly after 12.30pm today Sunday, 10 April 2016 a train collided with a tractor at Hockham Road level crossing, Roudham in Norfolk.

Two men, the train driver and the driver of the tractor, have been taken to Norfolk and Norwich Hospital for treatment. The driver of the tractor has sustained serious, although not life-threatening, injuries. The train driver's injuries are not thought to be serious.

The train - which remained on the tracks - was the 12.03 service between Norwich and Cambridge and had 135 passengers on board.

Three other passengers have been treated at the scene by paramedics. Their injuries are not thought to be serious.

A joint British Transport Police and Rail Accident Investigation Branch investigation is now underway.

[JayMac]

ITV News coverage with more pictures from the scene and a video news report. In that report you can see just how badly damaged the tractor was.

http://www.itv.com/news/anglia/story/2016-04-10/train-carrying-135-passengers-crashes-at-level-crossing/

[ChrisB]

The train isn't in good shape either - no braking system & other damage. From photos of the offside, it looks as though the tractor's trailer wrapped itself around the front of the cab & ran part way down the offside, stoving in windows...

[John R]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have confirmed today that the tractor driver had permission to cross the track.

[JayMac]

Oh dear. Didn't expect this one to be anything other than crossing user error. Timeline will be an important part of the investigation I suspect.

[a-driver]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have confirmed today that the tractor driver had permission to cross the track.

Still a lot of unanswered questions though, for example, how long did it take the farmer to cross after receiving authorisation from the signaller  

[Chris from Nailsea]

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has now released its full report into this incident:

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) has today released its report into a collision between a train and tractor at Hockham Road user worked crossing, Thetford, 10 April 2016.


Image showing damage to train 1K77

Summary

At 12:30 hrs on 10 April 2016 a passenger train travelling from Norwich to Cambridge collided with an agricultural tractor and trailer on a level crossing at Hockham Road, near Thetford in Norfolk. The train was travelling at 87 mph (140 km/h) when, on the approach to the crossing, the train driver saw a tractor moving closer to the railway tracks. The train driver sounded the train’s horn and applied the emergency brake, but could not stop before colliding with the tractor. The train did not derail, but its driving cab was damaged, and the driver and four passengers suffered minor injuries. The tractor was destroyed, and its driver was seriously injured.

The level crossing at Hockham Road is on a restricted byway, and has gates which are operated by crossing users. About one minute before the collision, the tractor driver had obtained permission to cross from a signaller at the Network Rail signal box at Cambridge. The signaller had given him permission to cross when there was insufficient time before the train would arrive at the crossing. This was because the signaller had lost his awareness of the position of the train because his levels of concentration may have lapsed, and his competence to operate the workstation safely and effectively had not been adequately monitored.

A system that had been installed at the level crossing in 2012, intended to display green or red lights to crossing users to warn them whether or not it was safe to cross, was not working at the time of the accident. It had been decommissioned by Network Rail following concerns which the company had about the safety integrity of the system. This had meant that users had to telephone the signaller for permission to cross. The RAIB found that Network Rail had not come to a clear understanding with the manufacturer of the system about how the equipment met the required safety integrity level, and having assessed the risks, had decided to turn off the system while improvements were made.

An underlying factor was that the arrangements in Cambridge signal box for managing fatigue among signalling staff were inadequate.

Recommendations

The RAIB has made three recommendations to Network Rail. The first concerns Network Rail’s approach to managing user worked level crossings, with the intention of either eliminating the need for a signaller to have to decide whether it is safe for a user to cross the railway or providing better information for signallers when making these decisions. The second relates to the processes that Network Rail uses when introducing new signalling equipment whose operating interface differs significantly from existing equipment, and the third covers the management of the competence of signalling shift managers when they also operate signalling equipment.

Simon French, Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents said:
In recent years, the RAIB has become concerned about signaller error as a cause of accidents at level crossings where it is always necessary for vehicle drivers to telephone the signaller for permission to cross (ie user worked crossings with telephones). In addition to our investigation of the collision between a train and tractor at Hockham Road, 2016 saw the opening of two other investigations into dangerous occurrences of this type. In both cases people were given permission to cross the railway with vehicles when trains were too close for this to be done safely.

Communicating with level crossing users will be one of many duties carried out by a signaller. In an environment where signalling control areas are becoming larger, and the number of crossings overseen by an individual signaller may often increase, it is important that the railway industry considers carefully the measures required to control the risk of signaller error leading to collision. Giving permission for users to cross the railway will often require signallers to carefully check the location of trains and estimate the time available for users to cross in safety. Although the reliability of such decisions is likely to be improved if signallers are provided with better information, it would be preferable to see, over the longer term, the progressive removal of crossings where the only form of protection is the telephone.

We are recommending that Network Rail should undertake a review of its measures for the protection of such crossings with the objective of reducing the risk of signaller error.

[grahame]

A reminder that not all level crossing accidents are the crossing user's responsibility, and how dangerous that assumption is early on.  Just because it's usually the user doesn't mean it's always the user.   Whichever it is, lessons should be learned for risk reduction or elimination, and IMHO^▸ (in my humble opinion) that whilst that may mean enhanced safety measures or crossing closure / replacement by a bridge, in some cases there may be no issue, especially where trains are proceeding only at a speed where they can stop short of the crossing, and road / path users can do a visual check just as they do with other road hazards.

[Tim]

Thanks for the update Chris.  It strikes me that whilst relying on a signallers judgement as to how far away the trains are on a low speed lightly used branch line might be appropriate, it does seem to be one of the weak links in crossing safety especially when trains are fast and frequent.

I bet if you asked crossing users a significant number would assume that being given permission to cross (either by phone or a miniature light) meant that the line was protected (ie train drivers were being shown a red aspect) rather than merely receiving an official version of what amounts to no more than "yeh, you've got time to get across" 

Having seen a near miss between a child's buggy and a 158 which was moving really fast at the crossing near Calverton Pumping Station (which I would be reluctant to call "crossing abuse" as opposed to a parent being distracted by difficult children and taking a bit, and only a tiny bit, longer than they ought to have done to cross after looking having not really appreciated just how fast trains move) I'm of the mind that level crossings of any type are not really appropriate where you have line speeds of more than the speed of traffic on a road of the kind which a person would routinely cross and therefore have some experience of.

[ChrisB]

I bet if you asked crossing users a significant number would assume that being given permission to cross (either by phone or a miniature light) meant that the line was protected (ie train drivers were being shown a red aspect) rather than merely receiving an official version of what amounts to no more than "yeh, you've got time to get across" 

If that were the case, I wonder whether they also wonder how the signaller would know that they were clear of the crossing & thus able to release said red aspect?....hmm, not sure about that statement.

[Tim]

I bet if you asked crossing users a significant number would assume that being given permission to cross (either by phone or a miniature light) meant that the line was protected (ie train drivers were being shown a red aspect) rather than merely receiving an official version of what amounts to no more than "yeh, you've got time to get across" 

If that were the case, I wonder whether they also wonder how the signaller would know that they were clear of the crossing & thus able to release said red aspect?....hmm, not sure about that statement.

I suspect most people don't think that hard.  Remember that the daily experience of most people is of roads either as a driver or pedestrian.  Everyone knows that "the little green man" only shows when the traffic is being shown a red signal, and every driver knows that traffic signals at a cross roads don't show a "proceed aspect" to both roads at the same time.  Every pedestrian trying to cross a busy road has an instinctive feeling for how fast a car might approach from around a hidden bend and is experienced in using that information to judge how quickly they need to cross. 

That is the psychological baggage that an occasional railway crossing user brings to the task of getting across the railway.  When the railway does things which the user is not familiar with (ie speeds of 100mph rather than 50 mph) I would say that there is an additional risk.       

[Chris from Nailsea]

Thanks for the update Chris.

Oh, that's what I'm here for - level crossings are my 'special interest', after all! 

When the railway does things which the user is not familiar with (ie speeds of 100mph rather than 50 mph) I would say that there is an additional risk.  

I think that is exactly what the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) (and indeed the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about)) are concerned about - hence their combined preference for removing level crossings, wherever practicable.

[JayMac]

This crossing had had mini red and green lights fitted, but they had been temporarily disabled by Network Rail because of 'safety integrity' concerns.

Had these lights been functioning, and interlocked with signalling, it's possible this would have lessened the chance of the signaller making the grave error he did.

[Tim]

This crossing had had mini red and green lights fitted, but they had been temporarily disabled by Network Rail because of 'safety integrity' concerns.

Had these lights been functioning, and interlocked with signalling, it's possible this would have lessened the chance of the signaller making the grave error he did.

I might be wrong, but I think that the "safety integrity" concerns may have been that they were not interlocked with the signalling.